

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND  
HISTORIAN  
U.S. Army Chemical School  
Fort McClellan, Alabama**

13 October 1997

**MEMORANDUM FOR MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE**

**SUBJECT: Material for Staff Rides**

1. The material is divided into two groups -- one group is made up of documents of varying types used for either staff rides or battle analysis. The battle analysis for various battles is used as a help for staff rides. The Chemical School uses two Civil War Battles -- The Battle of Chickamauga and The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. I have also begun preparing for a new staff ride to Pickett's Mill (Battle in the Atlanta Campaign). Most of these documents are contained in the accompanying disk labeled "documents".
2. The second group are made up of slides used for Staff Rides and Battle Analysis classes.
3. All of the information contained in these documents and slides are government material, and you can use them any way you want. I have enclosed a disk [labeled "slides"] with most of the slides you see in hard copy enclosed.
4. I hope that these slides are of some use to you. If not, simply place in the nearest round file. If you need further information, please contact me at DSN 865-5722 or FTS (205) 848-5722.

Encl

  
**BURTON WRIGHT III, Ph.D**  
Command Historian

# **BRIEFING PAPER**

## **THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN**

### **Operational Initiatives**

As the summer of 1864 approached, President Lincoln and his generals could feel somewhat secure. In the East, General Lee and his Army had been turned back at Gettysburg. They were no longer a real threat to attack the North. The Army of the Potomac had, at last, found a steady commander in the person of George Meade.

In the West, after the terrible defeat at Chickamauga, the North had rebounded under the leadership of U.S. Grant. He and his operating partner, William T. Sherman had orchestrated the Battle of Chattanooga and defeated the Army of the Tennessee and sent it reeling back to Dalton behind Missionary Ridge. Grant, now the commander of the theater, brought reinforcements in to Chattanooga, and the Army of the Cumberland -- reduced to 60,000 -- had two armies with it. The Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio. All told, Grant and Sherman would have more than 100,000 Union troops to oppose the new Confederate Commander, General Joseph E. Johnston.

Lincoln had finally found a General to his liking. One who had the ability to lead all the armies of the Union in the final offensive against the South. The last part of the Anaconda Plan (a simultaneous advance by multiple armies into the South) was about to take place. The President called Grant to Washington to give him the power to lead the armies -- the rank of Lieutenant General. A post last held by George Washington.

Grant and his president saw eye to eye on what must be done. Grant would plan and execute the movement of a number of Union armies into the heart of the Confederacy. Grant, himself, would

accompany the Army of the Potomac against Lee. Major General Benjamin F. Butler commanded the Army of the James which would threaten Richmond from another direction. Another Union Army under Major General Franz Siegel would move through the Shenandoah Valley towards Richmond. Another Army under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks would move up the Red River from New Orleans into the western Confederacy. Smaller landings would take place so as to control or negate any of the remaining Confederate ports left to blockade runners. The only major Union Army left was that in the West.

We he left for the east, Grant had willingly left the Western Theater in the capable hands of William T. Sherman. His was the job to destroy the Army of the Tennessee and take Atlanta which was Sherman's direct strategically objective.

As Grant was doing in Washington, Sherman was planning for his own campaign. He made some important determinations:

- a. The first objective which took precedence was the Army of the Tennessee. It had to be neutralized, and then Atlanta would fall.
- b. Sherman had to plan for and to be conscious of the ability of the Southern Army to send cavalry to his rear and destroy his logistical system to support his huge army. The commander in the west spent a great deal of time on this one issue. First, he developed a special regiment of engineers whose sole purpose was to keep the railway intact and to speedily rebuild any destruction by Southern cavalry. Secondly, he was willing to detach parts of his army -- actually, his strength was more than 150,000, but nearly 40,000 troops would be kept along the line of supply to secure

**its most important elements from attack -- to protect his supplies. Thirdly, he had created a special army under Major General Sturgis to do nothing but follow and destroy General Nathan Bedford Forrest. He above all the Confederate cavalry leaders Sherman feared the most.**

**The Union Army and its commander had to consider the terrain through which they had to march to Atlanta in their plans. The terrain was heavily wooded and contained many hill masses that could be used by the Confederates as defensive positions. The area was also devoid of farming so that the Union Army would not be able to live off the land -- hence, Sherman's near paranoia about his supply line.**

**Sherman had a right to be concerned. Although a competent General, Joseph Eggleston Johnson was almost too careful. He was a superb defensive general, but not much on the offensive. He would only do so when things were so in his favor as to make the operation risk free.**

**The campaign began on 4 May, 1864 with the Union Army moving out of Chattanooga toward positions on Pigeon Mountain held by Johnston's Army. Sherman attempted to develop a situation that would allow him to pin the Confederates near Buzzard's Roost and then slip a small part of his forces South to block Johnston and catch the Confederates in between.**

**General James Birdseye McPherson, Commander of the 25,000 man Army of the Tennessee got the critical assignment. He was to move through Snake Creek Gap and put his army in the path of the Confederates so as to catch them between two Union forces. However, dismounted cavalry and one brigade made McPherson so nervous that he retreated to the upper end of the Gap and remained**

there until Sherman came up. "Cump" was very unhappy, and took over direct supervision of McPherson's Army even though he still liked his subordinate.

Sherman again tried to trap and force the Confederates to fight at Resaca and in a two day battle, inflicted some casualties on the Confederates but did not shake them. Johnston retreated further south.

The Confederate plan was simple. Johnston did not want to risk a major battle in which his army could be defeated and what remained of Southern industry laid open to Union destruction.

Over the next few weeks, the action was always the same. Sherman would approach Johnston's prepared positions and use the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee to hold the Confederates and the Army of the Ohio under Major General Schofield to flank the Confederates out of their positions.

By late May 1864, Johnson had retreated all the way back to Dallas, Georgia, and had set up a line based on New Hope Church. This time, General Sherman directed General Oliver O. Howard and his IV Corps to move to the left and gain the right flank of the Confederate Army and flank them. This he proceeded to do.

As Howard felt for the Union Flank, he alerted Johnston, and he moved the division of Patrick R. Cleburne to the threatened flank with orders to hold. Apparently, General Howard did not know the true nature of the Confederate line, and he turned to begin his flanking movement too early, and right into the position prepared by General Cleburne. The Battle of Pickett's Mill then commenced on 27 May 1864.

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND  
HISTORIAN**

**U.S. Army Chemical School  
Fort McClellan, Alabama**

**18 September 1997**

**SUBJECT: Atlanta Campaign and Pickett's Mill**

**1. One of the most important parts of a staff ride is to relate what happens in a historical battle to the modern day. When considering Pickett's Mill, ask yourself the following questions:**

- a. Was the battle necessary?**
- b. Was the terrain favorable to an offensive operation?**
- c. What acts did General Cleburne take to maximize his position?**
- d. What principles of war were violated in this battle?**
- e. What part does Pickett's Mill play in the overall Atlanta Campaign -- i.e., its effect on the campaign?**
- f. How could General Howard have executed his attack better?**
- g. What made the Confederate defense at Pickett's Mill a successful one?**

**2. These and other questions may be asked of you during the Staff Ride.**

**3. Don't forget to compare and contrast the commanders in the battle in the following ways:**

- Education**
- Previous battle experience**
- Relationship with subordinate and superior commanders**

- **Part played in the battle -- main effort or secondary effort**
- **Health and mental attitude**

**4. Study the terrain from the point of view of military use. Could the Union have picked better terrain -- this is most important when actually on the real ground. Pay attention to terrain as to where you might find defense better and offense better.**

**BURTON WRIGHT III, Ph.D  
Command Historian**

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND  
HISTORIAN  
U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL  
Fort McCellan, Alabama**

21 August 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR COBC 6-97

**SUBJECT: PERSONALITY BRIEFINGS FOR KENNSAW STAFF RIDE**

1. To give a proper personality briefing, you need to know the following:
  - a. A briefing packet on all major personalities of the Kennesaw Battle can be signed out from Fisher Library to enable you to study for your briefing. The information contained in these packets varies widely depending on the personality. For example, there is a great deal on General Sherman and General Johnston, but very little on BG Kimball or BG Newton. Much of the information on these individuals comes from a book by an author named Warner and entitled GENERALS IN BLUE. This is also a Southern version entitled GENERAL IS GRAY. If you want more information, see me and I'll point you in the right direction for further information.
  - b. Once you have done that, you are ready to create your briefing. The briefing is composed of the following parts:
    - ♦ Birth and Early Life
    - ♦ Education
    - ♦ life until beginning of Civil War
    - ♦ Actions during the Civil War and at Kennesaw Mountain
    - ♦ Actions after the battle
    - ♦ What happened to the officer in the years after the end of the Civil War
  - c. I recommend you prepare the following prior to your briefing:

Note cards for your presentation

Practice the briefing for time and content

Use this as a bench mark:

Sherman - up to 10 minutes or more

Newton - less than 5 minutes

**Some soldiers on both sides did not do much before, during and after the war, and you cannot manufacture what is not there. Use what5 information you have to the fullest. If you can do it and do it well in under 5 minutes, by all mean do so. But Sherman or someone of his caliber takes LONGER than five minutes. Don't forget to draw lessons from the actions of your personality. What did that individual do that was good and that was bad.**

- 2. Why we do this: The reason is simple. One of the most important is that as officers, you will be judged to a considerable degree on how you brief. If you are a good briefer that can go far. You are not "born" as a briefer; one develops the ability to do so over much practice. Here is a chance for you to sharpen your ability at no real expense to your OER.**
- 3. When giving the briefing, you can do the following:**
  - c. Put on a costume and act as your personality would have**
  - d. Do a straight briefing where you introduce yourself, and then explain who your personality, tell the audience how your briefing will be conducted, and then proceed to do it, and then sum up with lessons learned.**
  - e. Do a personality similar to "a" above but without the costume**
- 4. If you have any further questions, please ask.**

**BURTON WRIGHT III, Ph.D  
Command Historian**

**CLASS SIZE: 32      COBC 6-97**

**KENNESAW MOUNTAIN STAFF RIDE**

**UNION**

**GENERAL SHERMAN** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL SCHOFIELD** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL MCPHERSON** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL THOMAS** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL LOGAN** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL GILES SMITH** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL MORGAN SMITH** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL HARKER** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL KIMBALL** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL NEWTON** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL JEFFERSON DAVIS** \_\_\_\_\_

**COLONEL DAN MCCOOK** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON**

**ELLIOTT** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL KENNER GARRARD**

\_\_\_\_\_

**CONFEDERATES**

**GENERAL JOHNSTON** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL LORING** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL FRENCH** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL CLEBURNE** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL CHEATHAM** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL HARDEE** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL WHEELER** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL HOOD** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL MANEY** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL JACKSON** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL ALEXANDER P. STEWART** \_\_\_\_\_

**GENERAL COCKRILL** \_\_\_\_\_

## **MILITARY SUBJECTS**

**CIVIL WAR INTELLIGENCE** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR CAVALRY** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR FORTIFICATIONS** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR MEDICINE** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR LOGISTICS** \_\_\_\_\_

**CIVIL WAR TRANSPORTATION** \_\_\_\_\_

**\*Highlighted Names will be briefed at Fort McClellan**

**BRIEFINGS AND LOCATIONS AT  
KENNESAW MOUNTAIN  
BATTLEFIELD**

**VISITORS CENTER**

CIVIL WAR CAVALRY  
CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY  
MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN  
GENERAL JOHNSTON

**ON TOP OF BIG KENNESAW**

MAJOR GENERAL SCHOEFIELD  
MAJOR GENERAL MCPHERSON  
MAJOR GENERAL LORING  
MAJOR GENERAL FRENCH

**ON TOP OF LITTLE KENNESAW**

CIVIL WAR ARTILLERY

**AT THE BASE OF LITTLE KENNESAW**

BG MORGAN SMITH  
BG GILES SMITH  
MAJ GENERAL LOGAN

**AT THE TOP OF PIGEON HILL**

CIVIL WAR FORTIFICATIONS  
BG JACKSON  
BG COCKRILL

**AT THE TEXAS MONUMENT ON  
CHEATHAM HILL**

**LT. GEN. HARDEE**  
**MAJ. GENERAL CLEBURNE**  
**BG NATHAN KIMBALL**  
**BG JOHN NEWTON**  
**BG CHARLES HARKER**  
**MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS**

**AT THE DEAD ANGLE (MANEY'S BDE  
FORTIFICATIONS)**

**BG JEFFERSON DAVIS**  
**COL DAN MCCOOK**  
**MAJ. GENERAL CHEATHAM**  
**BG MANEY**

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND HISTORIAN  
U.S. Army Chemical School  
Fort McClellan, Alabama**

**12 December 1996**

**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: Why Study Kennesaw Mountain**

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On the face of it, the Battle of Kennesaw was a relatively small battle. It settled nothing, and did not develop any new tactical or strategical ground. Yet, the battle is worthy of study for what it says as well as what it doesn't say. For example:

**The Character and Intelligence of William T. Sherman:** Considered by many historians to be one of the best generals produced by the war, Kennesaw seems to be an anomaly – that is, a mistake that Sherman made that was not replicated. That's correct. Sherman ordered only two mass assaults in his tenure in command of the Western theater – in 1863 at Chickasaw Bluffs and this one in 1864. Unlike Grant who order a number of bloody assaults – i.e., Cold Harbor, North Ana, Vicksburg – Sherman seemed to be willing to spare the lives of his soldiers. Why then did he order the attack. Historians cannot be precise because Sherman's own memoirs do not mention this attack. He left no writing that I know of where he mentions his rationale for having done it. Therefore, we can only speculate on why he did so. First, he was in a military dilemma – if you read the telegrams between Sherman and Grant, you could get the impression that Grant was in the worse situation – he had been fighting Lee for weeks, and had not made any significant headway and suffered thousands of casualties for nothing. Grant was being pressured by the administration – i.e., Abraham Lincoln and

Secretary of War Stanton – for something spectacular. That pressure was also being applied to Sherman. Try as he might, Sherman could not get General Joe Johnston to hold still long enough to plan and execute a formal attack with any expectation of victory. True, the Army was not almost within sight of Atlanta, but without any significant victories. General Sherman now had an opportunity to attack Johnston along the Kennesaw Line. Evidently, Sherman believed that he had an opportunity to break the line. His army was still far larger than Johnston's, and whatever he lost could be replaced. Unlike Grant, Sherman was not then applying an attrition strategy. In order to understand Sherman's point of view, you must think like him. Consider the battlefield as you know it. Obviously, there was no chance to carry Little and Big Kennesaw. They were just too big and too well fortified. There was, of course, a way around either flank, but that would simply force Johnston back to a new line across the Chattahoochee River. Johnston could not be strong everywhere. Even though there had been few instances in the war where infantry hard carried entrenchments, there might be a chance if the center could be weakened enough to punch a hole and then funnel in reinforcements and break Johnston's army. If you look at the battlefield, only the area between Cheatham Hill and Kennesaw looked promising. Sherman directed that the attack be made, but then left it to his subordinates WHERE they struck the Confederate Line. Remember, the confederate line was not always visible as they had not cut down trees enough to give the Union a full view of their entrenchments, so how many and what type of fortifications were present could not be answered except by a probing attack. Sherman viewed timing and surprise as important. If his diversionary attacks could be carried off -- the synchronization had to be precise -- and

**“spook” Johnston enough the weaken his center to reinforce, then the attacks had to be driven home quickly before those soldiers could be brought back. Everything depended on the strength and ferocity of the divisions to interest Johnston enough to reinforce. This was not done, and Johnston was not fooled. Not one Confederate soldier moved. Analysis of the records does not indicate if Sherman KNEW his tactics were working. The two guns fired just before the attack by the Army of the Cumberland lost them the element of surprise. When the dense columns of Union infantry appeared out of the forest and into plain sight, the Confederates were ready for them. One suspects that the repulse of the main attacks in the center did not dissuade, initially, the Union commander from considering further attacks. He was not physically present at Cheatham Hill, so he could not see the execution wrought by the Confederates on his assaulting columns. General Thomas, the commander of the army of the Cumberland, who was much closer to the action, advised Sherman that another attack might use up the army. Coming from a general who Sherman believed to be good, that had to shake his view of continuing the attacks. Technically, had the Union been willing to spend lives freely, they COULD have broken the line, but the cost would have been prohibitive, and might have weakened the Union forces to a point where there might have existed a temporary parity between Johnston’s forces and Sherman. On the face of it, Sherman’s attack was a mistake, but one must be there, at that time, and have to make that type of a decision to really understand the Union commander. How and why a commander does something is as important as the outcome of the battle itself. Knowing what was in Sherman’s head at the time enables you, as potential future commanders, to know how decisions are made -- how right**

decisions are made, and wrong decisions are made. The fact that Sherman did not confront the issue of this attack in his memoirs and did not deal with the fact he was derelict in security at Shiloh tell something about how Sherman wanted to be remembered by history. Both were terrible mistakes, yet Sherman chose to ignore them in hopes they would go away. History doesn't work like that, and they were remembered. But, Sherman did not provide us with what was in his mind at the time which makes any reasonable appraisal of his conduct there to rest upon interpretations of those who took his orders and executed them.

An Understanding of Terrain: Part and parcel to the development of an officer – a commander – is to teach that individual an understanding of and importance of terrain. Even though the military now possesses weapons that to a degree negate the importance of terrain (i.e., the helicopter, smart bombs), terrain remains an important impediment or a channel to victory for the side that uses terrain in the best way. Clearly, General Johnston understood the importance of terrain. His use of the mass of Kennesaw as the anchor of his line was a well thought out act, and uses terrain well. In fact, if you look at all the position occupied by Johnston during the campaign, all were well sited, and could not be taken by direct assault. Johnston's army was not strong enough to protect its flanks, and Sherman easily turned them and forced Johnston to give up his position and fall back. The problem is that Johnston's strategy was based on passivity – that is, he expected Sherman to attack him, and when Sherman moved part of his army beyond the Confederate flanks, then Johnston had to give up and moved back to a new defensive position – the position was being laid out and prepared even as the confederates occupied the line in front of it. Certainly Johnston obviously expected to move back to the

new position, so he was, in effect, thinking area. But THAT'S THE PROBLEM. All he could think about was defense. He never used terrain in an offensive way to either mask an attack or as a flank protector in preparing one. Terrain can be used that way, but Johnston, with a rich diversity of terrain to choose from, did nothing inventive with what the countryside offered him. That's why studying how the defense was conducted here and throughout the Atlanta campaign is a necessary exercise. No defense need be conducted so passively. Johnston was waiting for an opening, but Sherman did not provide him with such, and Johnston would not take a calculated risk to create one. Terrain can play a very important role in combat if you study the idea of Liddel-Hart called the "indirect approach". In a sense, the English tactical expert saw a link between terrain and maneuver. Using both, there was always a way to approach the operational objective without a direct march - hence, the term "indirect". Since this had not yet been invented, Sherman could have used it, but did not because the civil war, tactically speaking, was far more direct. The only DECISIVE RESULTS that could be obtained were by direct assault. Using maneuver to win was really passé then, but should not be now given the ways that the modern soldier is learning to break friction with the ground.

The Use of a Reconnaissance Element: Most of the time in the Civil War, Cavalry was used badly by commanders of both armies. That was the situation during the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman did not understand what his cavalry could do for him if aggressively handled. Although Sheridan badly mishandled the Union cavalry during the Wilderness Campaign, it was not because he was too passive. His subordinate commanders, particularly of his cavalry, also had no appreciation of what cavalry, well directed, could do.

For example, the weakest part of the defensive line at Kennesaw was the right flank which was held by dismounted elements of Wheeler's cavalry and if the Union cavalry had probed it, they could have easily turned the flank without the heavy losses sustained by the direct attacks at Kennesaw. The operational objective of Sherman's attack was aimed not only at splitting the Confederates, but also to reach the railroad line behind the Confederate lines.

Why Sherman felt it necessary to reach there seems to be a mystery. While the Confederates were using it to move supplies to support the army at Kennesaw, holding it would only force the Confederates to retreat, and nothing more. It was not that important an objective. Sherman made no plans beyond breaking the line and holding the railroad. He planned no battle of annihilation or any tactics to force the Confederate army into a single position of giving battle on his [Sherman's terms]. Cavalry could do some very important tactical and strategic things, but Sherman used the cavalry only in a narrow spectrum of operations. It is, also, doubtful that any of the cavalry commander in his army was capable of any but the type of operations Sherman required them to perform - i.e., no Bedford Forrest, James H. Wilson, J.E. B. Stuart, or Phil Sheridan here.

Conclusion: This battle is as useful to a fuller understanding of war as a detailed study of the Battle of Normandy, 73 Easting, or Market-Garden. The only difference is speed - how fast a unit can enter, leave action, or maneuver. As you study battles more and more, you will begin to see patterns of behavior. In other words, what follows a tactical action is the same in many instances - so much so that it is almost like night follows day. That understanding can allow you as a senior commander to make the right call to prepare for it, or at least understand that it is coming. Remember,

**do not become a commander of habit, but also recognize that the opposition can occasionally change their habits.**

**Burton Wright III, Ph.D**  
**Command Historian**

## CONFEDERATE STRATEGY IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

The South followed two separate strategies during the Atlanta campaign. Although President Davis took considerable time to micromanage strategy, he allowed his commanders like Lee and Johnson to determine what they did on their fronts without that much interference. With regard to Johnson on the Atlanta front, Davis was continually kept up to date on what the Army of the Tennessee was doing. To simplify the situation, Johnson adopted a strategy of an “army in being.” He did not believe that he had enough force to seek a single and decisive battle with Johnson; rather, he decided on a mostly defensive strategy of occupying fortified lines and inviting Sherman to attack him. In the meantime, he would look for an opening where Sherman might leave a smaller part of his army exposed, and Johnson could bring greater power to bear and wipe it out. This did not happen as Sherman learned something from Shiloh. He never allowed his various parts of the army to be very far away from each other. For the most part (except, Kennesaw), Sherman did not take the bait, and merely moved around and forced Johnson back to occupy successive lines that moved closer and closer to Atlanta.

This, of course, disturbed Davis, but Johnson kept writing him reports and promising him to attack, but he never did. It is hard to determine if Johnson was really lying to the President in saying that he would take the offensive. Bragg, for all his faults, was oriented to the offense. With the exception of General Thomas for the Union, no General had a better grasp of the use of defense when coupled with terrain as Johnson did. Sherman knew that Johnson was a very careful commander, and did not take gambles (as Hood would later do). Johnson would not attack unless everything was perfect which, of course, it never was.

Local politicians and other members of the government began to bombard Davis with memos asking what was up. How could his situation be allowed to continue as Sherman made his inevitable way toward Atlanta, and if the city fell, the fortunes of the south, however low they might be burning, would flame out altogether. The President tempered for a time to give Johnson maximum time to switch over to the offensive. But, his patience was running thin – it must be remembered that Davis and Johnson were enemies; so much so that when the Confederate President came out to see Johnson near Etowah, Georgia, as the President entered the command tent, Johnson left from the other side so as not to meet with him.

As the two armies moved closer to Atlanta, President Davis was also receiving chatty letters from one of the corps commanders, Lt. Gen. John B. Hood. In this, he was being duped by

Hood who wrote in his letters disparaging remarks about Johnston and disguised them so as not to be openly accused of “backbiting”. He also mentioned that he would be far more aggressive than Johnson were he in command. Eventually, these letters had an effect, and as the two armies closed into the suburbs of Atlanta, Davis decided to make a change. He relieved Johnson and placed Hood in command. This ushered in a very short, very aggressive era in Confederate strategy in the West.

Hood immediately moved to the attack, and initiated three battles in and around Atlanta – Peachtree Creek, Ezra Church, and the Battle of Atlanta. In all three battles the South losses equaled or exceeded those of the Federals. In three engagements, Hood had frittered away nearly 30% of his army without causing Sherman any discomfort. While the strategy of initiating the battles was good and well planned in one sense, the attacks were not executed properly and there was a distinct lack of synchronization. The Confederate forces hit the Union lines piecemeal and in several instances, tipped their hand early and allowed the federals to make more than adequate preparations. In all three cases, the Confederates switched and did what the Union had often done – human wave attacks against fortified areas.

What Hood had done was to reduce his army to such a point that it was no longer (even at 45,000 men) a real threat to Sherman, and the Union general could now consider taking Atlanta and completing his own strategy of moving to the sea. Hood had two choices – he could abandon Atlanta and move away so that Sherman would follow or accept a siege within Atlanta and hold on. He chose the former, and handed the Lincoln administration a important victory which brightened their then waning re-election hopes. The Confederate general strategy of attempting to influence the Union’s vote and elect McClellan was a complete failure.

Hood was just not up to the leadership level of army command, and his staff as well. Much of the problems for the lack of synchronization of Hood’s three attacks can be laid directly at his door – he wanted too much from the army, and his subordinate commanders, used to the more feline strategy of Johnston, did not make the psychological transition to the more frantic pace of offensive warfare. With the loss of Atlanta, and the beginning of Sherman’s march to the sea, the last days of the Confederacy were in sight because Lee’s army, still resisting at Petersburg, received what little food and support it had from the Atlanta area. That was now gone, and Grant, in tandem with Sherman, began elongating his lines until he turned Lee’s flank, and put his troops astride the sole rail line with Atlanta. Lee had no choice but to move out of Petersburg and move further into the Carolinas in hopes of combining his small Army of Northern Virginia with that of

Joe Johnson – yes, Davis brought him back to attempt to stop Sherman’s march to the sea, but given the smaller numbers at Johnson’s disposal, he could not do much as Sherman had 60,000 hard bitten, veteran troops without a sou of remorse in their devastation of the countryside between Atlanta and Savannah which was the remaining “breadbasket” of the South [the other, the Shenandoah Valley was in the process of being destroyed by the Army of General Phil Sheridan]. End of Game. The Confederate strategy in the West had been a complete and utter failure.

Burton Wright III, Ph.D  
Command Historian

## PRINCIPLES OF WAR: BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN

### 1. MASS

UNION: At the time of the battle, General Sherman has almost double the number of personnel that General Johnson. According to the tactics of the day, the only way a line, especially a fortified one, could be penetrated was to overwhelm one point of the line by sheer force of numbers. But, up to this battle, such attempts to do so were never very successful. Along the line held by the Confederates at Kennesaw, the Union achieves nowhere near the five to one superior to have a hope of breaking the line. Therefore, Sherman has not properly employed the principle of mass.

CONFEDERATES: Johnson's dispositions were as a result of two factors -- the lay of the geographical land, and the strategical necessity of protecting the nearby railroad lines. By using fortifications to their best, Johnson, has, in effect, massed where the needs to be. Big Kennesaw and Little Kennesaw are not directly attackable. His best units and commanders are south -- Cleburne and Cheatham along with Hood's Corps. Only on the right flank, largely defended by Wheeler's cavalry is Johnson weak.

CONFEDERATES win this one.

### 2. SURPRISE

UNION: Since the Union forces have been in the area for a few days prior to the attack, the element of surprise is, in effect, lost. However, the Union attacks are not simultaneous, and when two signal guns are fired to indicate the attack of Davis' division, this alerts the Confederates, and they fully man their trenches. Also, the Union forces attempt to fool the confederates by a heavy artillery barrage against Big Kennesaw and Little Kennesaw does not force the Confederates to reinforce. they can read the effects of terrain as well as the Union. No more troops needed.

CONFEDERATES: Since they are the defenders, surprise technically doesn't benefit them, but it does. Notice that the Confederate earthworks are blended into the terrain, and the Union attackers do not know exactly where the trace of the Confederate lines are. That benefits the defenders

UNION blows this one. The Union plans are crude by today's standards. Poor use of deceptions -- for example, study Rosecrans use of troop movements to force General Bragg out of Tullahoma without a major battle; it was one of the most brilliant campaigns of maneuver in the Civil War.

### 3. ECONOMY OF FORCE

UNION: Even the side with the most men must consider this. For Sherman, this is a nonstarter. His general operational pattern has been to push the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee up to the Confederates as a holding force, and then use the Army of the Ohio -- actually a small corps of 14,000 plus the cavalry -- for flanking. This actions has, in the past, forced the confederates to retreat.

CONFEDERATES: Means more to them, and Johnson has made maximum advantage of this. His positions are adequately manned, but even more so in areas that Johnson considers to be weak and more open to attack. His dispositions are good, and he takes maximum advantage of the terrain to enhance his numbers.

#### 4. OBJECTIVE

UNION: What was the objective of Sherman's Army -- Johnson's forces or Richmond, or to force its way as deeply into the Confederacy as it could and to cause as much damage? Both Grant and Sherman had an understanding of total war, and that in order to mortally hurt the Confederacy, it would be necessary to move in and destroy its industrial infrastructure -- also, by inference, make war on the civilians. How does the attack at Kennesaw support the objective? At the strategic level, it doesn't. What then was the tactical objective of the attack -- as Sherman envisioned it, he would, by deception, obtain from the Confederates a favorable lineup for breaking the enemy front and splitting up the Confederate Army. Sherman had an objective, but he was over optimistic as to breaking the Confederate lines.

CONFEDERATE: The strategical and tactical objective were the same -- stop or hold the Union Army stationary. That simple!

Nod to the Confederates here. They achieved their objective during the battle, but because of flanking movement which was ongoing during the attacks, the Union succeeded in forcing them out of their nearly impregnable position.

#### 5. UNITY OF COMMAND

UNION: No problem here. The chain of command was followed throughout. Sherman was in charge, and allowed his commanders maximum flexibility to achieve their objectives. It was Thomas who personally picked the areas of the Confederate front his units attacked. There were not the same problems that occurred in the East where General Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac, but Grant accompanied it in the field, and gave orders directly to major unit commanders without always going through Meade. Had Meade's personality not been what it was, the situation could have reached a critical point.

CONFEDERATES: No problem here. Johnson was reasonably well liked by his subordinates -- except Hood -- and they were not in the mood to contravene his orders as they had been with Bragg.

No real advantage to either side.

#### 6. SIMPLICITY

UNION: The whole point of this principle is that the concept of the operation is kept at a level where it understood and executed. It is obvious that a majority of those who had to execute the attack did not believe that it could be done. Sherman had, himself, seen the apparent depth and strength of the Confederate positions. His MEMOIRS mention the battle sparingly, so one could conclude from that he did not feel it was one of his better orders. In fact, he would later characterize it as a mistake, and one which he would not commit during the rest of the campaign.

He did not craft an order that was unduly complicated, but he wanted his troops to strike the Confederate lines at generally the same time to freeze any reinforcements, and he had considerable strength in reserve to throw into any breakthrough.

CONFEDERATE: They, too, planned on a very simple level. Just engage the troops on your front and hold. What could be simpler. Johnson was worried about his very weak right flank, but Sherman preferred a direct approach.

## THE IDEA OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

There has been a tendency among politicians at the time and historians later, to find fault with the way that Joseph E. Johnston conducted the campaign. Defensive warfare is something that is foreign to the U.S. Army.

But, consider this:

- a. Sherman controlled an army twice the size of Johnston's. How do you fight an enemy who heavily outnumbers you?
- b. Davis was putting pressure on Johnston to accept battle with Sherman, defeat him, and begin an attack on the North. Had not the great Robert E. Lee not fought larger Union armies and defeated them?
- c. Johnston had a choice, but it required that Sherman come far deeper into Georgia. The longer and longer the supply lines stretched, the more vulnerable they became. Neither side could live off the land and both major commanders knew that, so Sherman made keeping his supply lines running a major priority. Johnston had cavalry, but neither side used them very effectively -- Sherman was far worse in this department. But, in order to do major damage, Johnston needed a sustained operation by his cavalry against the Union supply lines. Sherman was terrified of Forrest, but the Confederates could not orchestrate that type of operation.

Jefferson Davis could not help using Robert E. Lee as a prototype. He was an excellent subordinate -- he handled things on his front, wrote the President every day, did not engage in partisan political maneuvering, did not desire higher authority, and loyally supported Davis when asked. Yet, Davis was unfair to Johnston in this respect. Lee's army was roughly the same size as Johnston's vis-à-vis the Union forces. Lee's tactics were identical with what Johnston was using -- entrenchments, flanking movements. The only difference, and Davis could identify it, was that Lee was only looking for a chance to counter-attack. His actions at the Battle of the Wilderness in early May clearly showed he was looking for an opening, but after that battle, he did not possess the strength to make his active defense work. He used the tangled growth of the Wilderness to magnify his numbers and to inflict greater losses on the Union -- in fact, he did, on balance, cause higher casualties, but the end result for both commanders was the same -- the Union continued to inexorably move forward, and the South backward. Lee knew that if Grant managed to get to

Petersburg-Richmond area, it was all over. Defeat was inevitable. On more than one occasion, Lee's army faced defeat -- i.e., the Mule Shoe, and the "Bloody Angle", and earlier in the Wilderness, but because of some real "luck" and hard fighting, the Confederates avoided disaster. At no time in Johnston's time in command did the Confederate Army face a similar situation.

But David had no patience with a "careful" defensive commander. It went against his normally aggressive nature, and besides, he had a number of powerful politicians who were very angry that he had allowed Johnston to give up so much territory. Davis was also in communication with General Hood who promised that he would be far more aggressive than Johnston. When the change was made, General Hood attacked three times (Battle of Atlanta, Battle of Ezra Church, and Battle of Peachtree Creek) and suffered more casualties in those three battles than the army had lost in the campaign up to that time.

When your army is heavily outnumbered, you have only one choice -- accept a defensive strategy that makes maximum use of terrain, and attack ONLY when the conditions are very, very favorable. In the end, it might have worked except for one thing. The Union commanders facing Johnston were not the series of incompetents that had earlier faced Lee and contributed much to his reputation. All the Union commanders from Sherman on down were competent and the major subordinates were as well. Most battles won when outnumbered, historically speaking, have been against less competent commanders. Napoleon, Caesar, Tamerlane, Genghis Khan were never defeated when they had the superior numbers.

What might have beens is one of the biggest wastes of time in history, but here, the time wasted will not be much. Based on his actions when placed in command of the Army, General Hood would have, quite probably, done the same things if he had been in charge from the start. He believed in the same strategy advocated from the start by Davis. This would have, of course, played right into the hands of Sherman. He would have preferred a stright up battle where his superior numbers would probably have prevailed. If the Confederate Army of the Tennessee would have been shattered in one battle, the way to Atlanta and into the deep south would have been all but open. The South did not have the resources and manpower to raise another major army [in 1814, Napoleon lost the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig, and with it, the Army that had been raised. The

Allies, who suffered more casualties in the battle, still had nearly 500,000 troops, and France could raise no more soldiers. Napoleon was forced from power and to exile on Elba].

The war would probably have been over far earlier because Sherman could have marched to Atlanta, and then up into the Carolinas as he was to do and attack Lee from the South. His Army and Grant's would have been when combined three to four times the number of soldiers Lee had left. A continuation of the war was futile.

What Johnston had in mind was not a new principle but one that was appropriate to the time -- an army in being. As long as he could keep his army going, the Federals were obliged to continue to follow it -- that is, as long as it had the strength to merit attention. When Hood threw his army at Sherman at Atlanta, Sherman quickly realized that once he had taken the city, he forced Hood into one strategy. That strategy was to follow him [Sherman]. Hood, however, chose not to do that, but to move north toward the Federal supply lines. Sherman then developed a new strategy of his own. The closest method of supply next to his rail lines to the north was the sea. So, Sherman then telegraphed the Union high command to have supplies waiting off the Georgia coast, and he pared his army down to its 60,000 toughest, and marched through Georgia. Why, because he knew two things -- Hood's army was not there to oppose him. In fact, there were no appreciable Confederate forces to the east, and, he could live off the land on his march to the sea because he was going through the untouched "breadbasket" of the south -- next to the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. Hood's rash move north to attempt to force Sherman to follow him opened up the last hope of the South. Johnston would never have been that impetuous.

He would have kept his army in touch with Sherman, and waiting for a chance.

The election of 1864 was then ongoing in the North. Lincoln was not a "shoo-in" for re-election. McClellan, the Democratic candidate, had made no secret that if he were elected he would suspend the war and opened communication with the Richmond government. There is no doubt that the North was becoming war weary, and the taking of Atlanta, made easier the continuing burden of the war. Lincoln desperately needed a major victory -- the fall of Atlanta certainly qualified -- to help win him the election. And it did. What if [those horrible words again] General Johnston could have held on to Atlanta a bit longer. Would Lincoln have been re-elected?

Maybe yes, but one this is for sure, it would have been much closer then it was in reality.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: The Atlanta Campaign in  
Perspective**

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The Atlanta Campaign grew out of a series of conferences between Grant and Sherman after the victory at Chattanooga. Because of this victory as well as his earlier work at Vicksburg, General Grant was now to be summoned to take command of the Federal Armies. He had made the decision to leave his friend Sherman in charge of military operations in the west. He did so without a moments hesitation. Grant and Sherman had worked together for too long not to have learned about each other. Both thought very much alike. Like two horses working in tandem pulling a load.

All of the federal commanders were aware of the outline of what became known as the Anaconda Plan. The Union had, by the summer of 1864, accomplished two of the three parts of the plan -- a blockade of the Southern coast, and the complete control of the Mississippi River. All that remained to finish the campaign was a movement by multiple Union armies into the heartland of the South to squeeze it until the Confederate government surrendered. The Western armies led by General Sherman would be a critical part of the final campaign beginning in the summer of 1864.

Sherman and Grant discussed what both would do. Obviously, Grant and Sherman knew that each army would have to move at general the same time to prevent the Confederates from

concentrating has one while the other remained inactive as was done at Chickamauga. Grant's objective -- or, in reality, the Army of the Potomac's -- was Lee's Army. The seizure of Richmond was a secondary mission. Confederate resistance in the Eastern theater of war was built on Lee's army. If that army were eliminated, the south did not have the soldiers available to create another.

Sherman's objective would be different. Grant's theater did not have the logistical importance of Sherman's to the Confederacy. Therefore, Sherman was to concentrate on taking Atlanta, and bringing the idea of "total war" [that is, war waged against all segments of an opponent's society] to the logistical heartland of the South.

A secondary objective would be the Army of the Tennessee whose new commander, General Joseph E. Johnston was a much different leader than General Bragg. No one can accuse Bragg of not being aggressive in the beginning of every battle he fought. Johnston was quite the opposite. He would not commit his forces to battle unless the conditions were so favorable that victory was all but assured. Given the fact that the South was reaching the bottom of its manpower pool, this was not an unwise strategy. But it was a strategy without risk that would merely postpone the inevitable.

The Union strategy would clearly be offensive. For Davis and his field commanders, no option other than embracing the defense was open. Davis, always, hoped to assume the offensive, but in this type of war, numbers were vital, and the south's numbers did not add up.

The Northern armies were far too large to be easily defeated now, and led by officers who were both well trained, and competent. The incompetents that Lincoln kept appointing to command [i.e., McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Pope] were gone. Grant, if anything,

was a generally good judge of commanders, and those he chose to command were proven leaders in combat, and people with whom both Grant and Sherman could and had worked. The administratively competent General Henry W. Halleck would handle the logistical side of the campaign and leave Grant to focus solely on the final defeat of the South.

General Lee was under no illusion. He would keep his army's strength by using terrain and the pick and shovel to both magnify his numbers and keep losses low. He had no choice. Lee was willing to take risks and would do so again, but he had to be more careful now.

The Army of Northern Virginia did not much like positional fighting, but that was to be its lot for the remainder of the war. In the West, the situation was much the same. General Johnston had managed to raise the numbers of the Army of the Tennessee from barely 45,000 after the disaster at Chattanooga back to something approaching 65,000, but the Union forces had gathered an army of more than 110,000 with nearly a quarter million soldiers in the western theater that could be used for operations by Sherman in support of the main effort.

Only one thing kept the numbers from being almost unmanageable for the South. The Confederacy had adopted a "raiding" strategy using their cavalry. Both Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler had shown some ability at this type of operation, and Sherman had to detail more than 50,000 men to garrison his supply routes to keep them both safe and open. During the campaign, Johnston did let his cavalry loose against this supply line, but they could not cripple it enough to force Sherman to give up the offensive. He had planned it that way.

The Union commander was not given to ordering assaults that wasted lives [Kennesaw Mountain, of course, and was the sole exception] and he could be nearly as careful as Johnston. In fact, he told several of his senior commanders that he [Sherman] believed Joe Johnston was a very good commander, and that he had better not make a mistake or the Confederates would make him pay.

When Grant and Sherman had finished their series of conferences, they had agreed on the following:

- a. the campaign would begin in early May.*
- b. Grant would concentrate on Lee and Sherman on taking Atlanta.*
- c. the campaign must attain tangible results prior to the 1864 elections and should be ended quickly.*
- d. the offensive was to be maintained without a let up so as not to allow the South any breathing room.*

Look at the geography of the land that lay between Chattanooga and Atlanta. If you can drive through it from Atlanta to Chattanooga. Notice which way the ridges run, and if you do a detailed map survey, notice the direction in which the rivers flow. Look at the terrain from the Confederate perspective. Johnston could count on the type of terrain that allows the use of fortifications to block larger forces, and makes it difficult for the Union forces to flank easily. Also, the distance between the two points allows the Confederates to trade space for time up to a point.

The Confederates heavily fortified Rocky Face Ridge, and covered most of the outlets from Chattanooga through Pigeon Mountain. Sherman had to maneuver to obtain a passage through them, and not without some heavy fighting. Johnston could have done better in his defense, but some of his subordinates -- most notably Bishop Polk -- were not up to the task, and the Federals

managed to make it through a lightly guarded pass and into the Confederate rear which forced Johnston to retreat back to the town of Reseca and give up his forward base at Ringgold. It was in this area that Major General Cleburne conducted a masterful delaying operation against Grant after the Confederates were forced away from Chattanooga. Johnston could have used some of that defensive genius.

The Union commander realized that he had to force Johnston into a battle early and defeat him. To do this, Sherman used his army as three separate armies --

Army of the Cumberland under Major General Thomas

Army of the Ohio under Major General MacPherson

Army of the Tennessee under Major General Schoefield.

All three were separate organizations with their own logistical capabilities, but Sherman saw the need to consolidate some supply capabilities at Army level and he did. The same for cavalry, and engineer functions. To support his army on the march, Sherman needed more than 500 tons of supplies PER DAY to keep his 110,000 men and 50,000 horse and mules fit.

At Reseca, the Confederates made a stand to cover their withdrawal, and Sherman attacked, but could not make any headway. General Johnston had his engineers working overtime. As the Army of the Tennessee fell back, engineers were looking for defensible lines, and marking out the front line trace so that when units arrived, they would know where to build their fortifications.

The Confederates learned so well that they could have a fairly defensive line of trenches in just a few hours. General Johnston normally liked to break contact, and move rapidly back to the new line and gives his troops several days to prepare for an attack.

**The Union forces would approach the Confederates, and would engage their battle lines. Skirmishing would begin, and Sherman would elongate his forces to find which flank was the easiest to turn. Normally, General Schoefield's Army of the Ohio would be given that task, and would slide around the Confederate flank preceded by cavalry. The Confederate cavalry would contest it, and be slowly pushed back while keeping Johnston informed at all times.**

**When he judged it prudent to retreat, General Johnston ordered his troops to quit their lines and move back before Sherman could close the trap. As the days went by, and casualties lengthened -- the North was suffering far more casualties than the South as the armies approached Atlanta -- a fact not lost on the northern electorate because Grant's army, pinned to the Wilderness by Lee and later outfought at Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor, was suffering even greater casualties. The Lincoln administration was suffering a crisis of confidence in the North because there had been no breakthrough and thus, no end to the war.**

**However generals try, strategy cannot distance itself from politics. This was so true during the summer of 1864. Lincoln was fighting for re-election against a strong challenge from General George B. McClellan who was running on the Democratic ticket. The most effective political theme McClellan used was that he would "end" the war [as Eisenhower said when he was campaigning for President in 1952 and as Nixon said he would do in 1968].**

**The North had been showing signs of "war weariness", and the signs for the administration were getting worse. Lincoln needed a victory by either Grant or Sherman to help revive the resolve of the North. So far, and well into June, this had not come to past. Joe Johnston was not cooperating. So, Sherman decided to attempt a**

bold and swift stroke at Kennesaw Mountain. Unfortunately, his stroke was neither bold nor swift, and thousands of Union troops were killed and wounded assaulting some of the strongest fortifications of the whole war. The Union commander did not repeat this maneuver the remainder of the war.

At this point, the machinations of one of Johnston's corps commander, General John B. Hood bore fruit. Davis was getting political heat from Governor Brown of Georgia on the "trading land for time" strategy of Johnston. Although Johnston kept writing Davis -- which he did nearly every day -- that he was going to go on the offensive, he never really did, and the suburbs of Atlanta were within sight of the federals. A new and more aggressive philosophy was needed, and Hood seemed, insofar as Davis could see, to be the man to do it. General Joseph E. Johnston was relieved of command and Hood temporarily raised to the rank of full general and given the task of halting Sherman. He did not wait long to begin offensive operations.

In rapid succession, Hood attempted three assaults against Sherman -- at Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and at Ezra Church. It wasn't that the attacks were ill-considered. Had some of Hood's subordinates -- i.e., General Hardee -- been up to the task of coordinating attacking forces coming from different areas, parts of Sherman's army might have been beaten as the Confederates had local superiority at the beginning.

The Confederate cavalry had attacked consolidated trains of Sherman's army, and had General Joe Wheeler been more aggressive, the cavalry might have dealt the blow that Johnston had so wanted -- to damage the Union logistical system to the point where Sherman had to retreat back up toward Chattanooga to re-establish his logistics. All these changes went glimmering.

As far as tactical brilliance goes, Sherman was not at the top, but his movement south to Macon and allowing the Confederates to come between his army and its supply line was brilliant -- fully as good as Grant's change of base from before Richmond to Petersburg. Because of some of Grant's subordinates' bumbling the attack on Petersburg, Lee was allowed to save the situation. But not so at Macon.

As the officers of Hood's army were attending a celebration in Atlanta, word reached Hood that the Union had taken Macon, which cut Hood off from his own logistics and presented him with a lesser of two evils -- stay in the city and accept siege, or abandon Atlanta for maneuvering room. Hood chose the latter, and presented Lincoln with an critical political victory. Up to that point, Lincoln's chances of re-election were not good, and he [Lincoln] had even taken the unusual step of drafting a statement admitting electoral defeat. Hood handed Lincoln what he needed for victory and the war could then be continued to the end.

The disaster of the three attacks is that they collectively cost the Confederates nearly 25,000 casualties, and the war because the army, so carefully husbanded by Johnston to force Sherman to consider it, now had fallen well below the numbers needed to compel Union attention. General Sherman could safely split his army now without worrying about Hood's forces west of Atlanta.

Unfortunately the Confederate Army commander didn't get the message. He conceived a bold enough plan for moving the Army north to threaten Union logistical bases -- i.e., Murfreesboro and Nashville -- hoping that Sherman would follow him. The Union commander had so large a force at his disposal, that he could take 60,000 men and begin the march to the sea while leaving a force far larger than Hood's in his rear to deal with the Confederates. He

**selected his best defensive commander, Major General George H. Thomas for that duty.**

**Hood so botched the campaign that he returned to Mississippi with only 10,000 out of the nearly 45,000 he started with. Thomas utterly crushed the outmanned Confederate Army at Nashville in one of the most perfect battles of the war.**

**The Confederate strategy was flawed at the beginning. Johnston really didn't try to maneuver Sherman into fighting him on ground of the Confederates choosing. It would have taken a smashing victory to deter Sherman from continuing the campaign -- He was not Burnside, McClellan, or Hooker. Like Grant, he was determined to complete the mission. The Union army was just too strong to defeat.**

**Johnston's idea of keeping his army "in being" was a good one because it was large enough to compel Sherman's direct attention. When Hood destroyed 1/3rd of his Army in his three attacks around Atlanta, Sherman ceased to pay attention to that army, and could do pretty much what he pleased.**

**As long as the larger Confederate army remained in tact as Johnston was doing, Sherman could not claim victory. Even if Johnston had shut up his army in Atlanta, Sherman had already seen the fortifications, and had no desire to attack them -- Kennesaw was a stark reminder of throwing troops against strong field fortifications.**

**If the city had most of its residents removed, and was well provisioned, the Federals would have had to accept a long siege -- since Pemberton had not prepared Vicksburg for a siege, it enabled Grant to force starvation of both people and garrison in a relatively short time. Had Atlanta been properly prepared for a siege it might held out long enough to force Lincoln from office, and stop the war**

where it was then as McClellan had said he would do. At that point in the war, the South had to depend on “miracles” to sustain itself. But history shows that when he was almost down for the count, Frederick the Great and Prussia were saved by a sudden turn of events. This could have happened here given some breaks for the Confederates, but neither Grant, Lincoln, nor Sherman were about to surrender that break.

The Atlanta campaign should always be studied closely for the lessons that it can teach for present and future generations. There is always some “luck” in war as even Clausewitz had to admit, but history shows that in most instances, good commanders make their own “luck” by soberly assessing the situation and determining the best action, and then executing it with an inherent flexibility that allows for changes to fight a fluid situation.

The Confederates did not do this because they lacked a decentralized system that would have allowed commanders on the spot to take the initiative given their closer and hopefully better perspective. Unfortunately, the Confederates at that time did not have the type of commanders that do this. Their system of command and control did not produce them. It is doubtful that Jefferson Davis, a micromanager if ever there was one, would have allowed a commander of such independent means. He kept Braxton Bragg on as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee far longer than he should have.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**HOW CHICKAMAUGA CAME TO BE**

The genesis of this campaign occurred in 1862 when General Bragg invaded the state of Kentucky. Since the legislature of that state had voted neutrality, the legislature had to call upon the North to send in troops to expel the southern soldiers. This they did, but then stayed and took over the entire state. A battle of sorts was fought between Major General Don Carlos Buell and Bragg which Buell won, but only by a whisker. Bragg retreated into Tennessee. Western Tennessee had already fallen to General Grant with the seizure of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the Battle of Shiloh. Because of disagreements with General Halleck and Stanton, Buell was relieved of command of his army, now called the Army of the Cumberland (the Union named its armies for rivers, and the South for geographical places, i.e., states). His replacement was Major General William S. Rosecrans who had just completed along with Grant the battles of Iuka and Corinth. Rosecrans had garnered favorable mention so Stanton and Lincoln, looking desperately for fighting generals at the time, seized on Rosecrans.

The new general moved his forces to Nashville, which the Confederates had evacuated not long after Shiloh, and then Rosecrans stayed there for weeks gathering supplies, and engaging in a sniping contest with Stanton in Washington. Finally, in mid-December, and in bad weather, he launched his army toward the Confederates which Rosecrans knew from intelligence was then at Murfreesboro. This time, Bragg would not retreat, but offer battle before the city.

The Battle of Stones River was one of the bloodiest up to that time, and Rosecrans barely won it. Bragg, even though he was urged by every senior officer in his army to stay and fight, opted to retreat to the city of Tullahoma. There, he spent nearly six months building fortifications and preparing for the coming battle with Rosecrans. The Union general was many things, but he was a decent tactician, and he knew how to move armies, and to draft good and workable plans.

Like many generals before him, Rosecrans used Napoleonic tactics. First he feinted the way he correctly viewed Bragg thought he would go, and all the while, he moved one of his Corps around the Confederate army and deep into its rear near Drechard. When Bragg heard of this, he had two choices. To allow himself to be penned up in Tullahoma even if the fortification were neigh impregnable, or to retreat to Chattanooga, and Bragg wisely chose the latter.

Chattanooga means "eagle's nest" in Cherokee. Actually, the city of 5,000 was nestled among towering mountains all the way around. Bragg fortified the city, and set his army in a long screen from north to nearly 125 miles south. After his army had rested from Stones River, Rosecrans conceived a plan similar to that he'd just executed at Tullahoma. Again, he moved to gain Bragg's attention. Crittenden's XXist Corps with Wilder's mounted infantry brigade moved on the city and slightly North of it. By demonstrating and other stratagems, Crittenden made Bragg thing most of the Union army was opposite or near Chattanooga. In actuality, General Rosecrans was swinging the XXth and XIV Corps south to move to cut Bragg off from his major supply base, Dalton, and then capture his army or force Bragg to retreat south and occupy Chattanooga. At least, that was the plan, but Rosecrans first meant to move on Chattanooga, seize it, and then build it up as a base of operations so he could move south on Dalton and thence on to Atlanta which was he immediate strategical objective.

This time, however, it was Bragg who was about to turn the tables. When Wilder's brigade directly approached the city, and set up Eli Lilly's battery to bombard it, the surprise was all on the Confederate side, and Wilder's soldiers observed soldiers and civilians running around as the cannon balls whistled into downtown Chattanooga. When Bragg came to the conclusion that he had well and truly been flanked, he left the city, but this time with a difference. He arranged for soldiers to give themselves up to the Yankees with tales of woe -- the army falling apart, retiring in distress and disunity, you know the drill.

Rosecrans was normally an intelligent man, and should have seen this sudden loquaciousness of the rebels to be what it really was -- a smoke screen for something else. But, the Union commander was riding high; in fact, he was euphoric. In a single campaign, and without the loss of a man, he had just forced a major Confederate to abandon a critical city to the

North without a battle. The stuff of legends, and one cannot really fault Rosecrans for being overconfident. Still, he was that, and presently, he placed his army in extreme danger.

At the time of the beginning of the campaign in August, Bragg barely had 35,000 men in Chattanooga, but the Confederate Strategic Mafia had been at work -- Davis, Bureauregard, Longstreet, and Lee (Davis, by the way, could not stand Bureauregard, and only employed him in backwater assignments through most of the war). Since Rosecrans army was the only Union force then in motion, Bureauregard as well as Longstreet had written Davis with ideas to concentrate excess Confederate troops against Rosecrans. Finally, the Confederate President had persuaded Lee to part with some of his men, and Longstreet and two divisions of his superb infantry were on their way to join Bragg. Breckinridge's big division as well as General W. H. T. Walker's Reserve Corps, and two divisions of General Simon B. Buckner's Corps were also on the way. From but 35,000, Bragg grew to 55,000 and was still growing when Rosecrans was in the midst of his final moves against Chattanooga. Incidentally, Rosecrans correctly did believe that Bragg now outnumbered him. In fact, Rosecrans was the only Northern commander who could say with truthfulness that he fought the Confederates at equal or less numbers.

Bragg marshaled his now enlarged army around Lafayette, Georgia. His right resting near Lee and Gordon's mill and his left near a cul-de-sac called MacLemore's Cove. The Confederates were just waiting for Union troops to march into their web, and it wasn't long. On 10 September, 1863, the division of Major General James Negley marched blithely into MacLemore's Cove. The Union division had not a clue that thousands of Confederates were less than 12 miles from their location. When the division attempted to move from Davis' crossroads to Dug Gap, skirmishers fired on Negley, and he rode back absolutely terrified and yelled at the lead brigade commander of his division, "quick, sir, into line, into line".

The Union division took up a defensive position fronting the Davis house and to its side as skirmishers from the unit had detected a large Confederate force on the left flank -- actually Hindman's division with Buckner's whole corps behind it. Bragg now had a more than 5 to 1 superiority. The attack was entrusted to Hill whose division commanded by Patrick Cleburne who would attack, and his guns would tell Hindman to attack. Neither did in the "after you, sir; not, after you please" affair. Bragg finally came to the site and forced both sides of his trap to

move, but by that time, their quarry had flown -- Negley's division and Baird's which had been sent to reinforce it. They had retreated to the foothills of Lookout Mountain, and were positioned to make an attack suicidal.

Bragg was angry, very angry, but not for long as on Lt. General Polk's front, another opportunity presented itself. Crittenden's Corps, or in reality, parts of it, were located at Lee and Gordon's mill, so Bragg then orchestrated a concentration of most of Polk's corps, and Buckner's Corps.

This time, it was Polk's turn to get tactical "cold" feet. Again, a chance to do damage to Rosecrans' army was thrown away. The Confederate Commander was beside himself with anger that his well throughout plans had not been executed as he had written. Bragg's problem was how he wrote his orders. He would write a direct order well enough -- to attack -- and then qualify that with if you have a problem here, you can do this. This was the "out" his subordinates needed. Bragg should just have used the simple -- "attack, repeat, attack" that Halsey used during one of the desperate naval battles around Guadalcanal in 1942.

The Confederates had now missed two chances to bag portions of the Union army at relatively little cost. Rosecrans, as intelligent a commander as ever wore the Union blue, finally woke up, and began to concentrate his army. From around Lee and Gordon's Mill, he began to place his units on a right line from there to close to MacLemore's Cove. At least, the various parts of his army were within reasonable supporting distance of one another, but it took him several days to do it because McCook's XXth Corps was still in Alpine, Georgia, and had to march from there to near the battlefield. Bragg and his army were quite most of the time with Bragg getting the impression -- albeit a correct one -- that the Union left was at Lee and Gordon's Mill.

The Confederate general developed a plan not dissimilar to that he attempted to execute at Stone's River. What is football parlance would now be called a "swinging gate" play, where the balance the time lines up on the flank and runs around to opposing team and into their backfield rolling up the other team.

Bragg issued orders for Confederate Forces to cross West Chickamauga Creek by Reed's and Alexander's Bridges, and then swing south and onto the Union flank while Polk's corps kept the Union army from moving. At least, that's the way it was supposed to go.

In the meantime, General Rosecrans was moving his army by passing the right flank units down the line he had created, and then filling them in on the left -- one after the other. Patrol's known it is "bounding overwatch". In actuality, on the evening of the 17th of September, the Union's actual flank was in Kelly Field and NOT at Lee and Gordon's Mill. On the 17th, Rosecrans, ever mindful of his flanks as he moved his units up the Chattanooga Road (referred to today as the Lafayette Road) threw out Minty's brigade of cavalry and Wilder's of mounted infantry to defend the bridges and buy time. That's what they both did. Through much of the 18th as the bulk of the Union army tramped north from MacLemore's Cove toward Crawfish Springs and the battlefield while the two screening brigades battled to keep Confederate units from crossing. They did their job, and on the evening of the 18th, Confederate units had crossed the Creek, but at too late a time in the day to make a difference. They were within striking distance, but Wilder's brigade was in the south near the Viniard Field to block any movement there, and parts of Thomas' XIV Corps were in Kelly Field.

The actual beginning of the battle on the 19th involves a mistake on the part of Colonel Dan McCook. His brigade, actually part of Granger's Reserve Corps had been ordered forward to support Minty at Reed's bridge (remember, his brigade is an infantry brigade, not the cavalry brigade commanded by the other Colonel McCook). When his brigade arrives near Reed's bridge -- not 200 yards from Jay's Mill Road -- it was pitch dark, and McCook, ever the wary soldier, sent a patrol down toward the bridge to check things out. They managed to capture more than a dozen confederates from the rear column of the last of Bushrod Johnson's division that had earlier crossed. In talking to the confederate soldiers -- remember, soldiers of both armies were not under the UCMJ and Code of Conduct -- and he learned all they had to tell him from their somewhat limited perspective. Somewhat "Colonel Dan" got it wrong. He told General Thomas in a message that a "lone" Confederate Brigade was on the west side of the creek and all Thomas had to do was send down a division and "police" it up.

Thomas, seeing an opportunity to strike a blow with little effort, issued orders that sent Brannan's and then Baird's division into the wood's toward Jay's mill. Colonel John T. Croxton's 1,100 man brigade was in the lead, and it was this brigade that opened the battle of Chickamauga when it contacted a battalion of Confederate Cavalry from Forrest's cavalry division. The battle then grew from such humble beginnings. That's how Chickamauga happened.

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**BRIEFING SEQUENCE  
CHICKAMAUGA BATTLE STAFF RIDE  
CHEMICAL OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE**

**DAY ONE**

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**STOP ONE -- DAVIS' CROSSROADS**

**UNION  
MG ROSECRANS  
MG NEAGLEY**

**CONFEDERATE  
GEN BRAGG  
MG HINDMAN  
MG CLEBURNE  
LTG HILL**

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**STOP TWO -- LEE AND GORDON'S MILL**

**UNION  
MG ROSECRANS**

**CONFEDERATE  
GEN RAGG  
LTG POLK**

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**STOP THREE -- ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE**

**UNION  
MG ROSECRANS  
COL WILDER**

**CONFEDERATE  
GEN BRAGG  
MG ST. JOHN R. LIDDELL**

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**STOP FOUR -- REED'S BRIDGE**

**UNION  
MG ROSECRANS  
COL. MINTY**

**CONFEDERATE  
MG BRAGG  
BG JOHNSTON  
MG FORREST**

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**STOP FIVE -- JAY'S MILL**

**UNION  
MG ROSECRANS  
MG THOMAS  
COL. CROXTON  
BG BAIRD**

**CONFEDERATE  
MG BRAGG  
MG FORREST**

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STOP SIX -- **WINFREY FIELD**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
	<b>MG CLEBURNE</b>
	<b>LTG POLK</b>

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STOP SEVEN -- **BROCK FIELD**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
<b>MG JOHNSON</b>	<b>MG CHEATHAM</b>
<b>MG PALMER</b>	

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STOP EIGHT -- **POE FIELD**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
	<b>MG STEWART</b>

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STOP NINE -- **BROTHERTON FIELD**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
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STOP TEN -- **DITCH OF DEATH**

<b>UNION</b>	
<b>COLONEL WILDER</b>	

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STOP ELEVEN - **VINIARD FIELD**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
<b>BG DAVIS</b>	<b>MG HOOD</b>
<b>COL HEG</b>	<b>BG BENNING</b>
<b>BG CARLIN</b>	
<b>MG SHERIDAN</b>	

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STOP TWELVE -- **WILDER TOWER/WIDOW GLENN'S**

<b>UNION</b>	<b>CONFEDERATE</b>
<b>MG ROSECRANS</b>	<b>GEN BRAGG</b>

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**END OF DAY ONE**

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## **DAY TWO**

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### **STOP ONE -- BRIGADIER GENERAL HELM/COL COLQUITT MARKERS**

#### **UNION**

**CONFEDERATE**  
**EN BRAGG**  
**LTG POLK**  
**LTG HILL**  
**MG BRECKINRIDGE**  
**MG CLEBURNE**

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### **STOP TWO -- UPPER END OF BATTLELINE ROAD**

#### **UNION**

**MG ROSECRANS**  
**MG THOMAS**

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### **STOP THREE -- ALONG BATTLELINE ROAD**

#### **CONFEDERATE**

**MG CLEBURNE**  
**BG POLK**  
**BG DESHLER**  
**MG STEWART**  
**GEN BRAGG**

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### **STOP FOUR -- SLOCOMB'S BATTERY POSITION**

#### **UNION**

**MG THOMAS**

#### **CONFEDERATE**

**MG BRECKINRIDGE**  
**BG STOVALL**  
**BG ADAMS**

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### **STOP FIVE -- BROTHERTON FARM**

#### **UNION**

**MG ROSECRANS**  
**BG WOOD**  
**MG MCCOOK**  
**MG NEAGLEY**  
**LTC STIRLING**  
**CAPT KELLOGG**  
**BG GARFIELD**

#### **CONFEDERATE**

**GEN BRAGG**  
**LTG LONGSTREET**  
**BG JOHNSON**

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**STOP SIX -- LONGSTREET'S CP MARKER (DYER FIELD)**

**UNION**  
**MG ROSECRANS**  
**BG LYTTLE**  
**MG SHERIDAN**  
**MAJ MENDENHALL**

**CONFEDERATE**  
**GEN BRAGG**  
**MG HOOD**  
**BG JOHNSON**  
**BG KERSHAW**

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**STOP SEVEN -- UPPER END OF DYER FIELD/HARKER'S HILL**

**UNION**  
**BG HARKER**  
**MG THOMAS**

**CONFEDERATE**  
**GEN BRAGG**  
**LTG POLK**  
**LTG LONGSTREET**

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**STOP EIGHT -- BACKSIDE OF HORSESHOE RIDGE/JOHNSON'S POSITION**

**UNION**

**CONFEDERATE**  
**BG JOHNSON**

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**STOP NINE -- POSITION OF RESERVE CORPS (STEEDMAN'S MARKER -- HORSESHOE RIDGE)**

**UNION**

**CONFEDERATE**

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**MG STEEDMAN**  
**MG GRANGER**

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**STOP TEN -- POSITION OF MG GRANGER'S RESERVE CORPS HEADQUARTERS**

**UNION**  
**MG GRANGER**

**CONFEDERATE**

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**STOP ELEVEN -- POSITION OF SNODGRASS CABIN**

**UNION**

**CONFEDERATE**

**MG ROSECRANS**  
**MG THOMAS**  
**MG GRANGER**  
**BG GARFIELD**

**GEN BRAGG**  
**LTG POLK**  
**LTG LONGSTREET**  
**MG FORREST**

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**END OF DAY TWO**

## CHICKAMAUGA – A CONFEDERATE DEFEAT

History records the Battle of Chickamauga on 19 and 20 September 1863 as a victory for the Confederacy. In reality, it was a stunning defeat even though the battlefield belonged to the Army of the Tennessee and the Union Army of the Cumberland retreated into Chattanooga. In fact, it was such a stunning defeat that the long and slow descent to destruction for what remained of the Confederacy can be measured from it.

It could be said with some justification that the Union command element lacked strategic vision, particularly, the Army Chief of Staff, Major General Henry W. Halleck. Although called “Old Brains” for his translation of a French military book, Halleck lacked the turn of mind that directs armies to victory. From the first to the last the Union side had numbers and an industry that provided almost unlimited military material. There was hardly a battle during the entire war that the Confederate forces were not outnumbered and outgunned. That the South lasted four years was a tribute as much to the genius of her generals as the tenacity of her fighting men.

Against the cold logic of numbers and weight – an agricultural society against a industrial one – the South could not last. But, it didn’t have to go either quickly or quietly. Bragg’s ineptness and those of his subordinates cost the South the last chance for a complete and decisive military victory when it was still possible.

The first mistake was belonged to the Union. At the time of the beginning of the campaign, Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland was the only Union Army in motion. The Army of the Potomac was in camps in Northern Virginia, and the Army of Mississippi (Grant’s victorious Vicksburg army) was also not campaigning. Burnside’s 25,000 man army in Knoxville were not under the control of Rosecrans – they were in a different military district, and the Union Army did not then allow commanders to cross district lines even in the name of good strategy and tactics. With the inept Burnside in command, they were not pulling their weight either.

This allowed the Confederacy to enact a sound strategic move. With the Northern Virginia theater quiet, Lee was now persuaded that a concentration of superior numbers of Confederates against a Union force might result in a needed victory. President Davis was in a mood to support this concentration because in the last few months the Confederacy had suffered greatly – the loss of Vicksburg and the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg. Since Chattanooga was already threatened, troops had to be re-routed around it and this took time given the rickety nature of the southern railway system. Davis wanted Lee to take command in the West and whip the Union commanders there, but “Marse Robert” preferred to remain in his beloved Virginia, and the President would not “order” him to take command there. It would have

been interesting to see how Lee would have handled the less than dutiful subordinate commanders of the Army of the Tennessee. They might have taken to Lee and they might not.

In one respect, the South had already won a victory of sorts. Rosecrans' department officially listed more than 80,000 troops on its rolls, but he [Rosecrans] could bring slightly less than 60,000 to the battle. The rest had to be left behind to guard the long supply system that kept the Union forces in the field. Southern cavalry, under either Forrest or Wheeler, had made the Union commanders very wary of their supply lines. That was one of the reasons that Rosecrans had been feuding so much with Helleck. He wanted to insure that he had enough supplied to fight several battles because his supply lines to the North could be cut at any time, and remain so for periods of time.

When Bragg occupied Chattanooga several months earlier, he ordered his army to dig extensive fortifications to make Chattanooga safe from direct assault. With this done, he then proceeded to string out his small 35,000 man army to guard or outpost all of the major fords above and below the city. He knew that Rosecrans would eventually move on the city. It didn't take a tactical or strategic genius to deduce that Chattanooga had to be Rosecrans objective. This town had to be occupied by the Union because of its railway nets, and could not be bypassed without opening up the flank or rear of a Union army that did it.

The Confederates also knew that no Union, much less a Confederate, Army could live off the land in East Tennessee. This was one of the poorest parts of the state, and the people who lived within the confines of the battlefield such as the Snodgrass' family, the Widow Glenn, and the Brotherton's scratched out a meager living from the soil. No, Chattanooga had to be taken to be used as the supply point for the Union Army that would, inevitably, like death and taxes, move on the far more strategic prize of Atlanta.

When Rosecrans marched, he, like Napoleon, moved in wide columns using the corps as his basic structure. Since Rosecrans like most of his Civil War contemporaries, had studied at West Point and had been given a full dose in the tactical and strategic genius of Napoleon. Bragg had graduated from the same institution, but years earlier, and seemed not to notice that Rosecrans generally behaved the same way when attacking. But, this time, there was a crack in the normal dull strategical brain of Braxton Bragg.

True, with much of his army forward deployed to the north of the city where Bragg reasoned Rosecrans might move – he had good reason for this. The land was better and flatter to the North. Rosecrans was closer to the 25,000 potential reinforcements in Knoxville, and he could more easily open up his supply lines because there was a rail line to the north coming to Chattanooga from that direction. For those reasons, among others, Rosecrans choose an extremely difficult approach by going south through the high hills of Lookout and Sand Mountains.

When Bragg realized that the Union forces were across the Tennessee in strength, he had to evacuate his headquarters or accept a siege which even Bragg, for all his lack of tactical cunning, knew he

could not accept. This time, however, he laid a trap for the Union forces. Once his forces were out of the city, he saw to it that deserters were sent over to the advancing Union forces to tell of panic and disarray in the Confederate forces. This time, Bragg hit the “nail on the head”. Rosecrans, having executed another tactical maneuver gem was feeling his “strategic oats”, and saw an opportunity to crush Bragg and win a decisive victory. He ordered the highly dispersed elements of his army to engage in a pursuit operation and attempt to cut off Bragg from Rome, Georgia where the deserters told Rosecrans Bragg was bound for.

Actually, the Army of the Tennessee had moved about 25 miles south of Chattanooga to Lafayette, Georgia. More importantly, it was rapidly receiving reinforcements – Major General William Henry Talbot Walker’s two division corps showed up as well as Major General Simon B. Buckner’s two division corps. Suddenly, Bragg was hip deep in manpower riches. Two division of Lee’s famous Army of Northern Virginia under his [Lee’s] best field commander, Lt. General James Longstreet, were also on the way. His army was now beginning to come close to equaling in numbers the Union juggernaut bearing down on him.

In the beginning, Bragg had the right idea. His plan had been to attempt by deception to keep the Union army apart, and then he could, perhaps, destroy it in by concentrating superior numbers against smaller segments – a Napoleonic concept. This was a sound strategy. The South had already reached the bottom of its manpower barrel – granted, the South did not manage its people efficiently, but even maximum efficiency has its limits. Every Confederate soldier lost by death of wounds in battle could not easily be replaced. The Confederate commanders had to come up with a way to win at lower cost – not the first or last time this novel idea has been bandied about.

When Bragg’s cavalry under Brigadier General Warton reported that a lone Union division was about to enter MacLemore’s Cove. The Army of Tennessee’s chance had come. Bragg quickly positioned his forces in ambush. Two brigades of Cleburne’s division of D. H. Hill’s Corps were to fortify Dug Gap [Warton’s cavalry division had done a good job of obstructing it already], and Major General Thomas Hindman’s big division was positioned to the North to plug that escape route. Bragg then sent his commanders one last order – to attack as soon as the Federals approached Dug Gap, and that Cleburne was to begin the attack and Hindman to march to the sound of his guns.

It seems, so history has recorded, that Cleburne didn’t attack because he was not feeling well. This, by the way, has never been proven. One suspects that the ever cautious temporary Lt. General Daniel H. Hill was the prime mover here. General Hindman had also received word that more federal troops had begun to enter the cove and that more were moving from Thomas’ corps through another gap. All this was true, but they were not close enough to cause Hindman while he attacked the lone union division. Hindman hesitated, and requested reinforcements. General Bragg sent them in the form of Buckner’s corps in support, and still Hindman did not attack.

When Cleburne's skirmishers fired on Union Major General Negley who was, quite literally, out in front of his division, it didn't take him long to make his plea for immediate help known to Thomas who promptly sent another Union division to support Negley. The two divisions stood in battle line ready to take on the Confederates when they attacked, but they didn't. If General Bragg made one consistent mistake, it was that he didn't supervise his subordinates properly.

Lee did not have to. He picked his subordinates carefully, and only after proving themselves in battle at a lower level of responsibility. He could give his senior commanders general type orders and leave the execution to them with no real concern. Bragg could not. Beginning from the Battle of Perryville, Bragg showed he could not control his subordinates, and when they did take initiative, he tended to blame them rather than himself for what happened. Consequently, his subordinates did not take requisite tactical risks unless the situation was one of no danger which is, of course, a rare happenstance in battle.

By the time Bragg forced -- by up close and personal direction -- Hindman and Cleburne forward, it was too late. The Union forces had, when assured that the Confederates would not attack, backed out of MacLemore's the way they had come and set up defenses based on Steven's Gap. The Confederates missed a tactical situation that would have bagged two Union divisions at almost no cost. These two divisions would play prominent parts in depriving the south of many of its sons during the coming battle of Chickamauga.

Few commanders in history have had the opportunity to defeat an army in detail twice in one campaign, but Bragg did. After muffing the chance to get one and perhaps two divisions at MacLemore's Cove, Bragg, quite intelligently, saw another chance to bag a group of Union divisions without much effort at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Major General Thomas Crittenden's troops at the mill were outnumbered 4 to 1 or more by Polk's Corps plus that of Buckner in support. This time it was the Bishop's turn to get tactical "cold feet". Again, the Union forces were allowed to retreat unmolested.

It was not that General Bragg lacked tactical sense. In fact, it was rather good. His two efforts at defeat in detail were well conceived, but not well carried out. His tactical operation might have also worked but for one problem. His intelligence was about 24 hours out of date. He still believed that the Union left was located at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Now, it was true that Rosecrans in the days since Negley had almost been beaten in MacLemore's Cover had set up a rough battle line between the Cove and Lee and Gordon's. But, he was not moving his troops by sliding his right flank units one-by-one behind his lines and building a new left flank. On the night of the 17<sup>th</sup>, Union forces already rested in Kelly Field, and more were coming up. Rosecrans building an ever moving line that was inching its way toward Chattanooga and safety.

The Confederate commander believed that he could, as he had tried at Stone's River, to swing part of his army around the flank and on to the rear of the Union Army. It was a classic Napoleonic tactic, but it was doomed to failure because of two factors: the aforementioned lack of intelligence, and

the fact that Rosecrans had thoughtfully outposted the major bridges in the area over which the Confederates could cross to the west bank of Chickamauga Creek. The Federals, too, believed that the bulk of the enemy forces were on their front and not on their flanks. Rosecrans lacked good cavalry that could have given him better information, and he was, in a quite literal sense, operating in the dark as much as Bragg was. That's why both commanders were surprised when combat broke out on the 18<sup>th</sup>.

The most successful commanders in history have one general characteristic – they can change their plan when time or actions of either side merit it. Bragg, not being a great commander, could not do that, and he, more or less, stumbled into battle with the control of the combat doing to his subordinates without any central tactical leadership. This could also be said of the other side as well. Rosecrans was seemingly content to let his subordinates fight the battle – i.e., Thomas and his divisional commanders in the area of Jay's Mill.

When the two forces clashed in the woods near Jay's Mill, the battle quickly spiraled out of control for Bragg. First, he was surprised by the combat. He had expected to make contact at or near Lee and Gordon's, not at Jay's Mill. Still, when Forrest asked for reinforcements, he readily sent the two divisions of Walker's Reserve Corps, and brought up Cheatham's and Stewart's divisions from their locations further south and threw them in.

For the Confederates the key two cases on the 19<sup>th</sup> were critical in that either one, if properly supported, would have resulted in a complete victory with relatively few casualties. The first, the slashing attack on the Union center by the division of Major General A. P. Stewart had the chance of splitting the Union Army into two parts. Stewart attacked with brigades in column, and as they broke the Union line – Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve's division which was, providentially for the Confederates, the weakest division in the Union Army – and advanced into the Tan Yard and into Dyer Field behind the Union lines.

General Stewart appraised Bragg of this fact, but the Army commander was still fixated on his beloved flanking maneuver or "swinging gate" as some author's have called it, and did not send reinforcements. Another two divisions committed there would have or could have been decisive. Rosecrans had no such fixation problem. It didn't take him long to throw in the just arrived division of Major General Negley, and his XXI<sup>st</sup> Corps Commander, Major General Crittenden, set up a cannon line to halt the Confederate attack on his flank. This sort of brilliant improvisation was not uncommon among Rosecrans subordinates, but not almost never found with Bragg's. A pity for the South.

The second time the Confederates were within sight of a victory came nearly at dusk in the area of the Viniard Field. Two attacks – one by Hood's Division and then one by Preston – seriously dented the Union line. With reinforcement and more vigor, it might have turned the Union flank and cut the Union off from Crawfish Springs and further reinforcements. The only "fly in the ointment" as it were was the presence on this part of the field of Wilder's Brigade. His unit with only about 1,000 men in line had the firepower equivalent of an entire division with its Spencer repeating rifles, and they stopped the

Confederates cold. But, heavier reinforcements and a renewed attack by the Confederates might have forced Wilder back. Night was falling, however, and even if pushed, the attack would have come to a halt with the onset of complete darkness. Night attacks were rare in the civil war with only two on record, and one of them was executed the night of the 19<sup>th</sup>.

Sometimes Bragg's subordinates tried to execute at least something bordering on initiative, and Lt. General Polk did so on the 19<sup>th</sup>. With the arrival of the fresh division of Major General Cleburne, the Bishop deduced that one more thrust might do the trick. In a way, he was right. The Union forces had been giving "some" ground lately, and they were tired. But what Polk didn't know was that Thomas had found better ground for his defenses about a mile back, and was in the process of moving to that area when Cleburne went in. All the attack did was to take ground the Union would have given up without fighting, and causing many casualties for no appreciable gain in Cleburne's division and several of Cheatham's brigades. Again, Bragg and his subordinates could not develop tactics that served the tactical purpose without running up heavy casualties.

The problem as Horatio says in MCBETH is "not in ourselves but in our stars" The mark of a good fighter in the Civil War on both sides was a long casualty list. That somehow compensated for any other failings, and was accepted by the public as a victory – at least in the early part of the war, but as the fighting dragged on in the Wilderness, Grant's standing with the public dipped badly, and Lincoln had to take some political heat for keeping Grant in command. If a commander carried a position without heavy loss, then, somehow, people got the impression that no fighting had taken place. It was not until deep into 1864 that the light dawned on both sides that assaults with high casualty lists are not the harbinger of a victory, nor the end of the war. It's much like having a great deal of money – you don't give it a thought until you are down to your last 100,000 dollars.

On 19 September, Bragg was given two chances to win a major battle, and missed them both. The loss of life was considerable during the 19<sup>th</sup>, but it would be even greater during the 20<sup>th</sup>. That would have been avoided if Bragg had the good sense to take advantage of what the situation gave him, and act flexibly or get his subordinates to act with their better understanding of their immediate situation.

It is difficult to teach subordinates when to exercise initiative and when not too. Clearly, if subordinates fear the wrath of their superior or that the superior will blame them for whatever happens, they will NOT exercise any initiative. They will scrutinize any order to see if they can be blamed for what happens and if they feel they have an out, they won't obey if they think they might get into trouble. A commander where this mindset is rampant in his army will not often see victory.

Military history is filled with examples of commanders that get only one chance for victory. Bragg had two in one day, and on the second day of the battle, he would have two more, one of which was successful but no thanks to his leadership.

At the opposing war councils, each general made his plans for the next day. In the Confederate camp, Bragg continued to believe that his best way to victory was through the Federal left flank. The new

division of Major General John C. Breckinridge which did not fight on the 19<sup>th</sup> was brought up and positioned to being the attack the next day. The orders on how the attack was to begin were clear enough. Promptly at “day-dawn” (about 6:45 am) Breckinridge’s division was to attack the federals and be supported by Major General Walker’s Reserve Corps. But, in Bragg’s army, even simple orders can be mismanaged. And it was partly Bragg’s fault.

For ease of handling, Bragg suddenly decided to do away with the three corps setup, and divide his army into two wings – one commanded by the just arrived Longstreet and the second by Bishop Polk. The third senior officer on the field, Daniel H. Hill was now left out of the equation. Both Longstreet and Polk were made aware of the new command arrangement, but Hill was not, and Bragg went to bed that night with the expectation that at first light, he would hear the fire of his units as they moved to the attack. Bragg hadn’t counted on two factors. One was that the Union would just sit idly by and wait for the attack. This they did not do as Thomas had the Union forces working all night chopping down trees and building breastworks in preparation for the morning attack.

Daylight came, and the minutes passed, but there was no attack. This time, Bragg went out to see why nothing had happened, and he came upon Hill and Breckinridge. Hill told Bragg that he had not seen the day’s orders, and as such, he had given Breckinridge the authority to halt his attack so that his men could be fed. Unfortunately, Bragg then allowed this to continue rather than directly ordering the assault to begin which he should have done. Both Hill and Breckinridge were aware that the pickets could hear the Union forces felling trees for some sort of defensive works. The longer that they had to work, the better their defenses would be.

At least some in Bragg’s Army could obey orders. About 500 yards back of Breckinridge’s division, stood the two division of Walker’s Reserve Corps. They were in line of battle, ready for action at the appointed time. Major General Walker had received, understood and executed his orders.

As a result of the breakfast, the attack did not jump off until 0930. The Union forces had more than 2 extra hours to prepare their positions. Time was important then as it is now. Any extra time for the opposition to prepare for an attack that they know will come borders on the criminal. It did here, and when Helm’s brigade approached the Union lines, they attacked at right angles to it because their skirmishers had not been able to determine the enemy’s front line trace. Union troops were lying or kneeling within a dark wood line, and Helm’s soldiers approached close to their position without seeing them. The first volley struck down many of the Orphan Brigade, and as he tried to rally his, he, too, was hit and died shortly thereafter.

The important fact of his action was NOT that Helm’s brigade was massacred, and Colonel Colquitt’s [it had been Brigadier General Gist’s brigade before he moved to divisional command and had been specifically requested by Hill to make the attack] which was committed after it. The other two brigades of Breckinridge’s division – Stovall and Adams – were doing quite well. This time, the Union supplied the reason.

At about 0700, General Rosecrans rode his battle line. At his left flank, Thomas warned him that the MacDonald Farm was a weak spot as the defensive position he had created did not encompass it, and he had no troops to defend it. Therefore, Rosecrans gave him Negley's division, pulling it out of line and replacing it with that of Brigadier General Wood. Only one brigade of that division that arrived prior to the Confederate attack, and Beatty's brigade was stretched – it was not a large brigade to begin with – thin with two regiments near Alexander Bridge Road and two more near Reed's Bridge Road. It was this brigade that sustained the Union right at Stone's River nearly a year earlier. They were easily overwhelmed by Stovall and Adams, and they swept over the fields of the MacDonald Farm stopping to reform for about 20 minutes near Alexander Bridge Road, and then plunged into the woods with Stovall on the left and Adams on the right. It was at this point that the South could have won the battle had Walker's Corps been committed as a whole.

Breckinridge informed his chain of command that if he had reinforcements, he could continue his attack, and probably roll up the Union line. However, Lt. General Hill had other ideas, and he had already begun using Walker's Corps as individual units – one brigade at a time, to hurl them against the deep defensive line developed by Thomas. It was a futile gesture. The Union line was so dense on the left flank that there were extra regiments lying unused in Kelly Field because there was no place for them in the line – the same with artillery batteries. Thomas had put all of his strength into his line and kept none in reserve for a potential turning of his flank. When this did happen, he acted promptly enough, but it was more like a panic situation than one that had been foreseen. It was this attack that set the stage for the movement of Wood's division because like the Confederate Commander, his Union counterpart was also worried about his flank toward Chattanooga. He was, as he had said during the discussion at the Widow Glenn's the night before, willing to abandon the right. He was about to make good on his promise.

Bragg again missed an opportunity. Had he called a general commanders meeting as Lee often did, he could have insured that his commanders were briefed on the plan, and could take initiative based on their understanding of it. When junior commanders meet under the control of the senior commander, considerable synergy can result. Bragg was not into synergy, quite the opposite. He never understood to his dying day that the army was a "team" and that all efforts had to be focused on winning the battle and not engaging in vulgar squabbling over trivialities. That problem has not been eradicated in any army since then – look at some U.S. commanders during Korea and Vietnam. Even Desert Storm has now started to unravel into battles between commanders over actions before and during combat. As a result, the chance to end the battle early went glimmering.

When the decisive point of the battle arrived, it was not General Bragg that was responsible but General Longstreet. Were the troops and commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia superior to this counterparts in the Army of the Tennessee – of course not. Longstreet was not superior to Bragg, he was just more flexible. He had seen Lee's best troops – Virginians all – smashed to bits during Pickett's

charge. He was against the charge and tried to talk Lee out of it, but was unable to budge his superior. Lee rarely developed a rigid tactical plan, but with Bragg, this was a common malady. Longstreet was given control of the left wing with a total of five divisions, and Bragg did not interfere with his dispositions.

Longstreet reasoned that the only way to break a line held by the enemy armed with rifled muskets and in enough numbers was to attack with a long column striking the enemy's line along a narrow front. What normally stopped attacks like this in the past was that the troops were not deep enough to maintain the momentum once they penetrated an opponent's line. This was what Longstreet wanted.

Like the Theban general Epaminondas, he intended to overload one point of his opponents line. He marshaled a column of 11,000 troops spearheaded by Bushrod Johnson's division with Hood, and then McLaws behind. This column had momentum aplenty, but no thanks to Bragg. The one problem with this was that General Longstreet had substituted weight of numbers for tactical flexibility. He seemed to have no knowledge that the Union right flank was far weaker, and that his troops had almost overrun it at dusk the day before. In fact, Rosecrans had pulled it in and tightened it, but that did not protect from a major disaster that much. Only Wilder's Brigade positioned over by the Widow Glen's had the mobility and firepower to be an attack stopper.

As it was, two fairly fresh division – those of Major General Hindman and Major General Preston would probably have overwhelmed the weak division of Jefferson Davis and would have forced Wilder to give ground and would have had a good chance to duplicate the mayhem that he caused with the movement through Wood's vacated position at less cost if used in conjunction with an attack against Wood.

Military History shows that rarely does one attack always do the trick. Normally there must be a secondary attack or two to set up the main attack. Actually Bragg accomplished this, but not as a planned maneuver. He remained until the end of the battle wedded to his turning of the Union flank. The drumfire attacks against the Union left forced Rosecrans to denude his right flank to a dangerous level, and it cost him dearly. But, the cost was tremendous – much like Napoleon's attacks at Aspern-Essling. Napoleon won the battle but the cost was prohibitive. Bragg would be like Napoleon here.

Longstreet's attack was successful due to its timing that the Confederates had nothing to do with. It was Rosecrans down mistake that provided his unexpected dividend. Neither Longstreet nor his immediate commanders had expected to have so easy a time breaking through the Union front. The Union troops in the west had an uncommon knack of fighting hard as those from the Army of the Tennessee told the new arrivals from Northern Virginia.

When Longstreet collapsed the Union right flank, Bragg was still not aware that he had won a great victory. He made the final mistake of his defeat at Chickamauga by allowing Polk and Longstreet to work together which meant that each side would attack independently and not collectively. This allowed

the Union forces to continue to resist, and the longer they resisted, the chances for the total destruction of the Union army was lost. General Forrest sent a message to General Bragg that the Union forces appeared to be in a panic and they were preparing to retreat.

The Confederate Army was not moved in pursuit, and Forrest was so livid that he and Bragg had a spectacular falling out a few days later when Bragg took most of Forrest's troops away from him and gave them to Major General Joe Wheeler who Forrest considered to be a "child" and a less than adequate general. If a general must lose heavily in a battle, it should be in a winning cause. But because Bragg allowed the Union army to get away, he forfeited the victory and the casualties. One of the reasons that Bragg could not move the army in a pursuit operation was that it had been battered so heavily in the two days battle of Chickamauga that it was in no condition to move anywhere. There would be no strike into the "Yankee" heartland states as might have happened had the cost been far less.

Look at the Confederate casualties. Nearly 30% of the Confederate army had been killed or wounded in the battle. General Bragg had begun the battle with nearly 68,000 men, and he had about 48,000 left. It was not enough to begin anything like an offense that had been envisioned by Longstreet and others when they talked President Davis into this concentration. They had wanted the defeat of the Army of the Cumberland, but after that, a movement into the center of the Union. With a substantial part of the Union Army shut up in Chattanooga Bragg could go nowhere until that situation worked itself, and the reinforcements that the Union had launched to support Rosecrans when Longstreet moved, were now coming into contact range.

General Bragg would need all his troops for one reason. He well knew that the Union had sent reinforcements to Rosecrans – in all, 40,000 troops were on the way. When combined with what remained of the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga, that would give the Union forces nearly 80,000 men versus roughly 48,000 Confederates. The prospect of Confederate reinforcements was nil. All that was available had been sent. Bragg had squandered them in a futile battle that has been listed as a Confederate victory but was, in reality, a defeat. At first sight, the South was jubilant when news of Chickamauga reached throughout the Confederacy, but within just a few days, when the horrendous casualty lists came in, the South began to realize that it wasn't a victory. What might have been never was.

Burton Wright III, Ph.D  
Command Historian

5 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR Chemical Officer Advanced Course

SUBJECT: Briefings of Major Participants -- Battle of Chickamauga

1. Comparison of Briefings -- Bad and Good

## CHICKAMAUGA BRIEFING

## PERSONALITY BRIEFING

ASSIGNED LEADER: Major General Patrick R. Cleburne

**BRIEFING ONE**

General Cleburne was born in Ireland in 1844. When he was a young man, he enlisted in a British Infantry Regiment in which he served for three years. His parents bought out the remaining years of his term of service. General Cleburne migrated from Ireland and arrived in the United States. He settled in the state of Arkansas and worked as a druggist. He had wanted to be a druggist in his native Ireland, but that required a knowledge of Latin, and he had not mastered Latin enough to take the exam. He became active in politics in the state, and was elected to several municipal offices. His friendship with Major General Hindman who served with him as a division commander in the Army of the Tennessee was of long standing. It seems that Hindman, during a speech he made in Helena, had maligned a local family whose brother swore revenge. Hindman came to Cleburne, and asked him to back him in any fight with this family. Cleburne did so, and was wounded in the back during an ambush on the main street of Helena. Thereafter, his relationship with General Hindman was a deep one. When the war began, he became an officer in a regiment called the "Yell Rifles" and quickly rose to command that regiment. General Cleburne then became a brigade commander, and then a division commander after the Battle of Stone's River. His rearguard action after the Battle of Chattanooga is considered to be a masterpiece of that art. With just his division of 4,000 men, he held back

Sherman's entire army of 30,000 at little loss to himself and great loss to Sherman. He remained a divisional commander until his death at the Battle of Franklin. Normally an officer of such a caliber as Cleburne would have rose to a higher level of command, but he wrote what is called the Cleburne Memorial in which he advocated arming slaves to fight for the Confederacy. This created quite a stir in Richmond, and Cleburne barely retained command of his division. While a division commander, Cleburne was well liked by his men who thought that he was competent as a commander. He also generally got along with most of his fellow commanders in the Army of the Tennessee. Just before his death at Franklin, Cleburne had become engaged to a young lady and had applied for leave to go and marry her. The leave was to take effect after the end of the campaign. As his division was passing a church yard near Franklin [the church of the Polk family], Cleburne remarked that if he died he would like to be buried there. He was.

## **BRIEFING TWO**

**BRIEFING: MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK R. CLEBURNE**

**WAS BORN IN IRELAND IN 1840. IMMIGRATED TO THE U.S. AND BECAME A SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSMAN. ROSE TO DIVISION COMMAND, AND FOUGHT IN MOST OF THE BATTLES OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE. KILLED AT THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN IN 1865. BURIED IN A CHURCHYARD OUTSIDE OF FRANKLIN.**

1. Is there anything missing from the above biographical sketch based on the enclosed full biography? What doesn't this tell you about Cleburne the man, and how it affected his actions? What doesn't this tell you about Cleburne's performances as a commander?
2. If you had an officer brief you based on your knowledge (based on the larger biography), what would you think the officer had done to prepare for this briefing?
3. Why is it a good idea of go into greater detail on the personalities of civil war commander? Why would you do it if you were the staff ride leader?
4. How do you go about finding the information you need to do a good biography of your commander?

GENERALS IN BLUE

GENERALS IN GRAY

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

LIBRARY LEADER FOLDERS (BY NAME -- ASK)

BOOKS ON THE BATTLE

TUCKER -- CHICKAMAUGA -- BLOODY BATTLE IN THE WEST

COUZZENS -- THIS TERRIBLE SOUND

5. Who would you ask for assistance?

Historian

SGL

Librarian --- Mr. Pastorette

Civil War Expert - Historian

3. What do you look for in a good briefing?

Knowledge

Poise

Well thought out

Concise

Clear

4. Hope this helps you put out the best briefing possible.

BURTON WRIGHT III, Ph.D

Command Historian

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND HISTORIAN  
U.S. Army Chemical School  
Fort McClellan, Alabama**

31 March 1997

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Logistics in the Chickamauga/Chattanooga Campaign

1. The logistics of both armies was very important, but particularly the Union. Rosecrans had deliberately taken the hardest route into the Confederate rear, and he had to supply his army over that route. The 58,000 man Army of the Cumberland needed more than 200 tons of supply per day. Rosecrans had to create a supply system from what the authorities in Washington would allocate him [weapons, food, oats and grain, uniforms, etc.].
2. The Union set up a rail line from Louisville to Nashville to Murfreesboro through Tullahoma to Bridgeport -- part of the rail line from Tullahoma to Bridgeport had to be rebuilt. But, the Confederates left few working locomotives, so the U.S. Military Railways had to keep the line running, and they could only move about 10 tons per day down the line to Bridgeport. Therefore, Rosecrans had to wait. He wanted to have enough logistics to supply his army for at least two battles and several major skirmishers. This took time, and got Rosecrans into a painful and acrimonious exchange with Washington over his time table of movement. In late July, Rosecrans felt he had enough logistics, and moved toward his ultimate objective of Chattanooga.
3. The Union forces had to struggle over two major mountain ranges (Sand and Lookout Mountains) to get to the battlefield. As the Army began to move out, Rosecrans had made plans to bring movement of his logistical supply system from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. He had even signed contracts with several bridge building firms in St. Louis to re-build railroad bridges going into Chattanooga. The railway to Chattanooga from the

west had been heavily damaged, and in order to bring large amounts of supplies from his intermediate depots in Murfreesboro and Nashville, Rosecrans needed to have those bridges up and running as his troops entered Chattanooga.

4. During the battle, the Army of the Cumberland did not suffer from a lack of material or ammunition. But, as the Army straggled into Chattanooga after the battle, they had lost a considerable part of the Army supply trains, and the depots at Bridgeport had not yet been moved to the city. Therefore, no significant stockpiles of supplies had been brought to the city before the Confederates clamped down on the Union forces.

5. The South had less of a problem. They were closer to their supply areas and their principal base of supply at Ringgold, Georgia. The South did not lack food or forage. Far from it, but the railway system the South then controlled did not have enough trains to support both the civilian and military at the same time. The South did not create an organization like the U.S. Military Railway System. They left the operation in the hands of the individual owners. So, it was often hard to orchestrate a efficient supply system. In addition to supporting the Army of the Tennessee, the areas of Georgia and Alabama also supported the Army of Northern Virginia, and they, being commanded by the best General in the South, Robert E. Lee, got the pick of the supplies and first call. The Army of the Tennessee got second choice. The supplies were stockpiled in Confederate government warehouses in Atlanta and then shipped north west to Ringgold or Northeast to Virginia. Unlike the North, the South had to build a logistical installation system from the ground up, and by this time of the war, General Josiah Gorgas had created more than two dozen major depots in the states of Alabama and Georgia. These installations supplied the principal military needs of the two major Confederate armies. Like their Union counterparts, they did not lack for powder and shell. Food and forage was another matter. Although largely agricultural, so many men had joined the military that the South did not have the manpower to keep many of its farms running. It was not uncommon to find a wife and children doing all the farming -- moving the plow and planting the seeds. The needs of the Army for horses and mules also arrested planting cycles. In the early

part of the war, soldiers frequently took “French leave” and went home to help with the planting and rejoined their units in the Spring. By late 1863, this had been stopped.

6. After the Battle of Chickamauga, the South managed to stop for nearly two months regular supplies into Chattanooga and came near to starving out the Army of the Cumberland, but in their camps around the city, the Confederates suffered nearly as equally as the North. When Joseph E. Johnson took over the army several weeks after the debacle of Chattanooga, he found an army not only beaten, but clothed in tatters and having little to eat. If Joe Johnson was anything, he was an efficient quartermaster and his handling of the supply situation radically improved food and supplies for his army. When the Atlanta campaign began in May, 1864, he had build up the Army of the Tennessee to 75,000 (versus Sherman’s 110,000) soldiers who were reasonably well clothed and fed.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE  
AT CHICKAMAUGA**

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**I. PRIOR TO THE CAMPAIGN**

Both sides used line crossers. Sometimes they would be former or actual slaves (used largely by Union forces), but more often they would be people disguised as simple civilians. They would obtain information on what they could see and hear from conversation. Also, both armies used local newspapers to obtain some intelligence data. They would read the editorials and other information contained therein to find out what was going on. People in the military often talked freely to newspaper people because there was not a real knowledge of security to keep them from reveling information.

Both sides also attempted to get prisoners. In most instances, Union and Confederate privates would talk rather freely of what was going on. However, unless they were located at a higher headquarters, they knew little beyond their regiment or brigade. Besides, neither side had trained interrogators.

Sometimes both sides would send in small packets of cavalry on deep missions to find out. They were what in Vietnam would be called "trail watchers". They were looking for any clue to the large

scale movement of troops or supplies. They would then return with some or no information.

Rumors played a great part in what both armies did. In most instances, a civilian through which the units passed depended on people met to furnish information. In the case of Major General Negley, he depended upon local civilians for guidance on the roads. Often, they told him either false or misleading information. Rumors began this way, and without proper information to discount them, they often grew into large proportions.

## **II. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE**

This came largely from Washington. An example would be the information that a corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had left its camps in Virginia bound for who knows where. Since Rosecrans Army was then the only federal army moving, it did not take a rocket scientist to determine where Longstreet was bound for. This information was obtained through the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (its G-2) by the use of newspapers, prisoners, and line-crossers. The information was telegraphed to Rosecrans as he began his campaign into the Chattanooga area.

## **III Tactical Intelligence**

Only by the use of two type: prisoner of war interrogations and by cavalry patrols and what soldiers saw and reported. General Forrest was particularly active in this regard as well as Col. Minty. The rest of the cavalry on both sides did little to provide real intelligence. Most of that was gotten right on the battlefield by the participants

**and sometimes, skirmishers out in front of units would see and hear things which would be reported back. For instance, the skirmishers in front of Breckinridge's division heard the Union forces chopping down trees and concluded -- correctly -- that they were building breastworks. Why the high command did not profit from this information can only be imagined.**

Burton Wright III, Ph.D  
Command Historian, USACMLS

## **CHICKAMAUGA STAFF RIDE SCRIPT**

### **FIRST STOP: MACLEMORE'S COVE**

**General Negley**

How did you and your division get here?

Answer: His division was the lead part of that wing of the Union movement south of Chattanooga. He had crossed Raccoon Mountain and Sand Mountain, and was heading toward his objective which was Lafayette, Georgia

**General Bragg**

Why are the divisions of Generals Patrick Cleburne and Thomas Hindman with the Corps of General Buckner behind him. What is your intention.

Answer: General Bragg had NOT evacuated Chattanooga in haste, but had laid a trap for General Rosecrans, and the Union commander had fallen into it. Bragg was well aware that the Union forces were spread out – he had received reports of heavy Union movement opposite Chattanooga, and both North and South of it. Bragg correctly reasoned that the Union forces would move in and occupy Chattanooga and build it up as a base before campaigning further. If the Confederates looked as though they were in panicked retreat, then the Union forces might continue to pursue and also be scattered which would allow Bragg to defeat them in detail by concentrating his army against the smaller parts of the Union Army. He was about to succeed.

**General Cleburne**

Why are you here?

Answer: You are part of General D. H. Hill's Corps. You are currently blocking Dug Gap to prevent the oncoming Union forces from moving through the Gap. You have fortified the gap by felling trees and creating other obstacles. You, however, have reported yourself sick.

**General Hindman**

Why are you here?

Answer: Division is blocking Union retreat to the North. The only way OUT of the area called MacLemore's Cove is to the West the way the Union division entered the cove. My directions are to hold position and wait for the order to attack.

General Negley

What did you do on the morning of September

Answer: Having spent the night in the vicinity of Davis' Crossroads, I moved the division out at first light to march on Lafayette. I do not have any cavalry with my formation, so I took my staff out nearly a half mile in front, and rode in advance. I was fired upon by the Confederate skirmishers 700 meters from the lower part of Dug Gap, I immediately turned about and put the leading brigade of the division into line and that unit threw out skirmishers. After a short fire fight, I moved the bulk of the division to the area of Davis' Crossroads and set up a L shaped position because my skirmishers detected a large Confederate force on the flank. I prepared to defend the position against a Confederate attack from my front and left flank. The right flank has no enemy on it because there are no passes – the terrain in that direction has not entry system out of the mountain chain.

General Bragg

Why haven't your units attacks and crushed the single Union division that you outnumber nearly 4 to 1.

Answer: General Bragg is currently located at the top of Dug Gap and is impatiently waiting for the attack to begin. General Hill is with him. But, General Hindman has not attacked. He says that he is worried about his flank as he had received reports of Union troops entering Stevens Gap. General Bragg orders the two division corps of General S. B. Buckner to support Hindman. Still Hindman does not attack. General Cleburne who claims to be ill has said he cannot attack immediately because his men have to clear the obstacles they erected in the Gap before they can advance. All that day, the one Union division holds its battle line, but there is no fighting. That night, a second Union division joins the first at its crossroads position. There are now nearly 10,000 Union troops there, but Hindman has not attacked. He sent a Major who is of French extraction who could barely speak English. He gave the Army commander a confused view of the situation from Hindman's perspective, but this did nothing to clear up the picture for Bragg. The next day, the impasse continued, and it took another day before Bragg rode over to Hindman and ordered him to attack. By that time, the Union divisions has begun to back out of the Cove, and when Bragg met Hindman at the now abandoned Union position of Davis' Crossroads, all that was seen was the rear guard of the Union forces at the lower end of Stevens Gap. Bragg's attempt to trap a Union division had not occurred

To all Southern Commanders on the scene

General Bragg  
General Hill  
General Cleburne  
General Hindman

Why did the attempt to trap misfire?

You first General Bragg? Who do you blame for this?

**LESSONS LEARNED:**

*Commanders should insure that their subordinates obey orders. Bragg should have personally intervened and ordered an attack immediately rather than waiting. It was plainly obvious that the local commanders did not have confidence in either Bragg or his plan. In such a situation, commanders should be relieved and replaced by individuals who will obey orders. Take a look at the terrain. Notice how close Stevens Gap is, and while it is true that Federal troops were entering the gap, they would not have saved the Union division already in the cove. Bragg should have moved quickly to quell any problem and he did not do so under after the campaign, and then only haltingly. Decisive action is required here and it was lacking. Bragg violated the principles of unity of command, and the attack. His plan was sound, his execution faulty.*

**NEXT STOP: LEE AND GORDON'S MILL**

General Bragg

What were your plans here?

Answer: Part of Crittenden's Corps are located here. One Confederate Corps is available for attack – that of Bishop Polk. He is told to attack the Union troops in front of him, but sends back messages similar to that sent by Hindman – he needs reinforcements before attacking as he had no cavalry and cannot develop the situation.

General Polk

What are your reasons for not attacking

Answer, I do not know the strength of the Union positions in front of me, and I need to have substantial reinforcements available to insure that I won't be attacked in turn.

General Bragg

What did you do when General Polk would not attack?

Answer: Sent messengers urging him to attack and then went there in person to hurry him along. By that time, the Union forces had withdrawn out of range.

**LESSONS LEARNED:**

*Exactly the same as above. Bragg let his commander on the spot dictate the action without either going to the spot to supervise the action or to direct that it be done. When Polk did not attack, Bragg should have demanded an explanation and taken appropriate action, which he did not at that time. Another chance to defeat part of the Union army in detail was lost due to the fact that Bragg wrote orders open to change, and that he allowed this to take place made his subordinates contemptuous of his authority. They simply did not believe in his plans, and felt that they had the right to either outright disobey orders or interpret them according to their own feelings.*

**NEXT STOP: ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE**

Colonel Wilder

Why was your brigade defending Alexander's Bridge

Answer: Ordered here by General Rosecrans to keep the Confederates from crossing West Chickamauga Creek. I deployed the brigade in a defensive position on the West side of the creek. A Confederate Brigade approached and attacked from the march. They charged several times, but the brigades Spencer repeating rifles beat them back. After holding most of the day, the brigades flanks were turned, and the brigade retired down the Alexander-Viniard Road toward the Viniard. General Rosecrans was informed of the loss of the bridge.

**LESSONS LEARNED:**

*Never attack without properly reconning the situation. When presented with superior firepower, find a way around, or dig-in and ask for reinforcements. Wilder could have held the bridge indefinitely if the terrain had made it the only way to cross the creek, but that wasn't the case. Actually there were nearly a dozen places where infantry could cross and flank Wilder and he had outposted them to give him warning. The Confederates simply outflanked him, but he had bought the requisite amount of time that had been expected by Rosecrans.*

**STOP: REED'S BRIDGE**

Colonel Minty

Why was your 900 plus brigade defending this bridge

Answer: I was ordered to by General Rosecrans to deny it to the Confederates. I used a forward defense by stationing one battalion of cavalry as far forward as Pea Vine Creek. It was at that point that Confederate forces were engaged. Using parallel ridges to delay the division of Confederate infantry, the brigade delayed the Confederates from 0700 to nearly noon when Confederate cavalry took the bridge. Because of its stout construction and my lack of explosives prevented destruction of the bridge and the Confederates seized it more or less intact. The brigade withdrew to the area of Rossville. During combat, I had asked Col. Wilder for support and he has sent a regiment and a section of guns which I then sent on to Dyer Bridge north of Reed's bridge. The Confederates never threatened that area during the battle, so I withdrew the force and sent it back to Col. Wilder.

General Bushrod Johnson

What were your orders and how did you conduct your division during this action?

Answer: My provisional division of four brigades had reached Ringgold, Georgia by train on the evening of 17 September. The next morning I was directed by the Army commander to march the division over Reed's bridge and sweep south to get on the federal flank which was then at Lee and Gordon's Mill. I began promptly at first light, and about 0700 ran into a federal cavalry picket – I had not cavalry units at that time although General Forrest had joined the column – in fact, he and his staff rode out in front of the division. I did not know if the cavalry was concealing a infantry force, so I proceed carefully, and by nearly noon had forced the union cavalry back to Reed's bridge which General Forrest took by attacking with his cavalry and scattering the remaining federal cavalry. I began crossing the division to the other side at 1500 and turned the division down Jay's Mill Road to move upon the federal flank.

NEXT STOP: JAY'S MILL

Colonel McCook

Why is your brigade here the night of the 18<sup>th</sup>

Answer: I was ordered to come from Rossville to reinforce Col. Minty holding Reed's bridge. I arrived near the joining of Jay's Mill Road and Reed's Bridge road at dark, 18 September. I halted the brigade 400 yards from the cross-roads and sent forward a small recon party. They brought a number of Confederates prisoners. In talking to the prisoners, I learned that a single confederate brigade was on the east bank of the Chickamauga. I had already sent an entire regiment down to the bridge which they said that they destroyed. Therefore, the confederate brigade was isolated. I sent a messenger

to General Thomas, the senior officer present about the lone brigade, then the brigade spent the night in the vicinity of Jay's Mill.

## MORNING OF THE 19<sup>TH</sup> OF SEPTEMBER

General Thomas

Why did you send Brannan's division to the area of Jay's Mill

Answer: to capture the lone brigade. It seemed at the time to be an easy thing to do. The corps was to hold open the Lafayette Road, and so far as I knew, there were no large confederate forces West of Chickamauga Creek.

General Forrest

What were you doing at Jay's Mill

Answer: Protecting the Right Flank of Bragg's Army. It was there that Confederate Cavalry met Union infantry and a battle developed around the area of Jay's Mill. I immediately looked for infantry reinforcement while attempting to stop the Union forces to the front.

General Croxton

What happened?

Answer: My brigade was the leading Brigade of Brannan's division. I took them off Lafayette Road at first light and moved down a small farm road toward Jay's Mill. About a ½ mile into the woods, I put the 1,200 men of the brigade on line, and moved forward. About 400 meters from Jay's Mill, I encountered a unit of Confederate cavalry which was repulsed. Shortly thereafter, heavy masses of Confederate infantry came forward and began to exchange volleys. I was losing roughly 3 or more men a minute. Colonel Van Devere's Brigade was on my left flank, and BG King's Brigade of Regulars as a reserve. I continued to battle.

General Bragg

Did you intend to fight here? What was your basic battle plan?

Answer: No. The plan as issued the night before (18 September) was for the provisional division of General "Bushrod" Johnson to move over Reed's Bridge and move south on Jay's Mill road – other corps level units including Walker's corps was to move over Alexander's bridge and join Johnson on an attack to "roll-up" the Union left flank which was – at last report – located near Lee and Gordon's Mill. Union troops so far

North was not expected, but when asked for reinforcement from Forrest and others, I ordered more troops to move to the sound of the guns.

General Rosecrans

Do you intend to fight here? What was your plan?

Answer: No. My headquarters was still at Crawfish Springs. My main concern was keeping the road open to Chattanooga (Lafayette Road), and I wanted to re-unite the scattered elements of the army some of which had not joined me by dawn on the 19<sup>th</sup>. I was told there were no Confederate forces West of Chickamauga Creek, but I had placed Thomas' Corps in a position to protect our movement into Chattanooga. I had no intention of bringing on a general engagement until all the army was up. I had also received information that elements of Longstreet's Corps was enroute to the battlefield which, when they arrived, give Bragg a considerable superiority in numbers. Thomas' movement to pick up the lone Confederate brigade was entirely on his own initiative.

General Brannen

How does the battle go here for you?

Answer: Well at first. Croxton's brigade drove the enemy back, and quickly was stopped by Confederate reinforcements. At that point, he ran out of ammunition as he was conducting a passage of lines with BG King's Regular Brigade, King was assailed on the flank by a two brigade confederate force and his brigade shattered with hundreds of prisoners. I threw in Starkweather's brigade to counter attack, and restore the line, but the line as it then stood about 500 yards from the mill was tenuous at best as both my flanks were weak, but General Baird's division was close at hand, and as long as no further confederates attacked in on my flanks, I could hold for a while longer.

STOP: WINFREY FIELD

TIME – 0900 HRS – 19 SEPTEMBER 1863

General Baird

Your brigade commander by Colonel Scribner was routed here. Why?

Answer: Scribner's brigade took the Confederates who had stampeded King and Starkweather in the flank and forced them back. His line was located in the woods to your front. His men and the battery commanded by Lt. Van Pelt were resting there when they were suddenly taken in the flank by the brigades of Govan and Ector. He first learned of it when his brigade surgeon reported to him and told him he has just been a prisoner of the Confederates. Scribner could not swing his brigade around in time to stem the confederate attack.

Why was Van Pelt's battery lost?

Answer: Lieutenant Van Pelt's battery was placed in support of Scribner's brigade on the edge of Winfrey Field. It was overrun by Confederate infantry and all horses were shot down so that the guns of the battery could not be recovered and was taken.

STOP: Brock Field

General Cheatham

What was your mission ?

Answer: I was told by the army commander to move my five brigade division and tie-in on the right flank of Liddell's division. I entered an area called Brock's field where I encountered Union infantry of the divisions of Generals Palmer and Johnson. A fight developed for possession of the field which continued until around 1200 hours. My division did not make much headway against the Union troops, and they remained in control of most of the Brock field until nightfall.

General Johnson:

Why was your division in the area of the Brock Field?

Answer: I was directed by the army commander to support the divisions of Baird and Brannan near Jay's mill. I tied into Baird's right flank, and counter attacked pushing the confederates back through the area of Brock's Field. I was, in turn counter-attacked by a Confederate division and forced back. I asked for reinforcements, and the division of General Palmer tied in on my right flank, and helped my division hold its position

General Palmer:

Why was your division in the Brock Field?

Answer: I was sent by the Army commander to reinforce Union forces fighting there. General Rosecrans recommended that I move my division en echelon [that is, each brigade behind the other but at angles spreading out behind so that the division was oriented if it was attacked from the right flank. A good idea as it turned out. I spent most of the late morning fighting for control of the field.

General Rosecrans:

What is your plan at this point of the battle?

Answer: To protect control of the Lafayette Road and to unite the army as soon as possible. This was not the area that I would have accepted battle, but the Confederates had attacked, and battle must be accepted.

General Bragg:

What is your plan at this point in the battle?

Answer: Union forces in this location was unexpected, and those forces must be dealt with. My plans remain unchanged. To turn the Union left and possess the Lafayette Road and roll-up the Union forces. I still have a considerable force available for this, and will continue once the Union forces currently fighting are forced back to the road and I can consolidate my forces

STOP: Brotherton House

General Van Cleve

What was your division doing here and what happened

Answer: My division of three brigades was defending this area and a Confederate division hit my flank and collapsed my units in and around the Brotherton Road. They retreated in disarray through the Tan Yard and into North Dyer Field.

General Stewart

What was your division doing here?

Answer: I was directed by General Bragg to move up and support the division of General Cheatham. I found his left flank, but decided to go in column of brigades(one behind the other), and when my troops attacked, they took Union forces in the flank and shattered them. At first, the Union lines held, but they gave way as the hammer blows of the brigades hit them. I sent word to General Bragg that I had made a breakthrough in the Union lines, and I needed reinforcements to continue the attack. I never received them, and eventually, Union troops on both flanks counterattacked, and forced my brigades, now depleted in numbers back nearly to their original starting lines.

General Bragg

Why did you not give General Stewart the reinforcements he needed?

Answer: I did not want to commit more reserves because the situation was not that well developed. I did not know exactly where the Union forces were, and perhaps, there might be more on my flanks. I wanted to keep an active reserve, and one available to turn the Union flank the next day to cut them off from Chattanooga.

General Negley

Why was your division used in the containment of the penetration?

Answer: I was coming up from Crawfish Springs, and saw the penetration in progress, and was ordered by General Rosecrans to contain it. I did so, and helped to stabilize the situation.

General Crittenden

What did you do to stabilize the situation?

Answer: When I saw the penetration, I knew that it could break the army in two, so I helped to create a line of batteries on the flanks of the penetration, and rapidly tried to pull infantry from units nearest to the break to help contain it. I was successful from the right flank as Union forces also attacked from the left and contained the penetration and forced the Confederate units – later identified to be A. P. Stewart's Division – back across the Lafayette and restored the Union lines – but only barely.

**STOP: AREA OF WILDER'S BRIGADE – DITCH OF DEATH**

Colonel Wilder:

Why was your Brigade backing the division of Jefferson Davis

Answer: I had been moved to that location on the evening of 18 September, and had remained there. The troopers had built log breastworks and remained there. I had four guns from Lilly's battery on one flank and a two gun section on the left. When the Confederates of Longstreet's Corps attacked and drove the two brigades of Davis back through my position, I let the fleeing Union troops get past and then took the Confederates on. The Spencer rifles defeated every attempt to rush the position. A dry steam bed (ditch) was in front of the position, and the Confederates took shelter in it. Captain Eli Lilly moved up two of his 3 in ordnance rifles to enfilade the ditch, and fired nearly 200 rounds of canister. The slaughter in the ditch was terrible with Confederate dead stacked 3 and 4 deep. The attack stopped, and Davis' division, now reformed took up position on the flank and the fighting stopped for the night with no further attacks made by the Confederates.

**NEXT STOP:**

Viniard Field

Brigadier General Davis

Why was your division fighting in this area and across the Lafayette Road?

Answer: My division marched from Crawfish Springs in mid-morning, and arrived at the headquarters of General Rosecrans headquarters in early afternoon and marched right past the Widow Glenn's house. I saw Rosecrans there, and he directed that I take a position in front of his headquarters along a large open field. I marched my division there which had only two brigades – Heg's brigade on the left and Mitchell's brigade on the right. The two brigades crossed the Lafayette Road, and Heg's brigade first encountered oncoming battle lines of Confederates. At least five brigades of Confederates attacked – some of them apparently from Longstreet's corps – forced Heg's and Mitchell's brigades back in disarray. They were able to rally behind the strong stand of Wilder's brigade. I managed to form the two brigades, and in conjunction with several brigades of the just arrived division of Major General Sheridan, the lines prior to the attack were restored somewhat as darkness fell.

NEXT STOP:  
Widow Glenn's

General Rosecrans

As of the end of fighting on the 19<sup>th</sup> of September, how would you assess your position?

Answer: The position of the army was not a strong one, but most of the units were up or within supporting distance. My lines ran generally north and south and at time either at or near the Lafayette Road. My army's ability to retreat to Chattanooga was not blocked. At the commanders meeting late on the night of the 19<sup>th</sup>, I polled the commanders and determined that while losses were heavy, the army's ability to retain its ground was not badly damaged. I was resolved to renew the battle the next day, but only to hold position and keep the road to Chattanooga open. I had gotten the impression that General Bragg was resolved to turn my left flank and cut me off from the city. Since I had General Thomas on that flank, I wasn't worried, but I was willing to support his resistance and position there to sustain the army to include abandoning the right. Actually, I found the commanders to be in good spirits. They seemed confident and not worried. They all believed they could hold all the next day. Ammunition was still relatively plentiful, but the Army was cut off from water, but they was not yet a critical concern. I wanted to leave the small Reserve Corps near Rossville to guard MacFarland's Gap and keep the road open in case retreat became necessary. Longstreet's Corps has been identified in the ranks of Bragg's Army. The Confederates could outnumber my own army was over 10,000 or more. The Army was very lucky to have managed to reform given the long distances that were marched before most of it was concentrated. I can only thank the Confederates for not concentrating until I had most of the division up and could feed them into a line. I intend to ride the lines at first light to get a feel for the position of the divisions, and I want to have at least one or two divisions out of the line so that I can rapidly reinforce any breakthrough area. If the army can hold tomorrow, I have every expectation that Bragg's army will retire.

General Bragg

How did you feel about the battle on the 19<sup>th</sup>? Did you achieve all of your objectives?

Answer: I did not want to fight the battle along the Lafayette Road. My original plans called for the sweeping of the Union left flank at Lee and Gordon's Mill to the South, and crushing the Union Army well away from any of its possible safe bases. This did not take place, but I continued to hammer at the Union lines all day. Most of General Longstreet's divisions are now up. My main attack will take place on my right flank against the Union units holding the Lafayette Road. My plan is still the same – to encircle the Union left and cut them off from Chattanooga. To that purpose, I've put the army into two wings – one commanded by Polk and one by General Longstreet. Polk's is the key wing, and will make the main attack. He is to attack at "day-dawn" and each unit from north to south moves out in sequence so that they will all, more or less, strike the Union line at the same time. Once the flank has been turned and the Union line ruptured, the Union army can be defeated in detail. A operations order has been written to accomplish this plan and sent to the various commanders. D.H. Hill's two division corps (Cleburne and Breckinridge) will be commanded by General Polk.

END OF DAY ONE – STAFF RIDE

BEGINNING OF DAY TWO – STAFF RIDE

FIRST STOP: BRECKINRIDGE'S BATTLE LINE

Major General Breckinridge?

Why is your division in line of battle?

Answer: My division did not take part in the fighting of the 19<sup>th</sup> of September. After dark, I marched the division across Thedford's Ford, and was guided by a staff officer from General Hill, and put me in this location. I received a copy of General Bragg's orders, and knew that I had to prepare my division for a dawn assault. However, when General Hill came up – my Corps commander – I asked him if he could take responsibility so that my division could have breakfast as we had no ability to light fires and cook rations. The men had nothing to eat for nearly twenty-four hours. Hill gave his consent, and the men were ordered to begin cooking rations. Shortly thereafter, General Bragg arrived in a hurry and he and Hill had a quick discussion. Bragg was angry about the fact that the attack had not been made at first light, but he allowed my division to continue its rations.

General Walker

Question: Why was your corps behind the division of General Breckinridge

Answer: As per the orders of General Bragg, I had by two divisions up and in line of battle ready to support Breckinridge's division. However, since the division in front had not moved, I had my line down in line and wait.

General Bragg

Question: Why have you not managed to get your attack going at the time you specified?

Answer: It's all Hill's and Polk's fault. I talked to General Polk personally and he understood the importance of the attack stepping off at dawn so that the Federals would not have the time to prepared positions. Hill should never have let the division eat. But, I had no choice but to allow this as it was already well into the early morning.

#### NEXT STOP: LEFT FLANK OF THOMAS' LINE AT THE BEGINNING OF BATTLE LINE ROAD

General Thomas

Question: Why did you choose this position?

Answer: Simple, look at the terrain. The land to my front slopes up to my position. The trees are far enough apart that they give good visibility. I have the units tightly packed along the ridge line which gives my great firepower to the front. I am, of course, worried about my flanks – only Beatty's brigade is protecting the area of the MacDonald farm. If the Confederates attack into that area, my flank could go. However, to my front, the defenses are solid. In Kelly Field, I have reserve units and artillery batteries and all of my corps ammunition readily available. I picked this position yesterday. In a defensive fight, it is vital to pick the best terrain to maximize your position and minimize the power of the enemy.

General Rosecrans

Question: Are you worried about the left flank? If so, what do you do about it?

Answer: Right now, the entire army is committed. I have no fresh units to put into the line. I said last night that I would abandon the right. General Thomas has asked for reinforcements, and I sent Negley's division up to support, and am prepared to send more. I can leave Wilder's brigade on the flank because it is both mobile and has the firepower of the Spencer's to give the brigade the firepower of a division. I don't like the idea, but the road to Chattanooga must be kept open at all costs. The army cannot retreat back the way it came. I must fight and win here.

#### NEXT STOP: VARIOUS POINTS ALONG BATTLELINE ROAD

General Hill

Question: How did you manage the attacks in this area?

Answer: The brigades of Adams and Stovall overlapped the Union line. But, I felt that after the repulse of the Orphan Brigade and the death of General Helms, I had to make the penetration of the federal line here – at whatever cost. I wanted to use the brigade of General Gist whom I had seen in action before, and I knew that they would do the job regardless of the defenses put together by the Union forces. Cleburne was also attacking, and I was sure that he would put pressure on the Union line. On the left of my corps, the division of General Stewart was also to go in. If I fed the brigades of W.H.T. Walker into the battle at this point, I should be able to achieve a breakthrough. I know that General Walker did not like the idea, and wanted to use this two divisions as a whole force, but I didn't think that would be necessary or prudent. When General Polk came to plead on behalf of Walker I dealt with him in the same fashion. I held to my belief that the line could be broken here, and that the forces under my command could do it. As I read the attack plans of General Bragg, it was clear that this point was the most important of the day, and that the decisive breakthrough should and could be made here.

General Walker

Question: Why did you disagree with the plans of General Hill

Answer: Simple, the brigades of Adams and Stovall had already turned the Union line and needed support if they were to be successful in their attack. I wanted to use my entire corps to turn the Union line. It was obvious that Helm's brigade had been smashed against a stout union defense. If my entire corps of two divisions – those of Liddell and Gist were committed as an entire unit, they would have easily turned the enemy's flank and seized control of the Chattanooga Road and led the defeat of the Union Army, but General Hill, who commanded on this part of the field, would not budge, and after a time, by two divisions had been committed as individual brigades, and I was left with nothing, in essence, to do but hurry any reinforcements I could find into the battle.

#### NEXT STOP: AREA OF SLOCOMB'S BATTERY

General Stovall

Question: How are things going?

My brigade quickly overcame the Union opposition – it looked like a few small regiments, and we turned at the MacDonald Farm and drove down the Chattanooga Road. As we neared the woods at the upper end of the farm, I stopped the battle line for a time to dress and reform the brigade. General Adams did the same, and then the battle line went

forward and drove the federals nearly a half mile. However, it soon became evident that the Federals had managed to bring up reinforcements, and I appealed for reinforcements, but none came, and my brigade as well as that of Adams had to return to the area of the MacDonald Farm. Such a pity because we could have rolled-up the federal flank if Walker's two divisions had been sent to support us. This was an area of weakness of the federal line.

General Thomas

Question: How did the deal with the situation.

Answer: Obviously, I had already noticed that my line did not reach to Reed's Bridge Road, and I had only the small brigade of John Betty to place on that important flank. I asked Rosecrans for reinforcements, and he sent me Negley's division which was enroute to my location when the Confederate attack developed. Other brigades were taken from the line to meet the Confederate attack. It was near thing. If the two Confederate brigades had been rapidly reinforced, then I would have been in trouble, but they didn't, and I was able to stabilize the line. That problem convinced me that I might have to fall back if the Confederates continued to attack in strength. Behind my position, there was a hill with a farmhouse on it (Snodgrass). It looked like a good position, so when General Negley's units had been put into the line in different places, he had nothing to do, so I moved all the reserve ammunition and as many artillery batteries as I could spare to the hill, and wanted Negley to act as an anchor if I had to fall back. He was instructed to place his guns to sweep the area of the MacDonald farm as I feared another attack there. My front was still under attack by Confederate troops, but they were attacking in individual brigades, so I was able to hold the left flank easily.

NEXT STOP: KELLY FIELD

General Thomas

Question: Was this location of an open field useful to you and how did you take advantage of it?

Answer: The battle line was several hundreds yards into the wood line, and it was an idea open area to place the reserves and all the ammunition. The line was so heavy that regiments were pinched out of it, and they rested in the field with full cartridge boxes and could be put into the line to replace any unit that had run out of ammunition. With both fresh units and ammunition close at hand, this was an idea position and I was resolved to make the best of it.

NEXT STOP: AREA OF POE FIELD

General Stewart

Question: Why did you attack here?

Answer: According to the orders issued the evening before, I was to attack when Cleburne's division stepped off, but before I could order my brigades forward, Major Pollock Lee arrived with a direct order from Bragg to attack, and I sent my men again into the area of the Poe Field. As yesterday, the federals put up a heavy fire, and although my troops managed to cross the Chattanooga Road again, they were stopped – until, that is, the attack by Longstreet's units to the left which broke the federal line, and my attacks began to make headway with the federal maintaining a stubborn resistance at the upper edge of the field. I wasn't able to push them back, but beyond the units of Federal general Palmer's divisions, we were able to make no headway except where Brannan's division was in line. Prisoners confirmed that much to me.

General Thomas

Question: What happened here?

Answer: Union troops in the area of Brannan's division were attacked in the flank by the Confederates and driven in, and my line had to bend back toward that hill behind the Chattanooga Road. I desired that the troops along the road hold in place while I created a new line facing the Confederate breakthrough further south. The entire Union flank in that area seems to have been destroyed and partial units of those divisions in the south have been forming up on that new position. If I can hold there, I can keep the line intact until the fall of night, and then withdraw up to Chattanooga.

NEXT STOP: BROTHERTON FIELD

General Rosecrans

Question: What transpired here this morning

Answer: I rode the entire battle line around 0700 hours from North to South. While up at the Left flank area with General Thomas, he noted that he was fearful of holding the flank should the Confederates overlap it around the MacDonald farm. I ordered Negley's division out of its line at the Brotherton Cabin up to reinforce Thomas, and ordered General Wood's division into line to replace it. Some time later, I came to discover that Negley had not moved. I questioned him on this, and he said that Wood's division had not yet showed up. I went to Wood, and he told me that he was waiting for Negley to move before he brought his brigades into line. I lost my temper with Wood, and dressed him down in front of his staff. He deserved it because Thomas needed Negley's troops to maintain the important left flank.

Shortly after 10 am, Captain Kellogg of General Thomas' staff came to me, and reported that Brannan's division was out of line, and there was, as a result, a nearly 1/4 mile or more gap in the line. I told Major Frank Bond, one of my ADCs, to draft an order that

put Wood's division in place of Brannan. I also ordered General Sheridan's division forward from its place near Widow Glenn's to take over Wood's trenches. I spent most of my time concentrating on the vital left flank. I glanced quickly at Bond's order and approved it. It was sent on to General Wood. I did not feel the need to discuss the move the commander of the Corps, General McCook although he was nearby.

General Wood

Question: Why did you move your division out of line when you knew that General Brannan's division was, in fact, in line where it was supposed to be.

Answer: I was obeying a lawful order. I saw no reason to ride to the Army commander as he had already expressed displeasure at my not obeying an earlier order. I did what was required prior to the move which, I might point out, I did smartly as per the order. I talked to Major General McCook, my corps commander and told him the situation. I also talked to the division commander on my right, BG Jefferson Davis, and he agreed to cover my gap until another unit could take his place. I went ahead of my unit when the first or Harker's brigade was on the road and moving toward Thomas. I found General Thomas and told him of my order and that Brannan was already in line, and would he take responsibility for changing the order and placing me where he [Thomas] wanted me. He said he would happily do so, but as he did, all hell broke loose to the south. Although my skirmishers were in a lively fight, I had no indication that an attack was imminent, and could therefore safely make the move.

NEXT STOP: ROSECRANS COMMAND POST

General Rosecrans

Question: What did you do when the breakthrough took place?

Answer: First, I crossed myself as I am a Catholic and in stressful moments it is common for us to seek divine inspiration. I then mounted with my staff and rode off to encourage Lytle's brigade which was resisting on the opposite end of the hill. After a few minutes, it was obvious that the entire right wing had been broken beyond all recognition, and I was carried off with a group of fugitives down the Dry Valley Road where I met other senior commanders along it. After 45 minutes later, I ran into Brigadier General Garfield, and since I could still hear volleys back on the battlefield, I was resolved to go back, but Garfield persuaded me to let him go and me to go on to Chattanooga where I arrived around 3 in the afternoon. I was so overcome with grief that I could not dismount without aid, but I managed to get off the necessary telegrams to prepare Chattanooga for a siege. I also informed the President and the Secretary of War of the disaster, and prepared, hopefully, for the remainder of the army to reach the city. I sent gallopers to Thomas to urge him to hold until nightfall and then fall back to Chattanooga. Since the Confederates as left strong entrenchments when they abandoned the city, I was sure that what remained of the army could hold the Confederates off until help arrives. I knew that

two corps of the Army of the Potomac were on the way plus at least 20,000 from Sherman's Army.

Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis

Question: What Happened to your division

Answer: You remember I had but two battered brigades available and was in the process of stretching their thin numbers to cover Wood when the attack came. I was hit by the division of General Preston with full force, and my division simply disintegrated. I galloped to get help from Liabolt's brigade at the Tanyard, and they were, at first, reluctant to leave their position, but as they were forming up, the Confederates attacked from the woods to my rear and scattered Liabolt's brigade after to volleys from them. Brigadier General Lytle's brigade was still holding out when I left the battlefield and proceeded down the Dry Valley Road. I understand he was mortally wounded and his brigade routed.

Colonel Wilder

Question: What Happened on your front

Answer: At first light, my brigade was move from its position in the Viniard field back to the Widow Glenn's. General Rosecrans was in the process of moving his CP to a new location. My men prepared breastworks and stood in a commanding view of the upper Brock field and part of the Viniard. About noon, an entire Confederate brigade came at angles to my line toward the position I knew to be occupied by Lytle's brigade and at least one other unit of Sheridan's division. I took them in the flank, and put up such a destructive fire that the Confederates simply melted away. By that time, I saw that something terrible had happened to might left flank, so I brought in the brigade, mounted it, and proceeded down the Dry Valley Road. What I saw when I after riding about 800 yards was utter chaos with hundred of Union soldiers running intermixed with wagons and all in a state of panic. I rode to the top of a ridge near where I could see where army headquarters had been. The Confederates were in great numbers in the fields to might left front, and I was just about to order the brigade to form a square with the horses in the middle and fight my way to the Union troops that I could see still holding out at the upper end of this long field when up rode a hatless, red haired civilian who identified himself as the Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana. I did not know the man by sight, and only by reputation which was none too good in the army, but he was the Assistant Secretary of War, and he was demanding escort of Chattanooga where he could get in telegraphic contact with Washington. He was also mighty scared.

NEXT LOCATION: LONGSTREET'S COMMAND POST

General Longstreet

Question: What happened on your front?

Answer: The grand column made an immediate breakthrough, and collapsed the right flank of the Union army and pursued it through his long field. I established a command post near a house not from where Rosecrans' command post had been located. The staff sat down to a lunch (late) of sweet potatoes and bacon. The pursuit of the federals had stopped before a large hill in the distance where, I was told, a firm stand was being made by part of the Union army. Before I could order a further attack, General Bragg sent for me, and I went to his headquarters that was then up near Jay's Mill Road. I don't think that he really fully understood that his army had won a great victory. After some talk, I managed to get him to again split the command with Polk attacking on one side of the Union defense, and my troops on the other, but I told him that would not be good because I could not coordinate well with Polk, and it would require a concerted attack to overwhelm the federals. Bragg would not be budged on this issue. I returned to my headquarters and moved it to a point along the Glenn-Kelly Road and tried to get some order in the attacks, but it was a difficult problems because the federals were resisting well, and over a distance along a low ridge near what I was told was the Vittitoe Farm. Divisions attacked one at a time, and this allowed the Union forces to make a good stand. As near as I can tell, Polk simply continued to attack the Union forces long the Lafayette Road, and did not force them back until nightfall. Because of the disjointed nature of the pursuit of our army, a chance to defeat the federals in detail was lost, and the Union army retreated back into Chattanooga.

#### NEXT STOP: UPPER END OF NORTH DYER FIELD

Colonel Harker

Question: When the assault occurred to your rear, what did you do?

Answer: My brigade was in column along the Glenn-Kelly Road, and when the breakthrough occurred, I decided to move my brigade into the upper end of the North Dyer Field. I could then conduct a retrograde operation and keep the Confederates from attacking the larger hill to my right that I had reason to believe General Thomas was preparing for a final stand. The brigade proceeded to the rail fence at the upper end, and waited until the Confederates came into range, and gave them a volley which stopped their pursuit. The brigade moved back little by little until I reach the area of the fields for the Snodgrass House, and by that time, Thomas had formed a defensive position. I held my part of the line during the remainder of the day until what remained of the army retreated to Chattanooga.

General Hood

Question: Why was the pursuit not made more quickly?

Answer: As you know, I was wounded as the pursuit was gathering steam, and just before that I had told one of my division commanders, Evander Law to move out and keep ahead of everything. When the bullet in my right leg took me out of the fight, a division of responsibility occurred as General Law and General Johnson got into an argument about who was senior, and the pursuit slowed. Also, the men were tired and although they performed well, they began to lose momentum. When the troops approached the large hill mass at the upper end of the Dyer Field, they ran into a large concentration of Union soldiers, and began to attack in segments. I was not there to control it, and we lost a good opportunity.

General Johnson

Question: What happened to your division

Answer: My division made the initial breakthrough in Brotherton, and I just kept moving straight ahead against little Union resistance. It was a complete stampede for the Union forces as their wagons and troops dashed pell mell to the Dry Valley Road and moved down it in a hurry. There were numerous smashed wagons, and all the wrecks of a complete rout. I moved my division to the outer foothills of the Lookout Mountain, and finding no further Union soldiers, I turned north and moved down the Dry Valley Road. I went back into the fight in North Dyer field and learned that Hood was down. I was senior to General Law and felt it was my duty to take over pending a more senior general, but General Law didn't see it that way, and we got into an argument. It was not resolved until General Longstreet arrived, and I went back to my division. I moved it onto the flank of the Union forces still resisting, and attacked up a steep hill a number of times against stiff Union resistance. I even managed to get artillery pieces up one part of the ridge to fire on the Union forces. However, on the fifth attack, I routed the diminished Union forces in front of me and came to the brow of a hill. Across the valley I could see other elements of the Union army still resisting, but as I was about to attack them, I was counterattacked by three Union brigades, and forced back. I later learned that these brigades were from the Union reserve corps under Major General Granger, who had come to the battlefield on his own initiative. I wonder why Polk could not have stopped them, he had the equivalent of two corps to do so.

NEXT STOP: SNODGRASS HILL

General Thomas

Question: What did you do after the breakthrough?

Answer: The day before while the fighting was raging near the Chattanooga, I rode into the wood on the west side of the road. I discovered a hill to my rear on which there was a farm house and outbuilding plus field – the name of the farmer was, I believe, a Mr. Snodgrass. I noticed that the hill might lend itself to a good position for artillery, and also, if I had to make a retreat if pushed back, I could still cover the Dry Valley Road. When I

put in most of General Neagley's division into the line, he had nothing to do, so I put him to work getting all the stray and reserve artillery he could find, and moving it up to Snodgrass. I thought that artillery firing from that height could support my left flank which I had shown to the Army commander was weak. When the break occurred, I immediately rode to that area to see what troops I could get and keep the Confederates off my forces near Kelly Field. If I could not, then the Army was lost. When I got there, I discovered that General Neagley had taken the reserve artillery and reserve ammunition and gone on to Chattanooga. But, enough forces had survived the rout to the south to form an adequate defense, and I spent the rest of the day in that area. The biggest problem was ammunition, and early in the afternoon we were down to our last rounds. One of the officers in the staff up near the Snodgrass house told me he could see a dense column of infantry approaching, but he didn't know whose they were. Neither did I and I asked several officers to use their telescopes to find out. Eventually, the flag of the Reserve Corps was identified, and I felt very relieved. When General Granger arrived, I had to throw in his corps in a desperate attack on Horseshoe to keep back the Confederates, and his men went at it with a will, and in the process suffered heavy casualties, but more importantly, General Granger brought with him 95,000 rounds of ammunition. That saved the day, because ammunition was distributed to all the troops, and enabled them to hold on until nightfall. We fired up almost the entire 95,000 rounds by the end of the day. This operation saved the remainder of the Army of the Cumberland. General Rosecrans sent a message to me from Chattanooga to hold on until night, and then retreat, and that was what I did, closing on Chattanooga at first light on the 21<sup>st</sup> of September.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

**BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA**

1. **SURPRISE:** This principle goes to the Confederates. When General Rosecrans began the campaign, his plan was to force Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga. Rosecrans would then march his army in and immediately restore rail traffic into the city, and build Chattanooga up as a logistical center. Once he had established his base of supplies firmly, he would then reform and obtain reinforcements for his army [his actual strength was over 80,000, but Rosecrans had to keep a large number of soldiers protecting his supply lines from Confederate cavalry -- as a result, he could only bring 58,000 men to the battle], and march south along the rail line from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Bragg's use of deception was particularly effective, and Rosecrans bought the idea that the Confederates were in a panic and not in a good position to give battle. He then ordered his far flung corps [XIV, XX, and XXI] to engage in pursuit. His corps were so far apart -- his right flank corps was at least 75 miles from his left flank corps. None were in close supporting distance. If Bragg's subordinates had realized what he had wrought and attacked vigorously, the campaign would have turned out much better for the South. The whole point of the principle is to catch the enemy unawares, and that Bragg did. In fact, Rosecrans did not really understand what he was facing until Polk wasted a perfect opportunity to bag much of Crittenden's corps at Little Round Bay at Lee and Gordon's Mill. At that point, Rosecrans really woke up to the danger and initiated a rapid concentrating of troops at and near the Mill so he could protect his major way into Chattanooga via the Lafayette Road.

2. **UNITY OF COMMAND:** This principle goes without doubt to the North. General Rosecrans maintained this principle throughout the campaign. He was in command, and his subordinates attempted to perform the way he wanted them to perform. Bragg, on the other hand, did not practice this, and as a result, his orders and his subordinates did not obey his instructions, and many opportunities were lost. Rosecrans also spent time with his commanders, and often solicited their views. All his subordinates were allowed to put in their own thoughts on the situation, and they could raise issues with him at any time. Bragg did not generally discuss his plans with his subordinates, but simply communicated orders to them and expected them to comply with something that they did not see -- the whole and complete picture which Rosecrans saw to it that his subordinates knew, but Bragg did not. Rosecrans did violate the unity of command in one important way. He often dealt with subordinate units without going through the corps commander -- most frequently with both McCook and Crittenden). He frequently violated unit integrity as he mixed his units to defend the Lafayette Road.

3. **THE OBJECTIVE:** What was the Confederate objective in the battle? -- hard to say except to destroy or defeat Rosecrans. Remember, that Longstreet had managed to persuade Davis to move his corps to the West to aid Bragg, and also, that other forces to the tune of nearly 30,000 were also sent to reinforce Bragg. This was ONLY to unite and defeat Rosecrans. At the time of the Battle, the Union army was then the only Federal force of any size in motion. The Eastern theater was quiet, and Vicksburg had fallen so the sizable Union army there was quiet. Bragg succeed in this objective in that he had defeated Rosecrans, but failed in the strategic objective of keeping Chattanooga Confederate. Rosecrans had, in effect, satisfied his initial tactical objective in that the Confederates were forced from Chattanooga and moved south, and the Union did not give up its hold. So, while the South won a short term tactical victory, the failure of the Confederate objective of keeping the city failed, and caused the South, in effect, to finally loose the war. Like the fall of Vicksburg, this failure was catastrophic. The objective principle falls to Rosecrans even though he achieved it by a less effective means with his army penned up in the city and besieged by the Confederates. Even as the battle was being fought, the Union had reinforcements coming to Rosecrans with two corps of the Army of the Potomac (XI and XII under MG Hooker). But, Rosecrans had to give battle before they arrived. The objective is one of the top principles for it drives nearly everything else. Objectives are found on the tactical and strategic level, and Bragg did not think well at either level. Rosecrans had a good sense of both the tactical and strategic level, but he tended to be careless about details.

4. **SECURITY:** This objective was actively violated by General Rosecrans. When he moved his army south to try to get between Dalton and Bragg, he did not pay enough attention to his own security. His cavalry was not handled well, and to Rosecrans goes some of the blame for this. The Union horsemen were heavily outnumbered by the Confederates, but that did not mean that they could give security to the Union troops. When General Negley's division leaves its camp and moved toward Dug's Gap on 10 September, he had no cavalry out in front to screen his movement. In fact, none of the union units used cavalry in this way, but the Confederates had cavalry screening for them and providing security. So much so that it was doubtful that Bragg would have been surprised by Rosecrans.

5. **SIMPLICITY:** This must really be considered a tie. Although General Rosecrans' plans were very simple in theory, they were extremely difficult to execute because of terrain and weather considerations. While Bragg's tactical concepts were simple, his explanation of them in writing was not precise enough to give his commanders a sense of what they were doing as part of the whole picture. Bragg's orders were not clear and concise, and without the aid of General Garfield, Rosecrans orders were sometimes the same. For example, Bragg's orders to General Hindman and General Hill were clear enough, but Bragg usually put in some explanation paragraphs that allowed his commanders to interpret his orders as THEY and not HE viewed them. Hindman was able to sustain himself against Bragg's accusations of not obeying his orders because of the way Bragg worded the orders. General Wood did the same against Rosecrans when he pulled his division out of the line when he KNEW something was about to happen. The orders by Rosecrans were written by one of his aides and one doubts that Rosecrans read the

order which is flawed in a number of aspects. Both the Confederate and Union commanders failed the test of simplicity when the battle approached its climax. A commander must insure that when troops are committed to battle, they are well aware of what they are to do -- their part in the overall plan. When troops understand that they are, indeed, part of a larger operation and not operating as a single entitle, they march and fight better.

6. **MANEUVER:** In the early stages of the campaign, General Rosecrans was clearly the winner here. By attacking along a broad front, and using deception to confuse the Confederates, he used maneuver to its fullest. However, when the battle began, he dropped maneuver as a tool, and frantically began to move his army together, and then to slide it along the Chattanooga Road so that he could keep his flank from being turned as well as protecting his way back into his now available logistical base which is not exactly like the framers of the nine principles of war expected maneuver to be. Maneuver is to gain tactical and strategical advantage simply by moving all or part of the available forces. Bragg did not use maneuver as effectively, but when the battle began, Rosecrans ceased to maneuver and fought a defensive battle. Bragg, with his maneuver capabilities unimpaired, did not use maneuver as well as he could, and continued to fixate on turning the Union flank in the north when the Union army was desperately weak in its center and south. When he finally did break through -- not through his work, but by the idea and tactical skill of General Longstreet -- he did not use maneuver to complete the final part of his campaign - his objective being the destruction of the Union army -- and therefore, lost the war in the West.

7. **MASS:** This principle was executed by the Confederates well, but not by the Union forces. The tactical massing was not possible because of Rosecrans' detailed plan to turn the confederates out of the city. He used economy of force well, but when the decisive battle was fought beginning on 19 September, Rosecrans did not have his entire army on the field, and it trickled in during the first day of battle. Only on the morning of 20 September, did Rosecrans have the bulk of his army in hand, and ready.. The Confederates, on the other hand, had no recourse but to mass once Bragg gave up Chattanooga. Clearly, the Confederates were massed and ready when the campaign began its opening moves 10 days before the battle. Bragg also massed his forces successfully and used them in mass during his attacks. However, he did not mass decisively because his forces attacked piecemeal and did not achieve proper mass for a breakthrough. When Stewart's division broke through the Union front around noon on the 19th (September), Bragg had two divisions within reach that had not been committed and did not use them to mass. He missed a decisive point to mass. Rosecrans was never able to mass until the later part of the 19th when his army was, essentially, in one spot. But mass implies the offensive, and Rosecrans was not thinking in those terms -- Bragg was. The only massing done by Rosecrans was to allow Thomas to co-opt nearly 60% of the Union army on the left, and dangerously weaken the right which led to the final downfall of the army on 20 September. Most commanders know how important mass is -- simply put, if you put enough personnel and equipment at a weaker point of an enemy's force, you guarantee -- more often than not -- victory for your side.

8. **ECONOMY OF FORCE:** Both sides engaged in this principle of war. It is hard to determine just who did the better job. Since General Rosecrans was strung out in his early

operations before the battle, one might say that he was economical in his forces -- he kept the Confederates off balance with only a small part of his army while he massed the bulk of it well to the south. Bragg didn't really use economy of force at all. He didn't need to as the entire Union army was within his control area and he didn't have to mass one place and fight outnumbered someplace else. Rosecrans had to do that, and did it fairly well, but maintained his lines solely by the hard fighting of his troops, and by some of his subordinates who took some decisive action [Crittenden and Negley] when Stewart's division broke through, and they used enough force to drive back his tired brigades.

9. **THE OFFENSIVE:** This is a split decision. In the opening part of the campaign, General Rosecrans used the offensive to completely maneuver Bragg out of a defensive position and obtain a vital strategic base without having to fight for it. But, when Bragg then turned the tables on Rosecrans and massed for the offense without Rosecrans being aware, then the Union commander reverted to the defensive and never considered an attack. But Bragg did, and on both the 19th and 20th of September, Bragg's forces took the offensive against Rosecrans. The problem was that Bragg did not, by himself, mass for a decisive breakthrough he sought. He simply massed to attempt to turn the Union flank and didn't do that very well. Bragg allowed General Hill to control the flank, and he used the two divisions of Walker's Reserve corps to attempt to break the Union line rather than follow the successes of the Brigades of Adams and Stovall. Had he massed and continued the attack in this manner as General Breckinridge and Forrest wanted him to, the battle might have ended then and there with a hugely decisive victory for the Confederacy. A split decision. Neither commander used this principle well throughout the campaign.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: DID BRAGG LOOSE THE FRUITS OF THE BATTLE OF  
CHICKAMAUGA**

Since the battle in September, 1863, there had been continual argument on whether or not General Bragg allowed the fruits of the victory by his army at Chickamauga slip away and allow the Northern army to reach Chattanooga virtually unhurried.

The simple and partially truthful answer was yes. But in the larger sense, the answer is not quite so definitive. Look at it from the point of view of General Bragg. His army has suffered terrible casualties in beating the Union forces. Fully 30% of his artillery horses had been lost. His reinforcements from Virginia did not bring their own logistical implements so they had to depend for support on the already strained supply system of the Army of the Tennessee.

Although none of the major commanders had been hurt in the battle, a number of middle level commanders of promise had been killed or wounded (i.e., Brigadier General Ben Helm). Without proper transport, any movement up into the North would be next to impossible. There was also the weather to consider. During the war, most armies went into winter quarters in November or early December, and did not begin campaigning again until April. This would have given the Confederates slightly more than two months.

True enough, Bragg had allowed what remained of the Army of the Cumberland to reach Chattanooga, but that army was hardly in a position to fight, let alone cause Bragg any real trouble. It too had suffered severe losses in horses, wagons, personnel, and equipment. As long as Bragg could "choke off" the Federal supply line into the city, the Army of the Cumberland could not and would not budge from its base at Chattanooga.

As the Army commander, Bragg had to think of the bigger picture, and it did not look good. He was aware that substantial Union reinforcements were coming (to be precise, two corps

of the Army of the Potomac approximating more than 20,000 and Sherman was bringing a like number of veterans to the area), and that Burnside's army of 25,000 men remained close by at Knoxville.

Bragg could have begun a campaign into the North, but he risked problems in several areas:

a. The Union had Burnside's army at Knoxville. It was large enough to allow Bragg to pass, and then harass his rear which would have caused Bragg to have to detach a large part of his already greatly diminished force to watch and block Burnside.

b. The Union reinforcements could easily form a single army nearly equal in number to the Confederates, and confront Bragg anywhere they chose because it didn't take a great scientist to reach the conclusion that the North would have rushed reinforcements from all over to develop another and larger army to crush Bragg should he have attempted an invasion of the North.

c. What would have been the target? Clausewitz talks about the "center of gravity of a nation" What or where was this located in the North. St. Louis? Louisville? Nashville? How long would the Confederate army have had to remain in the North? What damage could it have done that would have forced the Union to stop the war or to open negotiations with the South?

It is easy with hindsight to blame Bragg for not pursuing, but consider this. Rosecrans had insured that MacFarland's Gap was being held, and in order to defeat the Union army, that position would have had to be taken against the units Rosecrans had placed there. Forrest, an accurate judge of most military situations, sent several messages to Bragg saying that the Union army was in complete retreat, and that if the Confederates moved immediately, they could bag the whole lot. The Army of the Cumberland was composed of some pretty strong fighting elements, and Forrest needed to take that into consideration. That Thomas could hold Snodgrass Hill and the Horseshoe Ridge with wrecks of units for nearly 4 hours against repeated attacks speaks to the level of fighting the Union troops were capable of sustaining. Something about a desperate military situation bring out the "lion" in many. This would probably have been the case here.

What units would Bragg have used that were fresh? Except for the two brigades of Longstreet that had not yet come up from Atlanta by train, and Joe Wheeler's Cavalry the entire army had been in one part of the battle or another. Many had been greatly reduced by the fighting, and were not in any condition for a renewed campaign.

There was no reason at the time to consider really making an attempt to destroy the Union army. Now, carrying Chattanooga was another matter. It was very important for the South to regain the city that General Bragg had relinquished without fighting to Rosecrans not three weeks earlier. That would have put back the ability to use an East-West railway back into service for the Confederacy. Also, the city could have been strengthened enough to act as a "wave breaker" for any Union move into the area. To do so without taking the city would have left the Union forces vulnerable to attack from Confederates there. If you think this is far fetched, Hitler used much the same strategy when the Russians attacked his forces before Moscow in 1941. He ordered his units to form "kessels" or pockets and hold off the Russians while a new counter-attack was developed. That was just what happened (as the Union would do it in November to Bragg's Army).

So when you believe that Bragg had squandered a wonderful opportunity here, think about it. Taking the offensive is wonderful and exhilarating, but it must have purpose, and must be at least doable. Bragg could develop no purpose, and whether or not he could do it was debatable. General Forrest was a superb leader, but he was not always right.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**WHY DO STAFF RIDES**

Military theory and tactics are not much different than similar doctrine that runs normal civilian businesses. The one major difference is that if a business executive makes a major mistake, his or her company may go out of business, but the country remains. If a major military leader makes a mistake, the U.S. as a nation could go out of business.

Fighting has always been considered by people to be physical - that is the art of destruction by physical means. But, war, thousands of years ago, and today is a "thinking" proposition. Units must be moved according to a plan, and much reach their destinations at a specific time and by a generally thought out route. This can only be accomplished by minds conditioned to be disciplined and focused. Minds that understand that for every military action this is an equal and opposite military action by the opposition. The most successful commanders in history have been those who anticipate what the opposition will do, and then develop and execute a plan that will win the battle or the campaign or the war. Mental flexibility at all levels of the military are necessary to be successful in war. The staff ride helps in this process in a variety of ways:

a. First, it shows officers and NCOs how and why battles were fought in history. Regardless of how a battle is fought today, it has origins in the far distant past. How tactics came to be and how

doctrine is developed and published are routed directly in military history. Take, for instance, the battle of Cannae which was fought in 216 BC or roughly 2100 hundred years ago. Hannibal's successful battle plan can be performed today -- the battlefield at Cannae is only a few miles square -- on battlefields that can stretch hundreds of miles. But, the one connector here is how Hannibal achieved victory and maneuvered his forces in the battle. His plan depended on WHAT the Romans would do to counter his initial disposition, and HOW he maneuvered his forces once the Romans attacked as he had anticipated. That remains the same today. Only time, speed and firepower have changed.

b. The Staff Ride is conducted more by the students than the expert who accompanies them. It is the students who do a great deal of study and briefings prior to actually going on the ride. They know the actions, the terrain, the weapons, and the commanders in some detail. When they arrive on the actual terrain, this allows them to fully integrate their knowledge where it happened. They can now see with their own eyes the very terrain where the action took place that they have been studying. In the case of the Civil War, the students have to adjust their minds to war on a scale that they, as modern soldiers, do not have to face -- most combat in the Civil War took place at distances from 50 to 150 yards even though the weapons of the time were effective up to 600 yards. The tactics had not changed from Napoleonic times, but the technology had.

c. Staff Rides are also inexpensive. Only the cost of a bus ride along with lunch and/or dinner. The payoff in training is far greater than funds expended on the exercise. It is recognized by many commanders as a very cost effective way to train.

The staff ride can be traced back to Roman times, but its use by the U.S. Army is recent -- just before the turn of this century. Since then, it has remained, virtually the same, for 100 years. It is done at every level of the army from company to division and higher staffs frequently do staff rides. The program is particularly popular and strong within the TRADOC school system -- all the branch schools have a staff ride program. This particular school has two separate ones -- the COBC students go to Kennesaw Mountain and the COAC to the Battle of Chickamauga. The MP school takes their NCO Academy students to Kennesaw as well as the PCC students. C&GSC also goes to Chickamauga and the Army War College goes to Gettysburg or one of the local Civil War Battlefields (Chancellorsville, Second Manassas, Antietam).

The staff ride program is particularly important to the army because it shows and demonstrates graphically to students how technology can change the face of battle, yet not change how the battle is lost or won. In some instances, battlefield decisions -- i.e., Rosecrans at Chickamauga on 20 September 1863 -- lead to victory or defeat. The problem with today's soldiers is that they must make decisions much more quickly than those of yesterday. Where Rosecrans had up to 45 minutes to undo the damage, today's soldiers have only a few minutes to accomplish the same feat.

Commander's minds must be trained to handle the complexities of modern warfare. Staff Rides help in this process by conditioning future commander's minds to how to think and act their way to victory. Staff Rides also help commanders understand the doctrine they use or will use in combat. The current FM 100-5 (OPERATIONS) is based on HISTORY -- MILITARY HISTORY. The doctrine that is within its pages is based largely on the study of past battles and campaigns and the culling of these historical events for

**useful information. Taken to its lowest level, war is organized chaos. Only a conditioned mind that separate and organize this chaos into a coherent and executable plan.**

**The Staff Ride accelerates this process and enables the future leaders to see how it was done in the past, so that they can understand the present, and plan and develop their own strategy for the future.**

**If we ignore the past because it has already happened, and look only to the future, we cannot really understand the future without a knowledge of the past. One supports the other. The Staff Ride is one of the tools the Army has always used to bridge that gap from ancient warriors to the modern warriors of today and the future.**

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**SUBJECT: Battle Analysis**

1. First, one must pick a battle to analyze. There are literally thousands to choose from. There are numerous publications available entitled A Dictionary of Battles or Famous Battles of the World or Decisive Battles of the World. They contain information about battles from every time, around the world and involving many nations. Perhaps the best book ever written on military history is one by Lynn Montross in the early 1950's but upgraded since entitled War Through the Ages. It, too, has many battles to choose from, and it is well written. Only one other come close, and that was written by the eminent British military history Major General J. F. C. Fuller, and entitled A Military History of the Western World. It comes in three volumes. Do not think that battles from thousands of years ago are not worth your attention. One of the most interesting but not well known occurred in the 12th century at a place called the Horns of Hattin. The Crusaders had moved into what is now Israel and re-conquered the territory there. They had set up a series of Crusader kingdoms, the largest and most powerful of which was the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The Arabs counterattacked under the brilliant leadership of the Emir Saladin. King Guy of Jerusalem went out to meet him in battle with his whole army -- nearly 30,000 total men with about 1,200 armored knights. Saladin defeated the Christian host without fighting a battle. What makes this obscure battle interesting is HOW he did it. Even today, his unique tactics can work if the terrain and situation are right. Look up the battle to see how Saladin won. It will, I assure you, make good reading. Once you've made your choice, this gives you the following information:

- a. **Who** -- that is, the commanders of the two armies
- b. **What** -- the two opposing forces
- c. **Where** -- where the battle occurred
- d. **When** -- the date and time of the battle

e. **Why** -- the reasons for the conflict and why the battle was fought where it was.

You must focus on two main areas -- **the strategic and the tactical**. That is, the larger picture of how the battle fits into the war or conflict in general, and specifically, just how it was fought. This adds to the usefulness of battle analysis. To know the importance of any particular battle is to be able to judge the degree to which the side that won took advantage of the win and how the side that lost minimized its impact.

2. **Each battle has a beginning, a middle, and an ending stage.** Each action that occurs in a battle has a reaction to it from the opposing force. Think of playing chess. The opening moves are often the most important. In battle it is the same. How a commander sets up the battlefield is as important as anything else. To choose where one fights is worth an extra reinforcing division in some battles. Napoleon was most successful when he knew the terrain and was able to maneuver the enemy to that terrain and then by maneuver close his army onto the enemy in successive waves that lapped around the enemy's flank and into his rear. That is the way that FM 100-5 would like to see the battle work. Do not forget to consider the terrain and weather. They can play a vital part of the battle. At one point during the Battle of the Bulge, a U.S. unit was bogged down in mud, but overnight, the roads hardened, and enabled the unit to escape what would have been sure capture. If you remember your history concerning D-Day Normandy (6 June 1944). The weather was very important to the outcome of the invasion, and the Allies needed several weeks of good weather to bring it off. They got those days needed, and if you remember, the lodgment had hard been made when very heavy and stormy weather came in for a time and wrecked two of the three MULBERRY harbors that had been set up to channel supplies ashore. Had the weather turned bad earlier, the invasion might have been in jeopardy.

3. **Who commands is important -- this is, what type of person was the commanders of the opposing forces.** Commanders are made and not born. They come to high level leadership through a process -- at least, this is the way its is supposed to go -- from lower level command and, hopefully, lower level success. They have risen in their profession by work, and professional development. Schooling and experience help to mold the

commanders. And, by in large, this had been the case. What you are looking for here is how a commander thinks and how he came to think that way. Patton's abilities to move and control large masses of armor were developed in two areas in his early years as both a young man and as a professional military officer -- his practical experience as a armor brigade commander in WWI, and commander of an armored division in the early months of the war. He was also a great reader even though he was what we now called dyslexic. He forced himself to be able to read inspite of that handicap, and by the time of World War II, he had a huge military history book collection. He read and re-read classics as the marginal notes in a number of his books indicate. Commanders can made the difference. A Greek philosopher of the 4th Century B.C. once wrote: "An army of stags led by a lion is more to be feared than an army of lions led by a stag." George Washington held the Continental Army together through two terrible winters -- the first at Valley Forge is well know, but the second, at Chester, PA is not as well known and often ignored. During that time, the army could have simply disintegrated. The British, who had real money to buy food, lived it up in Philadelphia while the colonials starved and died by the hundreds. Washington's force of personality and his ability to lead brought the Continental Army back from the brink of dissolution to become an army fully as good as the British Regulars that habitually fought. This was due in no small part to the personality of George Washington. Douglas S. Freeman has written a multi-volume history of Washington which is excellent as has John Thomas. Read them to see how Washington's upbringing and life until the revolution prepared him for the burdens of high command. This is why it is necessary to know the "mettle" of commanders in analyzing battles. They, as much as the fighting or nonfighting of their soldiers, determines the outcome of the battle. At the Battle of Chancellorsville in 1863, Lee won a great victory, but not over the Army of the Potomac. His [Lee's] actions so unnerved the Union commander Major General Joe Hooker that he took his army back across the river when 60% of it had not yet fired a shot in the battle, and his subordinate commanders were far from defeated. At least half wanted to stay and fight. Lee beat Hooker and not his army.

**4. What an army is and what it becomes is also part of the mix.** The commanders fight with soldiers that they lead. Who these soldiers are and how well trained they are

have a considerable impact on the battle. Sometimes, poorly trained soldiers can fight well and with such inspired courage that they all but win the battle. Take the Battle of Bunker Hill (or, more properly, Breed's Hill) where American colonists took on a thoroughly trained and professional military unit of Redcoats under General Thomas Gage. Although the British eventually won the battle, they did not at a terrible cost, and the colonials showed they had courage. However, the mistake of the Americans was to conclude that untrained levies can stand firm against the best infantry in Europe, and that was later shown to be a grave mistake. By the end of the American Revolution, the Continental Regiments of the Line were fully as professional as their British counterparts. History clearly shows that the better trained and motivated soldiers will win nearly every time assuming their leadership is adequate. It must be remembered that the Romans soldiers conquered much of the known world and fought most of the best armies available. Roman training and discipline normally carried the day even if their commanders were not good.

**5. There short term effects of a battle and long term effects.** In other words, what happened immediately after the battle and what happened in the ensuing weeks after it. Take the Battle of Gettysburg. As a battle, it was a simple defeat for Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, but it had the effect, coupled with the loss of Vicksburg, as the "high tide" of the Confederacy. Short term, Lee simply gave up his invasion of the North and returned South with his defeated army. General Meade, the Union commander, allowed him to move away without strong pursuit even though he had fresh troops available for the pursuit. Lincoln was in despair when news of this reached Washington. But long term, the effects of the battle rippled through the South. Lee lost 25,000 men that could not be replaced, and the initiative passed forever into the hands of the Northern commanders -- remember, Grant was brought by Lincoln to the East to plan the final attack on the South, and fashion an operation that would destroy Lee. He did so, but it took nearly 1.5 years of bloody combat to do so. Lee had lived and now died by the offense. Without the numerical strength his army had at the beginning of the campaign, it was next to impossible for Lee to have taken the offensive regardless of his desire to do so. Throughout the Wilderness Campaign, Lee always looked for an opening but he knew in his heart he lacked the numbers to pursue that type of a campaign. Some historians

have now concluded that Lee would have been better off to have adopted an defensive-offensive strategy -- that is, to take up defensive positions using the pick and shovel to magnify numbers, and then once the Union forces had battered themselves against the Confederate lines and been broken, to switch over to the offensive. Lee could have done this nearly two years earlier after Fredericksburg in December, 1862, but he chose not to. The Federal army, inspite of the nearly 15,000 losses of the campaign had 90,000 soldiers available. Far more than Lee had so he opted to allow Burnside to withdraw. Clearly, Lee had the psychological edge over the Union forces, and that is, after all, still important in war.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: Generals who were Late to Battle**

1. Perhaps the best example of this was Major General Lew Wallace [the later author of the famous book Ben Hur, and not to be confused with another divisional commander in Grant's Army, W. H. L. Wallace who was mortally wounded on the 1st day of fighting] during the Battle of Shiloh. His division of Grant's Army was some distance from the rest of the Army in and around Shiloh Church. When the battle began, Grant, upriver at a plantation, came rushing down to Pittsburg Landing (near Shiloh) and in the process, saw Wallace and his division standing to arms along the river bank waiting. Grant pulled into the bank and gave Wallace instructions to march to the battle immediately. In all fairness to Wallace, the route was somewhat difficult, and he was not that familiar with the area, but his division had marched up to its location prior to the battle from the area of the main camps around Shiloh Church. His division was placed there as a flank protection to the main army. At that time, Grant was awaiting the arrival of the Army of Major General Don Carlos Buell which was then enroute to his position. The first division of that army, commanded by Major General "Bull" Nelson was just a few miles away. In fact, if you wanted a culprit that did not move as fast as he could, Major General Nelson would be your man, but Wallace got the blame, and Grant's dislike from then on.

However, it seems that Wallace got lost and had to countermarch several times, and his division, which was so desperately needed, did not arrive on the battlefield until the fighting had largely died down on the first day of the battle. Grant never forgave Wallace for this action, and he was relieved of command of his division, and for the rest of the war until the Battle of the Monocacy during Early's march on Washington in 1865, Wallace was out of any combat assignment, and was largely used for administrative details. Thereafter, Wallace always defended himself on reaching the battlefield late because he said he simply got lost. True, his division

took a direct part in the fighting on the second day of the battle, but his tardiness did not help his reputation as a combat general which, up to that time, was fairly good.

## **2. BOOKS:**

Wiley Sword. SHILOH, BLOODY APRIL\*

James McDonough. IN HELL BEFORE NIGHT\*

Bruce Catton. GRANT MOVES SOUTH

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR\* -- [Look in Volume I or II of the readings to find the article penned on the battle by Major General Wallace years later. It is a good example of the type of defense he used to attempt to explain why his division was late.

GENERALS IN BLUE\* -- Look for his name in the back, and a complete biography of Major General Wallace will give you an insight into how he got there and what he did.

\*Book is available in the Fisher Library

3. I hope this helps you prepare for your written assignment.

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# **THE BEST UNTRAINED NATURAL COMMANDER OF THE WAR**

## **NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST, CSA**

Forrest is rightly remembered as one of the best cavalry commanders of the Civil War. Yet, the man was talented in a host of different areas. When the war began, Forrest was a plantation owner in Mississippi and one of the state's wealthiest citizens. He had gotten his start as a slave trader, and gradually he acquired enough wealth to afford a large plantation. He raised his own cavalry company, and was elected -- yes, officers were elected in the Confederate army at company level -- its commander. In the first few actions, Forrest so distinguished himself with his drive and determination to close with the enemy that he quickly was raised to regimental command.

-----This level of command was attained without one iota of military experience. Forrest was a barely literate man -- in those days, a semi-literate man could achieve success in business, but rarely in society. He had never been to a military school of any kind much less West Point. But, he had a natural flair for leading men in battle. Those who knew him throughout the war described two different men. When not in battle, Forrest was very quiet and unassuming. In fact, he was the opposite of the strutting peacock commander that other cavalry leaders of the Confederacy were -- i.e., "Fighting" Joe Wheeler. When battle beckoned, Forrest would change. His eyes, dark and deep, would flash, and his countenance would change as if it had been charged with electricity. His voice, normally quiet, would become booming, yet not loud. Forrest, interestingly enough, rarely raised his voice in combat except to cheer his men on. Those who served under him looked into those dark eyes, and knew that they were in the presence of a commander whose word was law.

By the time of the investiture of Fort Donelson by Grant in 15-16 February, 1862, Forrest had risen to brigade status while still a colonel. He told the Confederate Commander, Brigadier General Buckner, that he had no intention of surrendering -- it would not have mattered what his superior officer told him as Forrest did pretty much as he pleased --, and promptly took his 1,100

cavalry out of the fort over swampy terrain that the Union had not thought to block because of the nature of the terrain. Several thousand members of the garrison likewise -- infantry -- joined Forrest to make a breakout.

By the time of the Battle of Shiloh, Forrest was in the thick of the fighting even though his cavalry was not part of the equation. During one action, Forrest had charged with some infantry, and was caught by a federal rush. It looked like Forrest was doomed. A Union soldier put his rifle against Forrest's leg and fired given Forrest one of his 5 wounds, and almost propelled him off his horse. But, the tough Mississippian hung on, swung up a surprised Union private and used him as a shield to get away. If anything, Forrest was surprising.

The Confederacy had decided upon a "raiding" strategy to compensate for lack of numbers. Bands of Rebel cavalry would slip behind Union lines to wreck havoc with the Federals' supply system. At this type of action, Forrest had few equals with the exception of Stuart and before his untimely death at the hands of a jealous husband, Major General Earl van Dorn.

When Van Dorn paid a visit with 3,500 cavalry to the Union depot at Holly Spring to destroy nearly \$2 million in Union supplies, Forrest was doing the same thing to Columbus, Tennessee. He also ripped up nearly 60 miles of track. These twin attacks against his supply lines was so devastating that Grant had to return to his starting point and his first efforts against Vicksburg came to naught.

In addition to learning how to handle cavalry, Forrest was also fast learning how Infantry did their actions, and he saw to it that his own men were trained in infantry tactics. They, too, could leave their horses and attack on foot. At least in the West, the term "never seen a dead cavalrymen" did not apply to Forrest's men. He was probably one of the few cavalry commanders on either side that could successfully handle infantry as well as cavalry (you may note here that Major General Sheridan, who had commanded infantry in the Army of the Cumberland, handled cavalry for the Army of the Potomac, but his work with cavalry was not up to par as the first movements of the Army of the Potomac into the Wilderness were to show -- his troopers did not do their duty, and allowed Lee to bring Grant to battle within the heavy belts of forest rather than in more open areas as Grant had hoped.)

General Forrest developed a recipe for success that stood him well throughout the war. First, Forrest had a superb grasp of terrain. It was almost as if he could see the terrain from above and know just what was the best avenue for him to attack, and to place the enemy at the maximum disadvantage. Secondly, Forrest was very aggressive, but not in a stupid way. He knew when to give way to superior force. Thirdly, Forrest used any strategy including deception and bluff that would carry the day.

Take his relentless pursuit to Colonel Abel Streight's Union raiding party of nearly 1000 men. All Forrest had with him were several batteries of field guns and about 400 men. He put them in a merry-go-round formation so that the Federals were led to believe that there were three or four times their own numbers of Confederates ready to fight. After he placed Streight in the frame of mind that he was outnumbered, Forrest then pressured the Union commander into a premature surrender. When the surprised and mortified Union commander saw how few Confederates were really pursuing him, he wanted to re-think surrender, but by then, Forrest had the upper hand. Fourthly, Forrest fit the terrain to his tactics. He used artillery well to support his attacks, and he used his men dismounted as often as they were mounted. He also promoted the use of shotguns among his soldiers rather than the Union sabers. In fact, he always thought Union cavalry were stupid to charge with sabers because his shotgun toting men were at a far better advantage.

Unfortunately, the Confederacy never did realize the abilities of this unusual commander. Being a non-West Pointer, semi-literate, and a former slave dealer, his social and military standing with the Confederate hierarchy did not mark him for high command -- at least until the very end of the war when he was made Lieutenant General, but not given the type of an army that he could have used to make a difference.

Take Forrest at Chickamauga. Although his cavalry was primarily guarding the Confederate right flank, Forrest managed to become heavily involved in the fighting around Jay's Mill and kept the Union back until significant Confederate reinforcements reached the field. He then continued to screen the rest of the day.

On the 20th, Forrest was watching the large Union infantry force at MacAfee's Church -- Granger's Reserve Corps -- and when Granger made his decision to move to the battlefield,

Forrest immediately interposed his cavalry to keep this critical joining from happening. He appealed to Bragg for reinforcements, and, for example, Cheatham's division of five brigades was available, but not used. Neither Bragg nor Polk who commanded on that part of the field wanted to part with any men. As a result, Granger was able to push aside Forrest and save the day.

When the Union forces left the battlefield that night, Forrest was in the saddle the next morning harrying the Union forces. The Union troops were in such disarray, that Forrest literally begged Bragg for some forces to chase the Union troops out of Chattanooga and to the North, but Bragg was unmoved. After the Union troops had consolidated their hold on the city, Forrest rode back to Bragg's headquarters and had his famous argument with the Army Commander. There are any number of versions of this meeting (one says that Forrest stood toe-to-toe with Bragg and said that he would slap him if he were a man -- remember, any biography of Forrest makes very clear that this man did not threaten idly). Forrest left in a rage, and refused to serve with Bragg anymore. His unit was switched with another cavalry division, and Forrest spent much of his time raiding into Union territory and raising so much hell that Sherman, who now commanded in the West, sent out a "hit" army to track Forrest down and defeat him.

This Army was commanded by Union Major General Sturgis, and Forrest set a trap for Sturgis. The battle, called the Battle of Brice's Crossroads, was a sterling example of a commander understanding the military implications of terrain.

General Sturgis' Army of 10,000 (3,500 cavalry, 6,500 infantry, and an artillery train of nearly 20 fieldpieces) left Memphis and marched into Northern Mississippi. Forrest had very precise information on the route of march of the Union Army. The Confederate commander had spent some time in the area of Sturgis' route, and he laid a trap.

As the Union forces would have to pass through Brice's Crossroads, Forrest knew that the route leading to the Crossroads was swampy on both sides of the road. The only area that allowed for deployment of a force was in the immediate vicinity of the crossroads. Therefore, it was vital for Forrest to get there first -- which he did. The leading unit of Sturgis' army was the cavalry division under Brigadier General Grierson -- three brigades. About the same size of Forrest's cavalry units. The cavalry had a lead over the oncoming two infantry divisions, and

Forrest brought them to battle at the Crossroads. He pressed them so much that one of the brigade commanders of the Union force asked to be relieved of his command.

The Confederates under Forrest's direction attacked both flanks of the Union force and weakened it. The next attack Forrest would aim at the Union center which was tottering, but the Confederate commander added a new wrinkle. While pressing the Union forces in the front, Forrest would send a battalion of Tennessee cavalry deep into the swamp area to emerge on the flanks of the upcoming Union infantry forces. The shocks were to take place as a one, two punch.

First, the Confederates broke open the Union center and forced Grierson's brigades back on his infantry support which was still confined to the narrow roadway. As panic in the infantry began to set in, his Tennessee cavalry attacked the Union wagon train at the end of the column, and this disintegrated Sturgis' army, and turned a 10,000 man force into individual fugitives. Some didn't stop running until they got back to Memphis including Sturgis.

The Confederates, in addition to taking several thousands prisoners, captured the entire artillery train of the Union forces plus most of its logistical wagons as well. In addition, Forrest's men picked up 3 to 4,000 rifles on the battlefield. Sherman was embarrassed as he was in the midst of his Atlanta campaign and had counted on Sturgis to keep Forrest off his supply lines. Sturgis was immediately relieved, and his army quickly reconstituted, but a direct pursuit would have to wait until 1865.

After the crushing defeat of Sturgis' army at Brice's Crossroads [which is a small national park today, but only a small part of the actual battlefield is in government control], Forrest went on to continue his raiding into Union territory. When Hood brought his army north after abandoning Atlanta, Forrest provided cavalry for the army. At Franklin, before Hood ordered the famous charge there, Forrest pleaded with General Hood to allow him to cross the river on the Union flank, and attack the Union forces there. This would have the effect of forcing the Union army under Major General Schoefield to vacate Franklin's fortifications without a battle, but Hood would not be moved, and the attack took place.

To finally take care of Forrest once and for all, General Sherman developed a cavalry-only force under Major General James H. Wilson [it was the same force that had pursued the beaten

Hood after Thomas' army defeated the Army of the Tennessee at Nashville]. This 12,500 man force would all be equipped with the Spencer repeating rifles [see: James Pickett Jones. Yankee Blitzkrieg]. Wilson was not the same level of commander that Forrest was, but he was among the best generals produced by the Union during the war, and with the power his force could generate, Forrest, however hard he tried [i.e., at the Battle of Florence], could not stop Wilson in his march through the Alabama and into Georgia. Nathan Bedford Forrest had finally met his match.

At the end of the war, Forrest had been made a Lieutenant General, CSA, but he never commanded an army with enough strength of do real damage to the Union. Had he, rather than Bragg, been in command at Stone's River, Perryville, or Chickamauga, who knows what would have happened.

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## BOOKS ABOUT FORREST

There are at least five different biographies on Forrest. They are basically the same, but they are also different in that they take events in Forrest's life and give a different "spin" to them. But, the Wyeth book is perhaps the best because he knew Forrest personally and served with him. However, Forrest was a individual, and he had faults. Some of these bios do not deal with the whole man, but only the one that the South chose to remember. This commander was a complex man, and reading just one biography will only give you half the story. Although he was only semi-literate himself, Forrest left a lot behind him in ink. Of the major Confederate generals in the war, he was the most controversial, yet next to Lee, the best known and best loved in the South of those who fought for the Confederacy. When you visit the Chickamauga Visitor's Center, they have an excellent bookstore, and all the Forrest biographies are there in paperback. Make a selection, and take one or two home. You could do a lot worse than emulate this man in battle. As a pure warrior, he had few peers in either army.

Captain Eric Sheppard. Bedford Forrest. The Confederacy's Greatest Cavalryman\*

General Forrest at STONE'S RIVER

Peter Cozzens. No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stone's River\*

General Forrest at CHICKAMAUGA

Peter Cozzens. This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga\*

General Forrest during the Nashville Campaign

Wiley Sword. Embrace an Angry Wind: The Battles of Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville

\*Available in Fisher Library

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

*The Civil War from the Soldier's Perspective*

The Civil War was fought at the lowest levels not by professional soldiers, but by in the first years, volunteers, and in the last two, a combination of volunteers and draftees. Soldiers of the armies of the Confederacy and the Union came from all walks of life and all backgrounds. Not all educated men were necessarily officers. Some college educated individuals elected to serve in the ranks. Men from both sides were fired with patriotism. Some fought to free the slaves, but most fought to either repel Northern aggression or to restore the Union. All races fought and died in the conflict -- Hispanic-Americans, African-American, and Native Americans. African-Americans fought only on the side of the Union.

This war cut across families and localities. It was not at all uncommon for men from the same town to fight each other in different uniforms. Both armies began the conflict as large masses of semi-trained soldiers with more eagerness than professionalism. At the end of the war, the soldiers of both sides had become as hardened a group of pros in the art of war as any of the great armies in Europe.

To show how war was conducted, I will create a fictional character named James R. Sadler. For purposes of this paper, he will be from the North, although most Southerners would have followed a similar path during the war except they would probably be slightly better shots and better initially at surviving in the field. Mr. Sadler was a blacksmith from the town of Elyria, Ohio. He was 23 years old, stood approximately 5' 7" tall, and weighed in at 135 pounds. He was healthy and had all of his teeth. He had graduated from the local Elyria Upper School, and had what would be considered a high school diploma. He was literate and had knowledge of both history and English. He was also able to write numbers and to do simple arithmetic. When he saw a recruiting poster for the 44th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, he joined up as a private soldier. Mr. Sadler had absolutely no military experience, and had never fired a weapon. The new recruit was what you would call today a "dazzling urbanite." That is, he had been born in a city, and had never really lived in the country.

Mr. Sadler followed the recruiting party from the 44th Ohio to its camp on the outskirts of Cincinnati, Ohio where he formally signed papers of induction into the unit. The 44th had signed up for a three year tour of duty. The new soldier was assigned to Company B. That unit was commanded by Captain John M. Almazor. The Captain had been a reporter for the local newspaper, and had joined the located militia company in 1860 as a private. He was elected by members of the company as its captain. The regiment contained 10 companies of roughly 100 men each, a small band, and some logistical personnel. At full strength, the regiment would have normally had between 1100 and 1200 men in it. There was an officer who performed roughly what an Ordnance Officer did, another that was basically similar to a quartermaster, and one that functioned as a Adjutant General Officer.

The new recruit was issued a complete uniform series, and a .58 caliber Springfield rifled musket. His uniform included underwear, socks, shoes that were called "brogans" made from leather, load bearing equipment, eating utensils, a canteen, a metal cup, a forage cap, and a greatcoat (overcoat with cover), and a gum blanket which also served as a poncho in rain.

Training in the Civil War varied widely by unit. The 44th was lucky in that its first commander, Colonel John Dunston, had been a professional soldier before resigning his commission after the Mexican war to become a businessman. He was well versed in drill and the manual of arms which he proceeded to teach the men. Civil War units lacked experienced officers and NCOs. The regular army prior to the war was only 25,000 men, and the number of NCOs was very limited. A regiment like the 44th was likely to have a First Sergeant with experience, and a sprinkling of other junior NCOs. Normally, the experienced NCOs in the unit looked for bright men to promote -- a sort of "shake and bake" NCO. Mr. Sadler impressed the Company Sergeant as being a quick minded man, so he made him a corporal and assistant squad leader. He also gave Sadler extra training, and taught him the rudiments of keeping order in the squad.

Discipline in the Civil War again varied as widely as anything. Regular Army units in the Union forces had discipline almost as tough as British Regulars of the Revolutionary War. Volunteer regiments had less discipline, but again, it depended on the personality of the regimental commander. In this case, Colonel Dunston was a stickler for discipline, and insured that his regiment's camp was spotless and that his men were clean and neat. This Sadler learns quickly.

As to combat training, there was very little target practice. True, soldiers were taught to fire their rifles, but were not often taught to engage individual targets, but simply aim the weapon in the general direction of the enemy and pull the trigger. Soldiers were trained hour after hour in

loading and firing their weapon. At least half of the training was given over to drill. That is, formation marching. Remember, the Civil War was a conflict of lines. How soldiers in a unit moved from a marching formation to a battle formation and how fast they did it were vital to Civil War commanders.

However you may consider drill to be boring, in the Civil War it was vital to do it well. Unmasking the firepower of the unit and achieving superiority over the enemy meant the difference between victory and defeat. Sadler and his fellow soldiers would spend hundreds of hours drilling in the fields around the camp. They learned to move from a column of fours to a battle line of linear depth. The soldiers would respond to either a series of verbal commands given by the regimental commander and echoed by the company commanders much as marching is done today. If voice could not be used, then either a bugle or drum would act as a signaling device.

Now Corporal Sadler was designated as a file closer. By that is meant that when unit members were killed or wounded in linear formation, then he would be required to move down and close up the holes in the ranks made by enemy action. Like the other soldiers around him, Corporal Sadler would fire his rifled musket. The normal civil war soldiers carried up to 70 rounds in his cartridge box and sometimes carried 30 or more rounds in pocket. The Springfield Rifled Musket could fire up to 3 rounds per minute although some soldiers by cutting corners could fire between 5 and 6 rounds a minute. To fire, the soldier took out a paper cartridge from his supply and the front part of cartridge in his mouth. He felt with his teeth to determine the end of the bullet, and then bit off the rest. The part he bit off was the black powder element which he put in his rifle and then used the ramrod to fully seat the powder at the end of the barrel. He would then take the bullet out of his mouth and put it in the barrel and then use his ramrod. From a smaller box attached to his load bearing equipment he took what amounts to a small fulminate of mercury cap which he placed on a small protrusion under the hammer of the weapon. Then pulling the hammer back to full position, he soldier then raised the rifle and fired it. The kick of a black powder weapons was strong, and after firing 50 or more rounds during battle, soldiers had a huge bruise on their right shoulder and often couldn't raise their arms above the shoulders without pain. If a soldier fired 70 to 100 rounds during battle, this could so foul the barrel that .58 rounds could not fit down the barrel without cleaning it. If your father smoked a pipe, you would have noticed that a coating of hard ash appeared around the length of the pipe bowl.

One of the reasons that soldiers including Corporal Sadler were trained to march and fight in a dense mass is because:

a. Massed firepower was the way to victory, and the only way to achieve that was to mass as many rifles in as small an area.

b. Massed volleys into dense infantry had the effect of killing and wounding soldiers everywhere in the line. It is very difficult to continue to fight if you focus on the dead and dying soldiers on your right or left. Soldiers became so focused on loading and firing, and when their rifle experienced a malfunction, they continued to attempt to load and fire the weapon. On the battlefield of Gettysburg after the fighting was over, a rifle was found that had been loaded 12 separate times without firing it. The soldier was that focused, but he was also probably very, very nervous. More likely, this was his first battle.

c. At the soldier level, battles were attempting to stay alive in a veritable hell. Yes, the amount of smoke and flame in these Civil War Battles was intense. After several volleys, soldiers had trouble seeing much beyond a few feet. The noise of continued volleys by hundreds of rifles was deafening, and officers and NCOs had to shout at the top of their lungs to be heard. Normally officers would simply remind soldiers to be steady and keep firing. During combat, officers could ask soldiers to fire more slowly and effectively so as to conserve their ammunition. Given the amount of ammunition a soldier carried and having a rate of fast rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute, soldiers could fire no more than 30 minutes without getting more ammunition. In emergency situations, soldiers would check the ammunition boxes of the dead and wounded around them for more bullets. When ammunition ran out, the only method of defense for soldiers was a 16 inch iron socket bayonet which attached to the barrel.

There were, of course, those soldiers who did not want to fight when the bullets began to fly. Often called “skulkers”, they would leave the firing line. Many times, it would be to help a wounded colleague. In the later states of the Wilderness Campaign, it was not unusual to see a wounded soldier being helped by four men carrying him in a blanket with another carrying his rifle and another his pack. Cavalry pickets had to be placed along roads to the rear, and when wounded soldiers would come by, the cavalry troopers would demand “show blood” before they would let the soldiers pass.

After several months of training, Sadler and his fellow soldiers of the 44th Ohio were attached to the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, XIVth Army Corps which was then part of the Army of the Cumberland. The commander of the corps was Major General George H. Thomas. The Division Commander was Major General Joseph J. Reynolds. The 44th joined the division when it was at Nashville and the new army commander, Major General William S. Rosecrans, had just

been appointed. He was preparing his army for a movement south to fight the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. Corporal Sadler, because of sickness and loss of personnel, has been promoted to sergeant's rank. He now has three chevrons and is in charge of what amounts of a platoon within the company. He will march with his regiment as Rosecrans moves his army toward the Confederates which the "rumor mill" in the army says are waiting for them at Murfreesboro.

As the Army advances in late December, the weather turns terrible, and the 44th Ohio marches for several days in a driving downpour. This particularly impacts on the soldiers because they cannot make fires easily. Coffee was important to the Civil War soldiers as it is to the modern soldier. Soldiers in this conflict did not eat prepared meals like MREs. They were usually issued cattle every third day -- there was no means of preserving meat. Each regiment had a butcher, and the cow was skinned there, and the meat distributed among the companies. All the meat was cooked, and packed in the Regiment's trains. Soldiers also occasionally managed to find a pig or two and have some bacon strips. Bayonets were used as cooking utensils with strips of bacon draped over them and over the fire. The coffee was real [Confederate soldiers never did get real coffee very often, but they normally did not lack tobacco and sugar which they often traded for real coffee with their opponents]. Cooking was normally given to the less qualified warriors -- the soldier with two left feet. Food varied widely in quality and taste. Some regimental commanders who had independent financial means often hired chefs from noted restaurants and brought them along. There is the famous story of the New York Regiment that found a runaway former slave who had learned the element of cooking. They bought him a horse and cooking utensils and the cook followed the regiment and when the unit stopped for the night, he, supplied with condiments by the officers, began cooking. At the end of the war, this former slave was brought North by one of the regiment's officers and became a famous chef at Delmonico's in New York City. One of the best restaurants in the city.

Soldiers of both armies were paid. Union soldiers received between 20 to 30 dollars per month with officers given more -- up to \$100 with generals getting over \$250.00. Of course, payment was in government "greenbacks". In 1862, Congress passed an act that allowed the Treasury Department to issue paper money. It so happens that the bills created were printed on green paper hence the name greenbacks. The problem was that in previous years, precious metals had been the commodity of trade. With the beginning of the war, the value of metal rose. In addition, the amount in circulation dropped as people hoarded. To enable the economy to continue operating, a stopgap measure was needed to keep the pace of business stable and to allow the

government to continue with the war. Sometimes, though, payment was not made, and soldiers had to soldier on for weeks without pay. Union paymasters would line up the regiment and pay them in greenbacks.

Each regiment on its manning table was supposed to have a surgeon. The quality of medical care in the Union army varied widely. There was never a close look at the real qualification of physicians in the army, so medical doctors with questionable abilities were often found within the ranks. Many had alcohol problems. The Union Army did have what amounted to "sick call" and the surgeon could excuse soldiers from duty and could allow them to ride in the Regimental Trains. There were certain details that had to be levied on each company. Officers tents had to be erected, latrines dug, supplies unloaded and the like. Such details have not changed for hundreds of years in the military.

When Private Sadler, now Sergeant Sadler entered the Union Army, he was given the most rudimentary of physicals. What passed for the local doctor would look him over and pronounce him fit to fight if he looked all right, and could walk and talk. If the man already has lost an arm or leg, or had an obvious limp or a deformed arm, that was about the only automatic disqualifier. You think age disqualified a soldier. Guess again, it was not uncommon to find soldiers in the 50's and 60's. One even got into the Confederate army who was almost 70 years old, and, incidentally, looked like it. But in those last days of the war, the south was desperate for any manpower it could get.

Many soldiers entered both armies with severe health problems that were not apparent, and when these individuals were subjected to the rigors of camp life and marching and often bad food, they had problems immediately. Those that didn't die were often discharged from the army and sent home. The 44th Ohio had begun with its full compliment of 1,000 men, but within weeks had been pared down to under 800.

As Sadler and his fellow Union soldiers approached the area of Murfreesboro, they camped in a forest near the right flank of the Union army. Little did they know that their commander, General Rosecrans, had elongated his position by having units of McCook's Corps which was the army's right flank build fires beyond their actual lines. This was done to insure that the Confederates thought the Union army larger than it actually was.

All this did was to enable the Confederates to attack on the Union flank because the curled around it at the location of the fires the night before, but there were no Union troops there, so they marched on -- the first to strike the Union line was the division of Major General Daniel

MacGowan. It shattered much of McCooks corps. The 44th Ohio was hurried to the flank to help attempt to hold the line. The Regimental Commander got his boys into line when the Confederate battle line appeared out of the fog of black power from previous volleys. They were well drilled, seemingly well equipped, and the 44th began careful volley fire. The Confederates began to loose men as gaps opened up in their lines and soldiers went down killed or wounded, but on they came. The Confederate line stopped to fire several volleys, and numbers of men of the 44th Ohio dropped. Sadler, whose company was in the center near the colors of the unit, suffered losses in his unit, and had to act, several times, as a file closer. Several of his closest friends went down. Some screaming in terrible pain. The man right next to Sadler took a round right in the head. All Sadler heard was the "thunk" of the round hitting, and the man dropping his rifle and slowly tumbling to the ground without a sound.

Because of the good training received by the 44th Ohio, they stood their ground manfully, but suffered casualties of 30 per cent of the regiment in killed and wounded. The brigade to which the 44th belonged began a hasty retreat when more confederate units appeared on their right flank. The dead and wounded of the 44th — that is, those who could not move — were left where they lay. Several men, hobbled by wounds moved after the unit as they hurried back in retreat, but were soon lost in the haze of gunpowder because they could not keep up. Such was war.

The Regiment rallied in the Round Forest among the remnants of Sheridan's division. Into the lines of the 24th came one battery horse, a caisson, and a gun from a battery that had been overrun. The one gunner left and his wounded horse had pulled the weapon clear of the onrushing cannoneers, and all the gunner wanted was to find another place to stand and he asked if the 44th would provide him a crew. This was quickly done, and the cannon began its mournful boom as it sent round after round of canister into the oncoming Confederate ranks. The 44th along with the remnants of Sheridan held on in the Round Forest against attack after attack by the men in butternut. Neither side faltered, but eventually the Confederates stopped attacking.

Sergeant Sadler, by then the sole NCO in his company still standing, saw that of the 78 men taken into combat, he and 13 other were the only ones left standing of the company. General Sheridan, a short man on a large horse toured the lines cursing and swearing and urging those around him to continue the fight. At one point, Sadler saw General Rosecrans and his mounted staff ride up, and Sadler heard the Army Commander admonish Sheridan for cursing and swearing. The division commander defended his action saying that using curses was the only way his men would pay him attention. For the first time in the battle, Sadler managed a smile.

The holding of the Round Forest was the focal point of the battle. It was such critical terrain that the fact that the Union still held it helped win the battle. After the Confederates retreated, Sadler, whose arm and shoulder was so sore from firing his rifle that he could not raise his right arm above shoulder, walked back across the battlefield his Regiment had occupied.

He came across hundreds of dead of both sides in many different postures. Some civilians were looking over the Confederate dead, and Sadler saw one mother find her son, and cradle his body in her arms and begin wailing and crying. Although they were the enemy, Sadler, who had seen hundreds of his own comrades shot and killed, turned away in sorrow and walked back to his campsite where the survivors of his unit gathered around the campfires to talk of the day's fighting. Sadler and 325 of his 44th comrades had survived their first battle. All knew that there would be others.

Unlike today, the 44th Ohio did not receive any replacements for its losses in battle. The Regiment stood at only 325 soldiers when all the fatigue details plus those lightly wounded, stragglers reported in. Those officers who survived were promoted within the regiment, and some good NCO's were promoted. Sergeant Sadler, whose conduct was noted in the after action report written by the regimental commander. He was promoted to Lieutenant, and became his company's commander. It wasn't much of a company. It's numbers stood at only 45 soldiers, but Sadler had come a long way. He now carried a sword, and a pistol with a maroon officer's sash.

The Army of the Cumberland marched into Murfreesboro after the Confederate Army of the Tennessee abandoned the city. The Army was, as a whole, as battered as the 44th Ohio. The Regiment continued to train and sharpen its abilities as well as repair the shattered mental and physical wounds of Stone's River.

Rosecrans was fighting a protracted battle of the telegraph with Washington. He was feuding with the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, and the Commander-in-Chief, Major General Halleck. Rosecrans wanted further reinforcements and supplies, but he had problems getting it out of Washington. All Stanton wanted him to do was to move south against the Confederate Army now entrenched in Tullahoma.

When he moved, Rosecrans executed over a period of a month one of the best planned maneuver operations in the history of the Civil War. By marching and the use of the feint, the Army of the Cumberland forced General Bragg to evacuate the city at the cost of under 800 casualties. Sadler and his company marched with the Regiment during the campaign, and endured the brutal conditions of the weather which turned roads into quagmires that almost swallowed men

and horses. Without the necessity of a single battle, the Army of the Cumberland marched into Tullahoma, heavily fortified by Bragg into a city that could probably not have been carried by direct assault. As Sadler and his mates marched into Tullahoma, the soldiers were very grateful to their commander that they did not have to shed their blood to take the trenches and fortified areas they saw on all sides.

Even as his troops entered Tullahoma, Rosecrans had his eyes on the next prize. One of the most strategically important cities in the South -- Chattanooga. It was the junction for a number of rail lines, and, as such, was important to the Confederacy. The loss of the city would mean that the South would lose much of its ability to move troops and supplies around.

Over a period of two months, Rosecrans set up a major supply depot at Bridgeport, Alabama, and began to build up a enough supplies for his Chattanooga campaign. The city itself is surrounded on all sides by high hills and the Tennessee River flows by it. Bragg assumed that Rosecrans would move his army and come from the North. The terrain was better, and it was also close to the 25,000 man army of Major General Burnside at Knoxville. The rail line north was also close. In reality, the Army of the Cumberland was coming over two of the larger hills in the South -- Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain. The terrain was terrible -- hills running to nearly 2,000 meters with few, if any, roads available. As the campaign began in late July, the climbing and hard work had just begun.

Sadler and his regiment were often detailed in their division to help the supply trains and artillery come up and down the mountain. They cut trees and underbrush to build a road, and then helped to push wagons up to the summit and then held ropes as the wagons came down the mountain. Five men of the 44th, though not in Sadler's company, were crushed to death by a wagon that overturned on its way down the hill. The team of 6 mules were also killed, and nearly 1,000 pounds of supplies were lost. Sadler frequently saw dead horses in overturned wagons on his trips over the mountains. During the work, Sadler was injured several times with his hands being scarred by rope burns, and his knee being twisted. In those days, the troops were physically tough, and endured much suffering. One of the men in the 44th became too ill to march, and he was left with several other sick men of the brigade at a small sawmill as the troops moved on. A orderly volunteered to stay with them. As soon as the brigade was finished with the upcoming battle, they would return. However, they didn't, and the men were captured, and those not returned under flag of truce to the Union army in Chattanooga, were sent to the infamous prison at Andersonville, Georgia.

On the morning of 19 September, the 44th Ohio was part of the train guard for the XIVth Corps baggage train. The Regimental Commander received orders from the brigade commander to march to the area of the Viniard Field. The regiment arrived around noon, and it was thrown into the fight to stop the division of Major General Alexander Stewart. Sadler was at the front of his company, and was slightly wounded in the arm. The regiment suffered moderate casualties in the action, but the Regimental Commander and his second-in-command were severely wounded. For a time, Sadler took command of the regiment and it was ordered back into a reserve position at 1700 hours. The regiment was now down to 220 officers and men. The brigade as a whole had suffered casualties comparable to the 44th Ohio.

Captain Sadler's wound was enough to force him to ride to Crawfish Springs to have his wound treated. When he arrived, it was dark but he managed to find his division's aid station. A surgeon looked him over, and told him to wait his turn. There were more than 500 wounded from the division still waiting to be treated. Their cries and moans were hard to take given Sadler's much less dangerous wound. Next to the operating tent, the young captain saw piles of arms and legs as the surgeons continued to amputate. A corpsman handed Sadler a drink of water from Crawfish Spring. It was the first water he had had since coffee that morning. After a wait of several hours while enduring screams and cries from the operating tent, he walked in and the doctor looked at his elbow, cleaned up the bone chips, cleaned the wound, and wrapped it in clean cloth. Sadler then went back to his regiment.

On the way, he stopped to talk to a number of other Union units and pieced together what had happened. It looked as though the Army had held its own, but the Confederates were apparently being reinforced. As it turned out, going along the Dry Valley Road, Sadler walked by the Union Command Post at the Widow Glenn's. There he spied the Army commander, General Rosecrans, dressed in a faded blue overcoat and a rumpled black hat turned up at the brim. His serious demeanor led Sadler to believe that the combat the next day was going to be very, very serious. Back at the regiment, the men's mood was somber. Few believed they would survive the next day.

Throughout the day, the 44th Ohio remained in a strong position behind breastworks near the Poe Field. Around 1030, soldiers of Stewart's division came through the Poe field in the attack, and were thrown back with heavy losses. Near noon, however, the Union line was penetrated on the right flank, and hundreds of fugitives ran through the lines of the 44th Ohio. Sadler kept the regiment, and when the oncoming Rebels reached their front, the steady volleys of

the regiment kept the Confederates at bay as the Regiment gave ground to a position where the army was making a last stand -- now known as Snodgrass Hill, but the name was unknown to the men of the 44th Ohio. There they fought from about 1400 until dark. During the fighting Sadler was always in the forefront of the action, and his actions were noticed by a number of Union general officers to include Major General George H. Thomas.

When the regiment reached Chattanooga and camped for the night, Sadler reported to the division commander, Major General Reynolds. He was told that the regiment performed well and that Thomas was recommending Sadler for promotion as the new Regimental Commander of the 44th Ohio. Not a bad day's work during the Civil War.

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Command Historian

## MEMORANDUM FOR Chemical Officer Advanced Course

## SUBJECT: The Tactical Risk

1. Among the wars of history, examples of supreme tactical gambles abound during the Civil War. Most were executed by General Robert E. Lee, but there are examples of Union commanders taking similar gambles.

2. When Robert Lee took command of the Confederate Army defending Richmond during the Seven Days, he inherited a serious situation. General McClellan had moved his larger army to within a few miles of the outskirts of the city. Confederate tactical operations were of a decidedly defensive nature. Lee intended to change that. His plan depended on a tactical risk. He waited for a chance to attack only a part of the Union Army with most of his own. When McClellan left Major General Fitz-John Porter's Vth Corps isolated on the right bank of the Chickahominy River, Lee was ready to strike. The bulk of McClellan's army was now on the left bank (70,000 men), and Lee intended to mass nearly 50,000 of his own army against the 26,000 of Porter. Included in that group was the Valley Army under Stonewall Jackson. Major General "Prince John" Magruder was to hold McClellan's overwhelming force in check. General Magruder was famous in the old army for being what amounted to a showman and a theater producer as he put on numerous plays [especially Shakespeare] complete with scenery and costumes on numerous small frontier posts -- to small audiences. This time, he would have a huge audience, and he would dazzle them with his deception. Troops marched to and fro, and the Federal Pickets heard shouted commands to all sorts of different units. This was reported to McClellan who didn't need any information to make him cautious since he thought he was facing 200,000 Confederates. Lee's tactical risk almost paid off, but he could not orchestrate his subordinates -- they had not worked together before -- to attack en masse and overwhelm Porter. The Union general was a solid commander, and defended his ground well and held Lee off until night fell when he was able to withdraw his corps more or less intact. Let us now analyze where or not Lee was really making tactical gamble. Consider this:

- a. Lee knew McClellan personally, and knew the Union commander to be a cautious man. A short study of the campaign to this point showed that McClellan was not one for sudden movements, but mostly ponderous and safe moves.

b. McClellan had begun to build fortifications -- much like those Lee's men had been building before they took the offensive, and that doesn't indicate a leap to the offensive.

c. The weather favored Lee in that the rivers were high and rapid due to heavy rains, and Porter could only be supported by a single and very weak wooden bridge over which the river water was cascading over. McClellan, even if he did suddenly develop an offensive spirit, could not really bring a rapid offensive. Still, Lee's plan was based on quick massing and quick execution.

Therefore, Lee was engaging in a risky tactical plan, but not all that much. He was not faced with an opponent that had a full house and he had only a pair. His hand was much stronger.

3. One of the best tactical risks ever taken in the Civil War was not done by Lee, but by Grant, and it occurred during the campaign of Vicksburg. Grant had been battering at the Confederate fortress for months and had not been able to take it. It was not that the Confederate commander LTG Pemberton was particularly brilliant, but the fortress was well sited and difficult to approach, much less attack. The city itself rose 200 feet above the river, and Vicksburg was surrounded on three sides either by swamps, low lying ground, or the river. Try as he might, Grant could not take the city or even surround it. So, Grant decided to gamble. He would have to put his army into the middle of Mississippi and cut it off from its supply lines. In order to make his gamble pay off, Grant asked the Union fleet under Admiral Porter to run the Confederate batteries, and he moved his army south along the west bank of the Mississippi. When he disappeared from in front of Vicksburg, Pemberton assumed that Grant had retreated North, and Vicksburg began a night of celebration with balls and socials. Just as the dancing was getting started, guns began firing along the river, and stopped the parties. The next morning Vicksburg awoke to the knowledge that the Union fleet had passed on south -- Pemberton sent Jefferson Davis a telegram saying that the Union fleet had passed south, but was heavily damaged. Actually, it had been only partially damaged, and Porter now provided troop ships for Grant to cross his entire army at Bruinsburg. Grant then marched almost due east for the state capital of Jackson. Davis and Pemberton realized that something was afoot, and Pemberton held a conference with his senior commanders. Most advised him to march out with his army and confront Grant and defeat him. A minority wanted to remain with the balance of the army in Vicksburg. Davis advised a more aggressive operational plan. In the end, Pemberton with an aversion to moving out of his works, left a part of his army in Vicksburg, and then moved out with the rest to try to put his army

along Grant's supply lines. Pemberton didn't get it. Grant had no supply line -- he was living off the land and once he had Pemberton safely tied up in Vicksburg, he would be able to open his own supply line -- but for now, he was on his own -- hence the big risk. At Raymond, and before Jackson, Grant fought Confederates under General Joseph E. Johnston. His army of 50,000 outnumbered the 26,000 that Johnston had and the independent 30,000 that Pemberton had. When Grant took Jackson, he moved due west down the rail line between Jackson and Vicksburg and fought Pemberton at the pivotal battle of Champion's Hill. After some hard fighting, Grant prevailed by superior numbers (he outnumbered Pemberton nearly 1.5 to 1). General Grant's risk had paid off. Vicksburg fell after a two months siege, and the hopes of the confederacy went with it. Since Grant was truly in enemy country, this was a great risk, but acceptable as he [Grant] has studied the ground well, and determined that boldness was his greatest friend.

3. Perhaps the best known tactical risk in the Civil War occurred during the Battle of Chancellorsville. Lee, with an army of but 50,000 men defeated a Federal Army of 100,000. He did so by taking the supreme gamble of sending his largest single unit -- Jackson's corps -- on a 12 mile march through the backroads to get on the federal flank while Hooker and nearly 80,000 federals stood nearby. All they would have had to do is move forward along their line at any time and Lee would have been defeated and the war, perhaps, ended far earlier. But, was it as great a risk as history has painted it. Consider:

- a. Hooker as Lee well knew was building fortifications and giving every indication that he was WAITING to be attacked.
- b. Lee had taken precautions to insure that the part of the army still left to him -- the divisions of Anderson and McLaws -- would perform the same type of demonstration he had orchestrated earlier during the Seven Days.
- c. For a reason that Lee could not fathom, Hooker, who had kept the initiative in his hands, had now given Lee the initiative back, and he [Lee] was determined to take advantage of it.

The proof is in recollections of the famous Lee-Jackson meeting on the evening of 1 May, 1863. In a letter to the widow of General Jackson after the war, Lee wrote that HE had been the one that conceived the flank march. He was not a man who spoke untruths. Lee was oriented on the offensive,

and he looked for a way to get "at those people [the Federals]". when he learned from J. E. B. Stuart that the federal flank was open, he wanted to attack at once. Hence the gamble. Lee was not a man to take risks lightly. He knew that Hooker had surrendered the initiative, and once surrendered, the initiative is very hard to regain. So Lee ordered the flank march. Of course, Hooker could have changed his mind, but Lee was basing his plans on the expectation of what a man he knew would do. He didn't guess, but there was always an element of risk. However, to Lee, this was acceptable risk. Lee was right, and Chancellorsville has been studied by military historians and thousands of officers of armies all over the world as a great victory. Truly, it was, but the amount of risk in the movement was probably far less than you would think.

4. Lessons learned. You must consider how to define the acceptable risk. Normally, a risk is made against heavy odds, but Lee worked to reduce the odds -- reduced to an acceptable risk. That's the mark of a great commander. Battles can be won against great odds, but only when the winning commander executes an acceptable risk as Lee did at Chancellorsville -- Hooker expected

Lee to RETREAT, and not attack. It is most difficult to bluff a player with a Royal Flush if you have only two pair, but it can be done.

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Command Historian

SCRIPT -- CIVIL WAR INTRODUCTION

SECOND HOUR

SLIDE 1 - PICTURE OF CIVIL WAR RE-ENACTORS IN BATTLE

NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF COMBAT IN THE CIVIL WAR EXIST AS THEY WOULD FOR LATER WARS. THIS PICTURE IS AS A GOOD A REPRESENTATION OF COMBAT IN THE CIVIL WAR AS YOU CAN GET -- I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU TAKE OUT A COPY OF THE TNT NETWORK FILM "GETTYSBURG" TO GET THE FEELING OF THE FIGHTING.

SLIDE 2 - MANPOWER -- NORTH AND SOUTH

THE CIVIL WAR WAS A MANPOWER INTENSIVE WAR -- ON THAT BASIS ALONE, THE SOUTH WAS ALREADY WELL BEHIND. THE NORTH MANAGED TO MOBILIZE MORE THAN TWO MILLION MEN. THE SOUTH MOBILIZED 850,000. EVEN THOUGH THE SOUTHERN FORCES SUFFERED FEWER CASUALTIES THAN THE NORTH, THE LOSSES COULD NOT BE MADE UP -- LEE'S LOSSES AT GETTYSBURG TOPPED 25,000, AND FOR THE MOST PART, HIS 75,000 MEN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMY WERE NO MORE THAN 60,000 BY THE TIME OF THE WILDERNESS IN MAY, 1864. OF THE 9,500,000 POPULATION OF THE SOUTH FULLY HALF WERE AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SERVICE WITH SOUTHERN ARMIES -- ALTHOUGH, THE SENATE OF THE CONFEDERACY CONSIDERED A BILL THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED SLAVES TO FIGHT FOR THE SOUTH IN RETURN FOR THEIR FREEDOM, BUT THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS HAD TO DECAMP FROM RICHMOND IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE WAR AND THE BILL DIED WITHOUT ACTION.

SLIDE 3 - STRATEGIC PLANS

THE NORTH'S PLANS WERE VERY, VERY SIMPLE. TAKE RICHMOND, AND KEEP THE CONFEDERATES FROM OBTAINING EUROPEAN SUPPORT. THE SOUTH'S WERE VERY SIMPLE AS WELL -- PURELY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. TO REACT ONLY WHEN ATTACKED. JEFFERSON DAVIS MADE A DECISION THAT CALLED FOR CONFEDERATE ARMIES TO DEFEND ALL SOUTHERN TERRITORY.

SLIDE 4 - STRATEGIC THOUGHT

TO PUT IT MILDLY -- THERE WAS NONE ON BOTH SIDES. NEITHER THE NORTH NOR THE SOUTH EVER DEVELOPED ANY DEEP STRATEGIC THOUGHT -- QUITE THE OPPOSITE. THE NORTHERN STRATEGISTS DESIRED ONLY TO BLOCKADE THE CONFEDERATE COAST, AND KEEP THE CONFEDERATES FROM EUROPEAN RECOGNITION -- FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, THE CONFEDERATES NEEDED EUROPEAN HELP BECAUSE THEY HAD NO INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND WANTED TO USE THE COTTON THEY DID HAVE TO BARTER FOR THE WEAPONS THEY DID NOT HAVE. THE CONFEDERATES DEVELOPED A SOMEWHAT MISTAKEN POLICY CALLED THE KING COTTON DIPLOMACY. THEY WITHHELD COTTON FROM EUROPE DURING THE NEARLY A YEAR WHEN THE SOUTH HAD RELATIVELY OPEN PORTS WITHOUT HEAVY UNION BLOCKADE. THE SOUTHERNERS FELT THAT IF COTTON WAS TAKEN OFF THE MARKET, THE MILL TOWNS OF THE BRITISH MIDLANDS WOULD BE SOON STARVED FOR COTTON AND WOULD CLOSE, AND THIS WOULD CAUSE RIOTS, AND THIS WOULD THEN FORCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO HELP THE SOUTH IN RETURN FOR COTTON -- FRANCE, BEING A CLONE OF ENGLAND, WOULD FOLLOW THE ENGLISH LEAD.

THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS -- 1. THE COTTON CROPS IN 1859 AND 1860 WERE BUMPER CROPS AND THE WAREHOUSES IN ENGLAND WERE BULGING. 2. THE ENGLISH QUICKLY SET UP COTTON FARMING IN INDIA AND OTHER PARTS OF THEIR EMPIRE AND HAD THAT PROVIDING COTTON AS THEIR WAREHOUSES RAN OUT. PITY THE POOR SOUTH. WITHOUT COTTON, THE SOUTH COULD NOT EXPECT THE EUROPEAN POWERS TO RECOGNIZE THEM AND FACE UNION OPPOSITION -- BESIDES, THE RUSSIANS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEY WERE BACKING THE NORTH, AND THE TSAR CARRIED GREAT WEIGHT IN EUROPE.

#### SLIDE 5 - ANACONDA PLAN

ONLY ONE MAY CAME UP WITH A WAY TO WIN THE WAR -- GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT, THE THEN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY. HE REASONS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEFEAT THE SOUTH WAS TO ENTER IT AND FORCE ITS RETURN TO THE NORTH. TO DO SO REQUIRED THE FOLLOWING: TO PLACE A BLOCKADE AROUND THE PORTS OF THE SOUTH THAT WAS AIRTIGHT -- THAT WOULD TAKE SOME DOING BECAUSE THE SEA COAST OF THE SOUTH RAN TO SOME 1,500 MILES. BY LATE 1862, THE NORTHERN NAVY HAD ACCOMPLISHED THAT. NEXT, THE NORTH HAD TO CONTROL THE MISSISSIPPI RIVERS. WITH THE FALL OF VICKSBURG IN THE SUMMER OF 1863, THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED.

THE FINAL ATTACK ON THE SOUTH WOULD INVOLVE THE MOVEMENT OF A NUMBER OF UNION ARMIES ALONG MULTIPLE AXES TO PIN THE SOUTH AGAINST ITS OWN COAST -- THE SQUEEZING. GRANT ATTEMPTED JUST THIS STRATEGY DURING THE 1864 CAMPAIGNS INVOLVING HIS ARMY AND THAT OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN. BY 1865, THE UNION ARMIES -- NOW GROWN TO AT

LEAST 3 MAJOR ONES, HAD SQUEEZED THE LIFE OUT OF THE SOUTH. IT WAS SLOW AIR STARVATION.

SLIDE 6 -- PICTURE OF GENERAL SCOTT

NOT YOUR LEAN, MEAN, FIGHTING MACHINE. WHEN HE WAS A MILITIA GENERAL DURING THE WAR OF 1812, SCOTT HAD BEEN SLIM AND HANDSOME AND A SUPERB COMMANDER. BY 1860, HE HAD GROWN TO NEARLY 300 POUNDS AND LOVED ONIONS SMOTHERED IN CREAM. HE ALSO HAD PERIODS OF SENILITY, AND HE WOULD NOT REMEMBER INFORMATION HE HAD BEEN TOLD MINUTES EARLIER. HIS MIND, HOWEVER, WAS SHARP ENOUGH TO UNDERSTAND AND TO PREDICT THAT THE CIVIL WAR WOULD BE A LONG AND DIFFICULT CONFLICT. HE AS ALSO SHARP ENOUGH TO DEVELOP A SOUND STRATEGICAL PLAN TO END THE WAR EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD TAKE FOUR LONG YEARS OF WAR TO FINISH IT.

SLIDE 7 -- NORTH STRATEGY

NORTHERN STRATEGY DURING MOST OF THE WAR WAS SLOW AND PONDEROUS. THE NORTH WAS TENTATIVE IN THE OFFENSIVE AND LARGELY BECAUSE THE NORTHERN ARMY DID NOT POSSESS THE EXPERIENCED GENERAL STAFF TO MAKE THEM HAPPEN. A MAJORITY OF THE MOST EXPERIENCED OFFICER IN THE PRE-WAR ARMY WERE FROM THE SOUTH AND LEFT TO JOIN THEIR NATIVE STATE. SINCE THE NORTHERN ARMY WAS WELL SUPPLIED, ITS STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS WERE BASED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE NORTH RARELY USED DECEPTION, AND LITTLE FLANKING. WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE, NORTHERN FORCES WOULD QUICKLY ASSUME THE DEFENSIVE.

SLIDE 8 -- SOUTHERN STRATEGY

IT WAS BASED ON QUICK MOVEMENT BACKED BY GOOD STAFF WORK. THE SOUTH COULD AND DID USE DECEPTION TO HELP THEIR CAUSE -- GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSON USED IT WELL AGAINST UNION FORCES WHEN HE MOVED THE BALANCE OF HIS ARMY TO MANASSAS TO HELP GENERAL BEAUREGARD WIN THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE WAR. THE SOUTHERN ARMIES WERE -- TO AN ARMY -- OFFENSIVE ORIENTED. IN FACT, THE SOUTH TOOK THE OFFENSIVE IN NEARLY EIGHTY PERCENT OF COMBAT DURING THE CIVIL WAR. IN FACT, THEY FAVORED ATTACKS WITH THE FEARSOME BAYONET ALTHOUGH ONLY ABOUT ONE PERCENT OF SOLDIERS WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED BY IT. BEING MORE POORLY SUPPLIED AND HAVING TO LIVE OFF THE LAND MORE OFTEN THAN THE NORTH, THE SOUTHERN ARMIES RANGED ALL OVER THE SOUTH BUT RARELY INTO THE NORTH. THEY WERE NOT, HOWEVER, TIED TO THE LOGISTICS FACTOR THE SAME WAY THE NORTH.

SLIDE 9 -- COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE NORTH

AS IN THE SOUTH, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES WAS THE PRESIDENT -- ABRAHAM LINCOLN. UNDER LINCOLN, THE SECRETARY OF WAR PROVIDED THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT -- THE FIRST SECRETARY LINCOLN APPOINTED WAS THE POLITICAL BOSS OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA -- SIMON CAMERON. HE WAS SO CORRUPT AND INEFFECTIVE, THAT AFTER ONLY A FEW MONTHS, HE WAS REPLACED BY A MUCH BETTER -- IF LESS WELL LIKED -- MAN, EDWIN M. STANTON. THIS MAN HAD BEEN A LAWYER, AND HE BLEW INTO THE WAR DEPARTMENT AS A FOLLOWING WING --

BLOWING OUT ALL THE INCOMPETENTS AND GRAFTERS THAT CAMERON HAD TOLERATED. NO LONGER WERE THEY ABLE TO SUPPLY THE UNION ARMY WITH SHODDY MERCHANDISE -- BLANKETS THAT FELL APART IN THE FIRST RAIN, SHOES WITH CARDBOARD SOLES, AND WEAPONS THAT PROVED MORE LETHAL TO THE SHOOTERS THAN TO THE ENEMY. THERE WAS, FOR AWHILE, A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF -- WHEN MCCLELLAN WAS THE SAVIOR OF THE UNION WHO COMMANDED THE UNION ARMIES IN THE FIELD. AFTER MCCLELLAN WAS REMOVED, LINCOLN USED HELLECK IN THAT CAPACITY UNTIL GRANT CAME ALONG. GRANT TRULY COMMANDED THE ARMIES IN THE FIELD, AND HELLECK WAS REDUCED TO THE JOB OF CHIEF-OF-STAFF FIGHTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BATTLES HE WAS MUCH BETTER AT WINNING.

SLIDE 10 -- PICTURE OF LINCOLN

LINCOLN WAS QUITE A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF -- HE WAS A MINORITY PRESIDENT IN A WAY, AND OFTEN MISUNDERSTOOD. NO ONE GAVE HIM ANY CHANCE TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE SOUTH -- NONE THOUGHT HIM COMPETENT BECAUSE HE CAME FROM SUCH POOR STOCK. THEY WERE QUITE WRONG -- LINCOLN WAS ONE OF THE CLEVEREST POLITICIANS AND PRESIDENTS IN THE NATION'S HISTORY.

SLIDE 11 - BACKGROUND OF LINCOLN

LINCOLN WAS BORN OF A POOR FAMILY IN KENTUCKY. LATER WHEN HE WAS A TEENAGER, HE AND HIS FAMILY MOVED TO ILLINOIS, AND LINCOLN ATTENDED SCHOOL IN A ONE ROOM SCHOOL HOUSE. HE DID NOT REALLY GRADUATE EITHER FROM GRADE OR HIGH SCHOOL. HE LEARNED THE LAW BY "STUDYING

IT" WITH AN ESTABLISHED LAWYER AND SET UP PRACTICE. HE HAD NO FORMAL MILITARY TRAINING, AND THE EXTENT OF HIS EXPERIENCE WAS A TWO WEEK STINT WITH THE MILITIA DURING THE BLACKHAWK WAR -- HE SAW NO COMBAT. HE WAS A ONE TERM CONGRESSMAN DURING THE MEXICAN WAR, AND WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT IT, HE HAD, UP TILL THE CIVIL WAR, A SOMEWHAT UNDISTINGUISHED CAREER.

SLIDE 12 -- COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH

THE SOUTH HAD A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT COMMAND STRUCTURE. LIKE LINCOLN, JEFFERSON DAVIS WAS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN BOTH THE STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL FIELDS. HE HAD NO LESS THAN THREE SECRETARIES OF WAR DURING THE CONFLICT, AND NONE WERE STANTON TYPE -- THEY ACTED AS A MESSAGE CONDUIT FOR DAVIS. THERE WAS A ADJUTANT GENERAL -- 65 YEARS OLD GENERAL COOPER, BUT THERE WAS NO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE FIELD, ONLY A MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. THIS WAS THE FATAL FLAW. LEE WAS GIVEN THAT POWER, BUT TOO LATE IN THE WAR AND WHILE LEE WAS A SUPERB TACTICAL GENERAL, HE SEEMED NOT TO EITHER HAVE THE APTITUDE OR INTEREST IN THE JOB. DAVIS WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER SERVED TO GIVE UP HIS MILITARY DUTIES AND CONCENTRATE ON THE TERRIBLE INTERNAL PROBLEMS THE SOUTH FACED.

SLIDE 13 - PICTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS

HE LOOKS LIKE A PRESIDENT DOESN'T HE! DAVIS, IN REALITY, WAS A MAN IN POOR HEALTH. HE HAD NEARLY DIED IN 1859, AND HE WAS GOING BLIND IN HIS RIGHT EYE. HE SUFFERED FROM SEVERE HEADACHES, AND WAS

ALWAYS UNDER A GREAT DEAL OF TENSION. UNLIKE LINCOLN, DAVIS WAS A MAN OF SERIOUS DEMEANOR AND HAD NO SENSE OF HUMOR. I DOUBT THE MAN KNEW HOW TO UNWIND AND HAVE FUN. THIS IS NOT TO SAY HE WAS NOT A LOVING FATHER TO HIS CHILDREN AND A GOOD HUSBAND. HE WAS THAT AND MORE. HIS WIFE VARINA WAS QUITE A WOMAN IN HER OWN RIGHT, AND SHE HELPED DAVIS THROUGH SOME OF HIS WORST BOUTS OF SICKNESS DURING THE WAR. BEFORE THE WAR, DAVIS HAD MANY WARM AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MANY OF HIS NORTHERN COLLEGES IN THE SENATE. HE COULD BE A WARM AND FRIENDLY MAN AMONG THOSE HE KNEW AND LIKE, BUT WITH MOST PEOPLE HE APPEARED TO BE STIFF AND ALOOF -- JUST THE OPPOSITE OF LINCOLN. AFTER THE WAR, DAVIS WAS KEPT IN CLOSE CONFINEMENT BY THE NORTH BECAUSE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF LINCOLN, AND ONLY A HUMAN RIGHT CAMPAIGN BY MRS. DAVIS FINALLY SECURED HIS RELEASE

#### SLIDE I4 - BACKGROUND OF DAVIS

DAVIS WAS BORN INTO WEALTH AND INFLUENCE. HE WAS EDUCATED AT WEST POINT, COMMANDED A MILITIA REGIMENT IN THE MEXICAN WAR -- THE MISSISSIPPI RIFLES AND WAS BREVETED SEVERAL TIMES FOR GALLANTRY IN ACTION. HE WAS THE INNOVATIVE SECRETARY OF WAR DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN PIERCE. IN FACT, HE MADE SOME OF THE CHANGES AT WEST POINT THAT PROVIDED SO MANY HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS FOR BOTH ARMIES DURING THE WAR. HE WAS ALSO EXTREMELY WELL READ IN THE AVAILABLE LITERATURE ON MILITARY THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND HISTORY. HE WAS ALSO THE SENIOR SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI, AND HAD ARGUED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SLAVERY ALL IN ALL, IF I HAD

TAKEN BETS BASED ON PREVIOUS EDUCATION AND PERFORMANCE WHO WOULD BE THE BEST CHIEF EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT DAVIS WOULD HAVE GOTTEN ALL THE BETS. HE APPEARED TO BE QUITE SUPERIOR TO THE "COUNTRY BOY" ABRAHAM LINCOLN. HOWEVER, AT THE END OF THE WAR, IT WAS LINCOLN WHO HAD THE FAR SUPERIOR GRASP OF STRATEGY AND POLITICS. HIS HANDLING OF THE SITUATION AFTER FORT SUMTER WAS FIRED UPON, AND HIS EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION WERE BRILLIANT POLITICAL STROKES WHICH TOOK THE MORAL HIGH GROUND AWAY FROM THE SOUTH. DAVIS HAD NO ANSWER TO THESE MOVES. HE SHOWED NO BRILLIANCE BECAUSE HE TOOK ON TOO MUCH OF THE BURDEN OF RUNNING THE STATE -- A TASK THAT WOULD PHYSICALLY BREAK HIM EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR.

SLIDE 15 -- TACTICAL COMMAND STRUCTURE - SOUTH

SOUTHERN ARMIES WERE COMMANDED BY FULL GENERALS. THERE WERE ONLY FIVE MADE DURING THE LIFE OF THE CONFEDERACY -- LEE, JOHNSON, JOHNSTON, BEAUREGUARD, AND COOPER. THEY HAD THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF FOUR STAR GENERAL. CORPS WERE COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT GENERALS, AND DIVISIONS BY MAJOR GENERALS OR SENIOR BRIGADER GENERALS. BRIGADES COULD BE COMMANDED BY EITHER A BRIGADIER OR A COLONEL. REGIMENTS WERE NORMALLY COMMANDED BY COLONELS, AND IN SOME CASES BY LIEUTENANT COLONELS. IN THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS, IT WASN'T UNCOMMON TO SEE REGIMENTS THE SIZE OF COMPANIES COMMANDED BY CAPTAINS SO HORRIBLE HAD BEEN THE LOSSES AMONG THE SOUTHERN SOLDIERS. PRESIDENT DAVIS COMMISSIONED THE GENERALS, AND PROMOTED NONE BEYOND THE RANK OF BRIGADIER WITHOUT

THAT INDIVIDUAL HAVING DISPLAYED BATTLEFIELD ABILITY. THIS PREVENTED UNDESERVING POLITICAL OR MILITARY HACKS FROM REACHING POSITIONS OF COMMAND. THE COLONELS AND REGIMENTAL OFFICERS WERE COMMISSIONED BY THE STATE WHICH RAISED THE UNIT. OFTEN THE REGIMENT'S OFFICERS WERE ELECTED BY A VOTE OF THE MEN -- IN SOME UNITS, THE COMMANDER HAD BEEN THE EMPLOYEE OF ONE OF THE PRIVATES IN THE REGIMENT. IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR TO SEE A PRIVATE WITH HIS OWN PERSONAL SLAVE WHO LOOKED AFTER HIS NEEDS. THIS, OF COURSE, WANED AS THE WAR CONTINUED ON.

SLIDE 16 -- SOUTHERN ARMY

SINCE THE CONFEDERATES HAD LESS EQUIPMENT, THERE WAS LESS SPIT AND POLISH. THERE WAS ALSO LESS DRILL AND CEREMONIES. SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS WERE VERY CLOSE, AND IN SOME UNITS, CALLED EACH OTHER BY THEIR FIRST NAMES IN THE EARLY PART OF THE WAR. OFFICERS SAW MORE TO THE COMFORT OF THEIR MEN.

SLIDE 17 -- UNION ARMY

UNION OFFICERS WERE MORE ALOOF FROM THEIR MEN. IN FACT, MANY OFFICERS COULD HAVE CARED LESS IF THEIR SOLDIERS HAD ENOUGH TO EAT OR THE PROPER EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS FAR MORE SPIT AND POLISH, AND A "BY THE BOOK MENTALITY" IN THE UNION OFFICER CORPS. SINCE THE UNION HAD ALL THE ABILITY TO MAKE CLOTHING, THE UNION TROOPS TENDED TO BE AMONG THE MOST COLORFUL IN THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, ESPECIALLY THE ZOUAVE REGIMENTS WITH THEIR RED PANTS, WHITE SPATS,

WHITE SHIRT WITH SHORT DARK JACKET, AND RED FEZES. IN FACT, NEVER WAS THEIR A MORE OPEN INVITATION TO "SHOOT ME" THAN THOSE TYPE OF REGIMENTS. THEY HAD, FOR ALL INTENSIVE PURPOSES, DISAPPEARED BY 1863, AND ALMOST ALL UNION TROOPS WORE THE NORMAL DARK BLUE UNIFORMS.

SLIDE 18 -- CIVIL WAR COMMAND STRUCTURE -- NORTH

THE NORTH WAS NOT AS FREE WITH HIGH RANK AS THE SOUTH. THE UNION ARMIES WERE COMMANDED BY MAJOR GENERALS UNTIL GRANT WAS MADE A LIEUTENANT GENERAL -- REVIVING THE RANK HELD BY GEORGE WASHINGTON DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. CORPS WERE COMMANDED BY SENIOR MAJOR GENERALS, AND SOMETIMES BY VERY SENIOR BRIGADIER GENERALS, DIVISIONS WERE NORMALLY COMMANDED AGAIN BY MAJOR GENERALS, BUT IT WAS NOT ALL THAT UNCOMMON TO FIND A BRIGADIER IN COMMAND OF A DIVISION. A BRIGADE WAS COMMANDED BY EITHER A BRIGADIER GENERAL OR A SENIOR COLONEL. A REGIMENT WAS COMMANDED BY EITHER A COLONEL OR A LIEUTENANT COLONEL -- SOME REGULAR UNITS OF REGIMENTAL SIZE WERE OFTEN COMMANDED BY MAJORS -- PROMOTION IN THE REGULAR ARMY WAS VERY SLOW, AND YOU COULD MOVE UP FASTER IN THE USV OR U.S. VOLUNTEERS. IN FACT, BEFORE CONGRESS MADE IT EASY FOR REGULAR OFFICERS TO LEAVE THE REGULAR ARMY TEMPORARILY TO TAKE COMMISSIONS IN THE USV, THE USV SUFFERED FROM LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM -- FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN GEORGE A. CUSTER ENDS THE CIVIL WAR, HE WAS COMMANDING A DIVISION OF CAVALRY WITH THE RANK OF MAJOR GENERAL. WHEN HE REVERTED BACK TO THE REGULAR ARMY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, HE WAS REDUCED TO HIS

REGULAR RANK OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS (HE WAS A REGULAR ARMY CAPTAIN AT THE TIME OF HIS ELEVATION OF BRIGADIER GENERAL). LIKE DAVIS, LINCOLN PROMOTED ALL THE GENERAL OFFICERS (WITH OF COURSE, THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS), BUT HE, UNLIKE DAVIS, WAS OFTEN EMBARRASSED BY POLITICAL GENERALS LIKE BENJAMIN BUTLER, JOHN C. FREMONT AND OTHERS. LIKE THE SOUTH, NORTHERN GOVERNORS COMMISSIONED THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS IN REGIMENTS RAISED BY THEIR STATE.

SLIDE 19 -- CIVIL WAR LOGISTICS -- NORTH

THE NORTH HAD IT ALL -- IT HAD A LARGE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND RAW MATERIALS. ITS PORTS WERE UNBLOCKED. NEARLY 90% OF THE GOLD AND SILVER IN THE U.S. RESIDED IN BANKS OF THE NORTH. EARLY IN THE WAR, THE NORTH WENT TO PAPER MONEY WITH SPECIE BACKING. SINCE THE CONFEDERATES DID THE SAME, BUT WITHOUT SPECIE BACKING, THEIR MONEY INFLATED IN VALUE UNTIL IT WAS PRACTICALLY WORTHLESS. THE NORTH COULD ALSO OBTAIN FAR GREATER LOANS IN EUROPE THAN COULD THE SOUTH.

AT ONE POINT IN THE WAR, THE COST TO THE NORTH OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICT WAS ONE MILLION DOLLARS PER DAY. THAT'S IN 1860'S VALUE - - TODAY, IT WOULD BE MUCH, MUCH HIGHER. YOU CAN SEE WHY THE NORTHERN GOVERNMENT ALMOST WENT BROKE EARLIER IN THE WAR, BUT BECAUSE OF THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE -- AN INCOME TAX WAS TEMPORARILY PUT ON PEOPLE -- THE BILLS WERE PAID. NOT SO THE SOUTH.

SLIDE 20 -- CIVIL WAR LOGISTICS -- SOUTH

THE SOUTH HAD ALMOST NO INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE. TEN YEARS BEFORE THE WAR, MANY LEADERS IN THE SOUTH HAD FORESEEN THAT THE COUNTRY'S NEARLY TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON ONE CROP AND ITS LACK OF INDUSTRY NEEDED TO BE CHANGED. HOWEVER, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BUT NOT ENOUGH. MANY OF THE LARGER PLANTATIONS WERE SELF-SUFFICIENT AND COULD MADE MOST OF THEIR OWN REQUIREMENTS FROM CLOTHES TO GLASS TO FURNITURE. HOWEVER, EVEN THOUGH THE SOUTH HAD ALL THE COTTON, THERE WERE MORE "SPINNING JENNYS" IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS THAN IN THE ENTIRE SOUTH. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, THERE WASN'T A WORKING POWDER MILL, AND FEW FACTORIES THAT COULD CAST CANNON OR MAKE FIREARMS -- TO BE SURE, BUCHANAN'S SECRETARY OF WAR, MR. FLOYD, HAD SEEN TO IT THAT ALL THE EQUIPMENT TO MAKE WEAPONS HAD BEEN SHIPPED TO THE SOUTH, AND THEY WERE USED. THE MAN WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT MILITARY LOGISTICS THE SOUTH HAD WAS A SOUTHERNER NAMED JOSIAH GORGAS -- HE OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO THE NORTH AND WAS REFUSED, SO HE WENT SOUTH. BY THE END OF THE WAR, GORGAS HAD SET UP A ROBUST SYSTEM OF LOGISTICAL CENTERS WHICH NUMBERED NEARLY TWO DOZEN. THROUGHOUT THE WAR, THE SOUTH NEVER SUFFERED FROM LACK OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION.

SLIDE 21 PICTURE OF UNION SUPPLY DEPOT

THIS IS A TYPICAL DEPOT -- ACTUALLY, THE PICTURE WAS OF A UNION DEPOT DURING THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN IN 1862. NOTICE THE PROFUSION OF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS. THERE WERE NOT THAT MANY SOUTHERN

VERSIONS OF THIS, AND WHAT VERSIONS THERE WERE HAD MANY WEAPONS THAT HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN UNION -- THE UNION ARMY WAS SO WELL SUPPLIED THAT IT HELPED TO KEEP THE SOUTH IN THE WAR -- FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE END OF THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, IT TOOK THE SOUTHERN LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT A YEAR AND A HALF TO SALVAGE ALL THE EQUIPMENT BROUGHT BY MCCLELLAN'S ARMY INTO THE AREA.

SLIDE 22 PICTURE OF TENTS

TENTS WERE USED BY BOTH SIDES. THE MOST POPULAR WAS THE SIBLEY TENT WHICH WAS NAMED FOR A CONFEDERATE GENERAL WHO SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN THE SOUTHWEST. BY 1864, MOST UNITS HAD DONE AWAY WITH TENTS AND ALL SOLDIERS WERE EQUIPPED WITH A SHELTER HALF -- THE FAMOUS "PUP" TENTS YOU KNOW TODAY. IT SAVED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WAGON SPACE FOR OTHER AND MORE IMPORTANT THINGS.

SLIDE 23 PICTURE OF UNION HOSPITAL

THIS IS A PICTURE OF A UNION FIELD HOSPITAL DURING THE SEVEN DAYS CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN VIRGINIA NEAR RICHMOND. NOTICE THE ORGANIZED NATURE OF THE HOSPITAL. ACTUALLY, IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE WAR, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE TO THE SOLDIERS OF EACH SIDE WAS DISMAL AT BEST. THE SURGEONS OF EITHER ARMY DEVELOPED A CRUDE SYSTEM NOT DISSIMILAR TO THAT CURRENTLY USED. AS SOLDIERS WERE BROUGHT IN TO THE HOSPITAL, A SURGEON WOULD LOOK AT THEM AND SEE HOW BADLY THEY WERE WOUNDED. THOSE WITH SEVERE HEAD WOUNDS, THOSE WITH STOMACH WOUNDS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE MORTALLY WOUNDED, AND THEY WOULD BE SENT TO TENTS OR LEFT ON THE GROUND TO DIE. THE

REMAINDER WERE PRIORITIZED WITH THOSE IN NEED GIVEN ATTENTION FIRST. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON FOR SOME SOLDIERS TO WAIT UP TO TWO DAYS BEFORE THEY WERE SEEN BY THE SURGEON.

SLIDE 24 -- PICTURE OF VARIOUS SEMI PERMANENT BUILDINGS

THESE ARE TYPE OF BUILDINGS THAT SOLDIERS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BUILD WHEN THEY WERE NOT CAMPAIGNING -- DEC-APRIL TIMEFRAME -- SOME OF THESE COULD BE QUITE COMFORTABLE, BUT MOST SOLDIERS PREFERRED REGULAR HOMES -- HOWEVER, THE HIGHER RANKING OFFICERS NORMALLY APPROPRIATED WHAT WAS IN THE VICINITY, SO THE COMMON SOLDIERS LIVED IN THIS CRUDE HUTS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE NUMBER OF FATALITIES FROM DISEASE CLIMBED HIGH WHEN THE TROOPS WERE STATIONARY. EVEN LATER IN THE WAR, THE TROOPS STILL DID NOT ALWAYS TAKE CARE OF CAMP HYGIENE THE WAY THEY SHOULD.

SLIDE 25 -- PICTURE OF SURGEON'S INSTRUMENTS

NOTICE THAT THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF SAWS -- IN FACT, MOST SURGEON'S KITS CARRIED AS MANY AS SIX DIFFERENT ONES. NOTICE THE BLUNT PROBE -- WOULD YOU LIKE A HAM-FISTED SURGEON PROBING IN YOUR WOUND WITH THAT. NOTICE THE TOURNIQUET -- WHAT AN INSTRUMENT OF TORTURE? DURING THE THOUSANDS OF OPERATIONS THAT THE SURGEONS OF BOTH SIDES PERFORMED, THEY RARELY CLEANED THEIR INSTRUMENTS, WHICH CAUSED THOUSANDS OF MEN TO DEVELOP GANGRENE OR OTHER INFECTIONS. ALTHOUGH 5,000 MEN WERE KILLED OUTRIGHT AT GETTYSBURG, THE REMAINING 30,000 WOUNDED ON BOTH SIDES WERE SUBJECT TO LOSSES OF

25% FROM COMPLICATIONS OF THE WOUNDING UP TO 1 YEAR AFTER. THE SURGEONS MOTTO WAS -- WHEN IN DOUBT, AMPUTATE. BANDAGES WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY, AND THE CHLOROFORM OFTEN RAN OUT WHICH MEANT THAT MEN HAD TO BE OPERATED ON WITHOUT ANESTHETIC -- IN ONE CIVIL WAR RECOLLECTION I READ, THE AUTHOR CAN STILL REMEMBER THE SCREAMS OF THOSE BEING OPERATED ON YEARS AFTER THE EVENT. THE CONFEDERATES HAD LESS INFECTION BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF EQUIPMENT -- THE UNION COULD GET ALL THE SPONGES THEY NEEDED, SO THE CONFEDERATES HAD TO USE COTTON CLOTH WHICH THEY THEN WASHED AND REUSED. UNION SURGEONS CONTINUED TO USE THEIR SPONGES FOR DAYS. THE CONFEDERATES ALSO DEVELOPED ONE OF -- FOR THE DAY -- THE MOST MODERN HOSPITALS IN THE WORLD -- CHIMBORAZO. THIS ESTATE IN RICHMOND WAS MADE INTO A HOSPITAL -- OR, SHOULD I SAY, A SMALL CITY. IT HAS SEVERAL HUNDRED SMALL HOUSES CONNECTED BY WOODEN WALKWAYS. THE WARDS WERE OPEN AND AIRY, AND THERE WERE CLEAN BARRELS WITH WATER AND OTHER LIQUIDS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WAR. THIS HOSPITAL HAD ONE OF THE HIGHEST SURVIVAL RATES DURING THE WAR. THERE WERE SOME SEVERAL UNION VERSIONS, BUT ALL OF THIS CAME AFTER THE WAR HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE NURSES WERE LADIES OF RICHMOND SOCIETY. YOU WOULD NOT BELIEVE THE PREJUDICE AGAINST USING WOMEN IN SUCH WORK AND HOW THE UNION LADY CLARA BARTON HAD TO FIGHT TO GET VOLUNTEER LADIES AS NURSES INTO THE MEDICAL SYSTEM.

SLIDE 26 -- PICTURE OF UNION BRIDGE

THE BRIDGE YOU ARE LOOKING AT WAS BUILT IN ALABAMA AT THE TOWN OF BRIDGEPORT IN AUGUST 1863. IT WAS BUILT BY THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND TO BEING ITS OPERATIONS THAT WOULD END IN THE BLOODY BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. IT WAS, INCIDENTALLY, NEARLY 1,400 YARDS LONG, AND WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHAT UNION ENGINEERS COULD DO. THE SOUTHERNERS HAD ALMOST NO BRIDGING EQUIPMENT, NOR ENGINEERING TROOPS. THE NORTH HAD ALL THE EQUIPMENT, AND COULD AFFORD TO TRAIN SPECIAL UNITS TO PERFORM ENGINEERING DUTIES -- THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND HAD A SPECIAL ENGINEER BRIGADE THAT PERFORMED JUST THOSE DUTIES, BUT COULD FIGHT AS INFANTRY IF NECESSARY.

SLIDE 27 -- LIST OF SPECIAL WEAPONS

THE MAJOR WEAPONS OF THE CIVIL WAR FOR BOTH SIDES ARE LISTED THERE.

THE LARGEST IN TERMS OF NUMBERS WAS THE SPRINGFIELD .58 CALIBER RIFLE. BOTH SIDES USED THIS WEAPON AS THEIR MAIN INFANTRY ARM.

THE COLT REVOLVER WAS USED BY CAVALRY, OFFICERS, AND ARTILLERY CREWS -- THERE WERE TWO MODELS -- A NAVY COLT AND AN ARMY COLT.

THE SWORD WAS, IN MOST INSTANCES, ORNAMENTAL, AND USED BY OFFICERS (THE FLAT OF THE SWORD) TO MOVE LAGGARD SOLDIERS ALONG OR TO TRY TO BEAT THEM INTO LINE OF THEY WERE RETREATING. THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS KILLED BY SWORDS OR SABERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR IS LESS THAN 1%. THE PIKE WAS PURE ORNAMENT, AND USUALLY CARRIED BY SENIOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL (I.E., THE SERGEANT MAJOR). IT WAS MOSTLY DISCARDED AFTER 1863.

SLIDE 28 - PICTURE OF .58 SPRINGFIELD

THIS WEAPONS WEIGHED OVER 10 POUNDS, AND COULD BE FIRED THREE TIMES IN ONE MINUTE. IT TOOK SIXTEEN SEPARATE MOVEMENTS TO LOAD AND FIRE THE WEAPON. MOST SOLDIERS CARRIED UP TO 70 ROUNDS FOR THE WEAPON.

THE KICK OF THIS BLACK POWDER RIFLE-MUSKET WOULD CREATE A HORRIBLE BRUISE ON A SOLDIER'S SHOULDER, AND SOME COULD NOT RAISE THEIR ARMS TO CHEST LEVEL AFTER A BATTLE. AFTER FIRING FOR A TIME, THE BLACK POWDER RESIDUE IN THE WEAPON WOULD CREATED SUCH A CAKED SURFACE IN THE BARREL THAT THE .58 ROUND WOULD NOT FIT, SO THE MORE EXPERIENCED SOLDIERS WOULD TAKE .57 ROUNDS (USED FOR THE BRITISH WHITWORTH RIFLE) AND PLACE THEM IN THE BOTTOM OF THEIR CARTRIDGE BOX. SOME SOLDIERS WERE SO HARRIED AND NERVOUS THAT THEY WOULD NOT REALIZE THE WEAPONS HAD MISFIRED, AND WOULD SIMPLY LOAD AND ATTEMPT TO FIRE AGAIN. ONE WEAPON PICKED UP FROM THE BATTLEFIELD AT GETTYSBURG HAD BEEN LOADED 12 SEPARATE TIMES -- ONE COULD SAY THAT IS USER WAS A TAD NERVOUS.

SLIDE 29 -- PICTURE OF FIRING MECHANISM OF .58

THE WEAPONS USED A SMALL COPPER FULMINATE OF MERCURY CAP TO PROVIDE THE EXPLOSION TO FIRE THE WEAPON.

SLIDE 30 -- PICTURE OF 1861-1863 SPRINGFIELDS

THE WEAPON ON THE LEFT IS AN 1861 VERSION AND THE ONE ON THE RIGHT AN 1863 VERSION. SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE TO THE FIRING MECHANISM AND TRIGGER HOUSING.

SLIDE 31 -- PICTURE OF SOCKET BAYONET

THIRTEEN INCHES OF STEEL, BUT THE NUMBER OF MEN KILLED OR WOUNDED BY IT WAS SLIGHTLY OVER 1%. AT THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, THEN MAJOR GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG ORDERED HIS TROOPS TO MAKE BAYONET ATTACKS AS HE THOUGHT THAT WOULD CARRY THE DAY. MOST THOUGHTFUL SOLDIERS QUICKLY LEARNED THAT MAKING ATTACKS AGAINST TROOPS ARMED WITH THE RIFLED-MUSKET OVER OPEN TERRAIN WAS TANTAMOUNT TO COMMITTING SUICIDE. YOU WOULDN'T GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO USE THE BAYONET.

SLIDE 32 -- PICTURE OF CARTRIDGE BOX AND BAYONET

THIS IS THE CIVIL WAR SOLDIER'S LOAD BEARING EQUIPMENT. THE CARTRIDGE BOX WOULD UP ROUGHLY 50 ROUNDS, AND SOLDIERS COULD CARRY 20-30 MORE IN THEIR POCKETS -- ASSUMING THEIR UNIFORMS HAD POCKETS WHICH WASN'T ALWAYS THE CASE. THIS WAS MADE OF COWHIDE -- LEATHER, BUT THE CONFEDERATES HAD MORE OF A PROBLEM PROVIDING THIS TYPE OF EQUIPMENT BECAUSE THEY HAD MORE CATTLE.

SLIDE 33 -- PICTURE OF WORKINGS OF THE COLT REVOLVER

SOLDIERS CARRIED THEIR VERSION OF "SPEED LOADS" -- THE CYLINDER IS REMOVABLE, AND CAN QUICKLY BE FITTED WITH ANOTHER. THE WEAPON COULD FIRE SIX ROUNDS, BUT WAS NOT VERY ACCURATE EXCEPT AT VERY

CLOSE DISTANCES -- THE AMMUNITION WAS NOT FIXED (METALLIC CARTRIDGE) BUT BLACK POWDER AND A ROUND BALL.

SLIDE 34 -- SPECIAL WEAPONS OF THE CIVIL WAR (LIST)

THE MOST USED WEAPONS OF THIS LIST WAS THE TOP -- THE SHARPS RIFLE WHICH CAME IN TWO VERSIONS -- A CARBINE AND A RIFLE, AND IT COULD FIRE 7 TIMES IN LESS THAN 10 SECONDS. USING A HOLLOW TUBE TO FEED MORE FIXED CARTRIDGES INTO THE WEAPON, THE SHARPS COULD BE FIRED SEVEN TIMES AGAIN -- GIVEN THE FACT THAT MOST CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS COULD FIRE 3 TIMES IN A MINUTE, THE SHARPS COULD FIRE MORE THAN 20 ROUNDS IN THE SAME AMOUNT OF TIME -- WHAT FIRE SUPERIORITY. THE HENRY CAME IN TO TYPES -- A TWELVE SHORT AND A SIXTEEN SHOT, BUT THIS WEAPON WAS NOT USED IN LARGE NUMBERS ALTHOUGH MANY UNION SOLDIERS PURCHASED IT THROUGH SUTTLERS OR THROUGH THE MAIL AS THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS. THE SNIPER RIFLE WAS USUALLY A BRITISH WHITWORTH WITH A HEXAGONAL SHAPED BARREL AND AN ACCURACY OF UP TO A MILE. A SMALL HOLLOW TUBE WAS PLACED ON THE TOP OF THE RIFE TO ALLOW THE FIRER TO SIGHT IN ON A TARGET FURTHER AWAY. THE AGAR MACHINE GUN OR AS IT WAS POPULARLY KNOWN THE "COFFEE MILL" GUN FOR THE LITTLE COFFEE CAN UNDER THE WEAPON THAT CAUGHT THE SPENT CARTRIDGES -- IT USED A METALLIC CARTRIDGE WITH A STANDARD MINIE BALL IN IT COMPETE WITH PAPER. THE GATLING GUN WAS NOT USED AT ALL BECAUSE ITS INVENTOR JOHN GATLING HAD SOME MECHANICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE WEAPON WHEN IT WAS DEMONSTRATED FOR UNION FORCES, AND IT WAS NOT ADOPTED.

IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT MOST UNION COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE REALIZED ITS

POTENTIAL IN BATTLE AND WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED IT ARTILLERY AND USED IT AS SUCH.

SLIDE 35 -- PICTURE OF THE SPENCER REPEATING RIFLE

NOTICE THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DESIGN -- THE SPENT ROUND IS DROPPED OUT OF THE BOTTOM AS THE LEVEL INJECTS A FRESH ROUND INTO THE CHAMBER AND THE SPRING KEEPS THE ROUNDS MOVING FORWARD.

SLIDE 36 -- PICTURE OF THE HENRY RIFLE

NOTICE THAT ITS WORKING ARE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE SPENCER BUT IT HAS THE ADDED CAPABILITY THAT THE WEAPON IS COCKED AS THE ACTION TO LOAD AND UNLOAD IS TAKEN. THE SPENCER HAD TO BE MANUALLY COCKED AND THEN FIRED.

SLIDE 37 -- PICTURE OF THE AGAR MACHINE GUN

NOTICE THAT IT HAS ONE BARREL AND THAT ALSO THE BARREL IS INTERCHANGEABLE. I CAN FIND ONLY ONE INCIDENT OF THIS WEAPON BEING USED IN A CAMPAIGN. GENERAL BUTLER'S ARMY OF THE JAMES USED TWO OF THESE WEAPONS DURING THE BERMUDA HUNDRED CAMPAIGN.

PICTURE 38 -- WORKINGS OF THE SPENCER

NOTICE THAT THIS WEAPON IS SO SIMPLE THAT IT RARELY JAMMED, AND ITS LARGE .69 CALIBER ROUND WAS FIXED -- ONLY 55,000 OF THESE WEAPONS WERE PRODUCED IN THE WAR (MOSTLY AS CARBINES), AND THAT COLONEL WILDER'S BRIGADE USED THEM WITH TELLING EFFECT DURING THE BATTLE OF

CHICKAMAUGA. ALSO, MAJOR GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON'S CAVALRY CORPS OF 12,500 MEN WERE ALL ARMED WITH SPENCERS AND NO CONFEDERATE FORCE WAS ABLE TO OPPOSE THEM DURING HIS LONG RAID INTO ALABAMA AND GEORGIA IN 1865.

SLIDE 38 -- PICTURE OF BATTLE FRONT SHOWING MAIN LINE AND SKIRMISHERS

THE RECON ELEMENT OF ANY CIVIL WAR FORCE WAS THE SKIRMISH LINE. NORMALLY ONE TO TWO COMPANIES OF A REGIMENT WERE THROWN OUT AS SKIRMISHERS AND PUSHED TO 500 YARDS FROM THE MAIN LINE. SKIRMISHERS WORKED IN GROUPS OF THREE, AND WERE INTENDED TO FELL OUT THE SITUATION FOR THE MAIN LINE. THE MAIN LINE CONTAINED ROUGHLY TWO THIRDS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE UNIT WITH ONE THIRD IN RESERVE ABOUT 200 YARDS BEHIND THE MAIN LINE. NORMALLY, THE CONFEDERATES USED THREE REGIMENTS OF A FOUR REGIMENT BRIGADE IN THE MAIN LINE WITH ONE IN RESERVE. THE NORTH USED TWO AND TWO. WHEN TROOPS RAN OUT OF AMMUNITION, THE RESERVE UNIT CAME UP AND REPLACED THEM IN THE FIRING LINE AND THEY RETURNED TO THE REAR TO FILL THEIR CARTRIDGE BOXES.

SLIDE 39 -- CIVIL WAR STAFFS

BOTH THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES HAD STAFFS, AND THEY WERE GENERALLY SIMILAR AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE THINGS YOU SEE ON THE SCREEN.

SLIDE 40 -- PICTURE OF R. E. LEE

ONE OF THE FINEST SOLDIERS PRODUCED BY THIS NATION. HE WAS SUPERB COMMANDER IN BOTH OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, BUT HE PREFERRED OFFENSE AND WHEN HE WAS OUTNUMBERED, HE ALWAYS SOUGHT AN OPENING. HE ALWAYS REFERRED TO UNION TROOPS AS "THOSE PEOPLE." HE NEVER CURSED OR SWORE, AND RARELY LOST HIS COOL.

SLIDE 41 -- PICTURE OF A. P. HILL

THE BEST DIVISION COMMANDER IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. LOSSES IN SENIOR OFFICERS WOULD PROPEL HIM TO CORPS COMMAND, BUT HE DID MIXED WORKED THERE. HE WORE A FLAMING RED SHIRT INTO ACTION, AND COULD PUSH HIS PEOPLE TO THE LIMITS OF ENDURANCE AND BEYOND.

SLIDE 42 -- PICTURE OF GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON

NEXT TO LEE, ONE OF THE BEST TACTICAL MINDS IN THE CONFEDERACY. ALTHOUGH A GENUINE ECCENTRIC, HE HAD LEE THOUGHT SO MUCH ALIKE AS TO BE TWINS. JACKSON WAS A DRIVEN MAN, AND WAS OFTEN THE SUBJECT OF JOKES WHILE HE WAS A PROFESSOR AT THE VIRGINIA MILITARY ACADEMY.

HE QUARRELED FREQUENTLY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES -- IN FACT, AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, MOST OF HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDER WERE UNDER ARREST, AND SEVERAL HAD DESIRED TO CHALLENGE HIM TO A DUEL, AND HAD FEW GENUINE FRIENDS AMONG THE COMMANDERS OF LEE'S ARMY. HIS DEATH AT CHANCELLORSVILLE SPELLED THE END OF THE SOUTH -- WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF HE AND NOT EWELL HAD BEEN IN CHARGE AT GETTYSBURG.

SLIDE NO. 43 -- PICTURE OF P. G. T. BREAUREGARD

THE CREOLE GENERAL. CONSIDERED ONE OF THE BEST MINDS IN THE SOUTH AMONG THE SENIOR GENERALS, BUT THIS OFFICER IS INVOLVED ONLY IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR AND ITS LATER STAGES. YOU SEE, HE DOESN'T GET ALONG WELL WITH PRESIDENT DAVIS, SO HE WAS RELEGATED TO BACKWATER COMMANDS FOR MOST OF THE WAR. HE COMMANDED THE VICTORIOUS CONFEDERATE ARMY AT MANASSAS, AND WAS ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON'S DEPUTY AT SHILOH AND TOOK OVER AFTER HIS DEATH. HOW GOOD A GENERAL COMMANDER HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IS OPEN TO DEBATE, BUT HE DID GOOD SERVICE IN SUPPORT OF LEE AS THE RICHMOND COMMANDER IN THE CLOSING MONTHS OF THE WAR, AND HE BOTTLED UP BUTLER'S ARMY OF THE JAMES AT BERMUDA HUNDRED.

SLIDE 44 - PICTURE OF U.S. GRANT

NOT A GREAT TACTICAL GENIUS ALTHOUGH SOME OF HIS ACTIONS SHOWED PROMISE. MORE KNOWN FOR BULLDOG TENACITY. GRANT'S CAREER OUTSIDE OF THE ARMY WAS ONE OF CONSTANT FAILURE AND BATTLES WITH THE BOTTLE. BUT, HE DEVELOPED A RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COMMANDERS AND A STRONG WILL TO DESTROY THE CONFEDERACY, AND HE KEPT AT IT AND EMERGED FROM THE WAR AS A HERO AND LATER AS PRESIDENT.

SLIDE 45 -- PICTURE OF HENRY R. HELLECK

CALLED "OLD BRAINS", HE WAS DISMAL FIELD COMMANDER, BUT A VERY GOOD ADMINISTRATOR. BEFORE GRANT, HELLECK RAN THE UNION ARMIES FROM WASHINGTON. WHEN GRANT BECAME OVERALL COMMANDER, HE WAS

RELEGATED TO THE JOB OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND HE PERFORMED WELL IN THAT CAPACITY.

SLIDE 46 -- PICTURE OF GENERAL BEN BUTLER

HERE'S ONE OF THE POLITICAL GENERALS I SPOKE EARLIER ABOUT. HE WAS THE POLITICAL POWER IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. LINCOLN RAISED HIM TO THE RANK OF MAJOR GENERAL BECAUSE OF POLITICAL NECESSITY.

BUTLER MANAGED TO SCREW UP EVERY TACTICAL ASSIGNMENT HE WAS GIVEN.

HE DID, HOWEVER, DO A GOOD JOB AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF NEW ORLEANS AFTER THAT CITY FELL INTO UNION HANDS IN 1862. HE GOT THE NAME OF "BEAST" BUTLER WHEN HE ISSUED A FAMOUS OR INFAMOUS IF YOU ARE A CONFEDERATE ABOUT LADIES IN NEW ORLEANS. HE WAS FINALLY RELIEVED WHEN HE BUNGLED HIS ASSIGNMENT OF ATTEMPTING TO TAKE FORT FISHER DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE WAR.

SLIDE 47 -- LIST OF EASTERN BATTLES

HERE IS A LIST OF THE MAJOR ACTIONS OF UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR UNTIL 1863

SLIDE 48 -- LIST OF WESTERN BATTLES

HERE IS A LIST OF THE MAJOR ACTIONS OF UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR UNTIL 1863 (BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA).

SLIDE 49 -- CIVIL WAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

THE REGIMENT WAS THE GENERAL BUILDING BLOCK OF BOTH ARMIES. A REGIMENT CONSISTED OF 10 COMPANIES OF 110 MEN EACH AND WITH SUPPORT

PERSONNEL, MOST REGIMENTS AT THEIR INDUCTION INTO SERVICE WERE 1,200 STRONG. BUT, AFTER SEVERAL CAMPAIGN, REGIMENTS LOST PERSONNEL, AND MOST REGIMENTS IN BOTH ARMIES BARELY TOPPED 600 MEN AND MANY FAR LESS.

SLIDE 50 -- UNION ARMIES IN THE WESTERN THEATER

HERE IS A LIST OF THE VARIOUS UNION ARMIES, THE BATTLES THEY FOUGHT IN THE WEST.

SLIDE 51 -- UNION ARMIES IN THE WESTERN THEATER

A CONTINUATION OF THIS LIST. MOST OF THESE ARMIES ARE SMALL, RARELY REACHING MORE THAN 25,000 MEN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

SLIDE 52 -- MOBILIZATION IN THE CIVIL WAR SYSTEM

BOTH UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES RELIED ON VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR, BUT BOTH HAD TO RESORT TO A DRAFT IN 1862. PEOPLE WERE ASSIGNED NUMBERS, AND A WHEEL WITH NUMBERS WAS USED TO DIAL EACH DRAFTEE. EXEMPTION COULD BE CLAIMED, AND SUBSTITUTES PURCHASED IN BOTH ARMIES. IN 1863, BOTH UNION AND CONFEDERATES HAD BEGUN TO ENCOUNTER STRONG DRAFT RESISTANCE FROM THEIR POPULATIONS.

SLIDE 53 -- DEFINITION OF THEATERS OF WAR -- EAST AND WEST

THIS IS A GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF THE TWO THEATERS OF OPERATIONS.  
THERE WERE OTHER ACTIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST, BUT THEY WERE SMALL AND  
DID NOT HAVE ANY REAL BEARING ON THE WAR.

SLIDE 54 -- NAMES OF CIVIL WAR ARMIES

IN A NUTSHELL, THE CONFEDERATES NAMED THEIR ARMIES AFTER  
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS, AND THE NORTH AFTER RIVERS.

SLIDE 55 -- UNION ARMIES LOCATED IN EASTERN THEATER  
MAIN ARMY HERE IS THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

SLIDE 56 -- UNION ARMIES LOCATED IN EASTERN THEATER  
MOST OF THESE ARMIES WERE CALLED IN LATE 1864 OR EARLY 1865

SLIDE 57 -- CONFEDERATE ARMIES IN EASTERN THEATER  
THE ONLY ONE WAS THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

SLIDE 58 -- CONFEDERATES ARMIES IN THE WEST  
THE MAIN ARMY HERE WAS THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE WHICH FIGHTS MOST  
OF THE MAJOR BATTLES AFTER SHILOH AND IS FINALLY DESTROYED DURING  
THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

SLIDE 59 -- CIVIL WAR TRAINING  
THERE WAS, AS YOU CAN SEE, NO REAL BASIC TRAINING. WHAT TRAINING  
THE DRAFTEE DID RECEIVE WAS GIVEN BY THE REGIMENT ITSELF. THERE

WAS NO EMPHASIS ON MARKSMANSHIP ALTHOUGH THE CONFEDERATES DID SOMEWHAT BETTER IN THAT ARENA BECAUSE THEY HAD TO PUT MEAT ON THE TABLE. THERE WAS ALSO MORE EMPHASIS ON DRILL AND NOT IN INDIVIDUAL SKILLS BECAUSE THE GROUP WAS THE SUM OF THE ACTION. IN LINE FROM A COLUMN OF FOURS TOOK SOME TRAINING TO EXECUTE, AND IT COULD TAKE UP TO 30 MINUTES TO PREPARE A DIVISION FOR AN ATTACK.

THAT'S THE CIVIL WAR -- REASONS AND MILITARY TACTICS IN A NUTSHELL.  
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS.

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND HISTORIAN  
U.S. Army Chemical School  
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**BRIEFING**

**SUBJECT: CIVIL WAR BULLETS**

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Most bullets during the Civil War were part of a paper cartridge which also included the black powder. Bullets normally weighted up to 50 grains with the black powder 60 grains. The bullet was called the Minie ball, but of course, is not a ball at all, but a conical bullet designed by Captain Minie of the French Army.

**Minie Ball**

The bullet was originally designed with a hollow base into which was placed an iron plug. The iron band was designed to expand upon the discharge of the powder and catch the grooves of the rifling of the barrel. As the bullet exited the rifle it was spin stabilized in flight. The expansion of the base of the round also trapped the expanding gas behind the bullet thus giving it a greater power and range. The soldiers used the bullet in this manner – he took a round from his cartridge pouch and placed the front end in his mouth and used his teeth (remember, all infantry soldiers had to have at least two teeth in their upper and lower jaw for this purpose) to find the end of the round. When found, the soldier would clamp down and tear separating the round from the 60 grains of powder. The soldier then poured the powder down the barrel and seated it firmly with his ramrod. The bullet then followed. He then produced a percussion cap onto the nipple under the hammer of the musket with the musket at what was called “half cock.” The soldier then moved the hammer to “full cock” and raised the rifle to this shoulder to fire. The recoil of a black powder weapon was powerful, and after a battle, it was not uncommon for soldiers to have a huge bruise mark on their shoulder, and many could not raise their arm past vertical.

How powerful was the bullet you ask. A model 1855 Springfield rifled musket could fire a Mini ball that could penetrate through a solid board of white pine three inches thick at 1,000 yards. During the war, the Union contracted for more than 46 million paper cartridges at estimated cost of \$800 million.

During battle, the use of black power would often foul barrels of rifles and make them almost unusable. The "William's" bullet was developed to help keep the bore of rifles clean.

### **William's Bullet**

It was a .58 caliber bullet with a coned zinc washer held to its base by a lead disk and plug. When fired, the pressure of the gunpowder drove the disc into the bullet, flattening the zinc washer and forcing its edges out against the surface of the bore. Thus, as the round exited the rifle, it cleaned the bore in the process. Over three million of these bullets were produced, and it was standard practice to have at least one or two Williams bullet in every package of .58 paper rounds.

Both sides occasionally used what could be called explosive bullets. The Gardiner bullet came in two sizes. An acorn shaped chamber filled with fulminate was placed inside the bullet and the charge connected to a 1.5 second fuzz ignited by discharge of the bullet.

### **Gardiner Bullet**

Many soldiers refused to carry them because the bullet had a tendency to explode without use. Only 10,000 were made at a cost of only \$350,000 with no explosive in the bullet.

Perhaps the largest bullet used in the war was .69 caliber and normally used only in smoothbore muskets. It weighed a hefty 730 grains and was fired by 70 grains of black powder.

### **.69 Caliber Bullet**

These bullets caused fearful wounds when they struck human targets. Given the aforementioned striking power of the bullet even at long range, then they rounds hit any bone, they shattered that bone. Also, the rounds were made of lead, and when the bullet entered the body, it could fracture. What you had with Civil War rifles was, in effect, a “dum-dum” round that went in small and came out big. In many instances, if rounds did not strike bone, they could go clean through a soldier. There are instances of the same bullet striking several soldiers.

During the Spanish-American War, many of the surgeons with the U.S. Army in Cuba had experience during the Civil War. They were amazed at the clean wounds left by the Mauser bullets of the Spanish soldiers. They were made of steel and jacketed so that they did not shatter in the body as did civil war bullets.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: Civil War Soldier Medical Systems**

*Overview*

Since the U.S. Army in its history to 1861 had never fielded a force larger than 25,000, the Civil War quickly overloaded the medical systems that the North or South initially organized. The military of both sides had few doctors with experience in dealing with combat wounds, and had to improvise after the carnage of the first few battles. Soldiers wounded at Bull Run or Shiloh could not immediately expect good medical care. The equipment, the system, and the base hospitals to provide that care did not then exist. Thousands of soldiers died because of a simple lack of basic medical care. That would change over time.

As the months dragged on, both the North and the South began to set up medical organizations that worked. As regiments were formed, the Table of Organization called for a surgeon. However, throughout the war, surgeons were often picked simply because they said they were surgeons. Little effort was made to check medical credentials. During the war, soldiers were often subjected to the work of either amateurs or outright quacks who claimed to have medical knowledge. It was not that uncommon to have soldiers operated on by veterinarians when massive numbers of wounded required care.

*The Medical System*

Let me take you from the battlefield to the base hospital as of 1863. Let's say I was wounded at Chickamauga. I would have been taken by either other soldiers or stretcher bearers to a hospital wagon and then to a brigade dressing station where I would have been given primary medical care. Normally, the brigade station handled lightly wounded personnel or those whose wounded required immediate attention. Let's say, I was shot in the leg. At the brigade station, the wound would have been looked at, and if it was not a "bleeder", then I would have been sent on to the division hospital. Upon arrival, I would have been placed in a area for new wounded, and in time [it could be hours], a surgeon would come around and look at the wound. If it wasn't serious enough, I would be put in a queue, and wait my turn to go under the knife to remove the leg. This was the civil war version of triage. If the doctors felt my wound was mortal [i.e., in the bowels, head, or stomach], I would be placed off to the side and given minimal care at best – anotherwords, allowed to die.

When I finally made it into the hospital, I would be put in a table of some kind, and strapped down at the legs, the middle of the body, and the chest. Normally, I would be given some form of sleeping drug - ether or laudanum - but often times, those had run out, and the surgeons would be forced to operate without anesthetic. A corpsman would open my mouth and put in a gauze or cloth gag so that I would not scream and distract the surgeon.

The Surgeon would then operate by cutting the flesh away from the bone, and then cutting the two major arteries on either side of the leg, and cauterizing them to stop the flow of blood. Then, using a saw, the surgeon would remove the leg above the point where the round broke it. Those who were operated on close to the trunk of the body had only a ten percent chance of survival. This action would take the surgeon roughly 30 to 60 seconds. The skin would be brought together and quickly sown up with "cat-gut" thread.

I would then be taken outside and put into the recovery area. Sometimes, a corpsman would come around to check the wound and to give me something to eat or drink. After a time [it varied from hours to days] I would be put on an ambulance, and taken to a rail head where I would be transferred to a hospital train. That train would then take me to the nearest major medical facility - usually a base hospital - where I would recuperate. If complications developed or I needed special care, I would be put on another hospital train that would take me to another and normally long established hospital where specialists in particular types of wounds were located. It would be there that I would be fitted with an artificial leg, and in time, discharged from the Union Army and if not too badly crippled, into the Veterans Reserve Corps.

### *Speaking of Hospitals*

The southern system was similar except it was not as fancy. Most southern medical system could provide roughly the same level of care that the Union could, but without the frills. The Confederates created one of the most modern hospitals - a place called Chimborazo. It was a converted plantation near Richmond that would grow to more than a hundred buildings connected by wooden pathways. Each building was a ward with up to 30 patients in bed spaced up to 4 feet apart. In the center of the ward would be several large barrels containing water and versions of "koolade" for the patients. The wards were "light" and airy and not dark and dank like many Union hospitals. This hospital also had something that Union hospitals did not have - a high level of survival. More than 80% of the patients that arrived at Chimborazo lived. Unlike most Union hospitals until the mid-part of the war, Chimborazo had female nurses. At the time, the use of women in hospitals was controversial - women were not supposed to see the suffering and other horrors of hospitals. However the soldiers didn't mind. Women were more gentle than the corpsmen, and were far more helpful - they wrote letters for soldiers and took care of valuables for family and friends if a soldier died. The North was slower in the use of female nurses because of the

opposition of the Army Medical Department – average age of the major commanders of the medical department at that time was in the high 70's and very set in their ways. Eventually, Clara Barton [the founder of the American Red Cross] persuaded Lincoln to allow her to provide nurses for hospitals, and the rest is history. Incidentally, Barton picked these ladies quite carefully, and they were given training prior to working in hospitals. Any transgressions of the written rules governing how nurses behaved resulted in removal from the program. Two types of people clogged hospitals of both the North and South – first, the most obvious, men wounded in battle, and second, those who were sick beyond the normal cold. Of the more than 600,000 soldiers on both sides who died during the war, fully 60% or more died from disease.

#### *Speaking of Field Sanitation*

In the early part of the conflict, neither side was particularly conversant with field sanitation. Troops relieved themselves where they wanted to, and the mess hall might be placed next to a latrine. Soldiers did not take baths much, nor did they wash their clothes frequently. Washing ones hands prior to eating or after going to the bathroom was nonexistent. Soldiers on both sides were provided by eating utensils and plates/cups. However, these plates and cups were rarely washed after use, and it was not uncommon to see particles of food on soldiers plates and forks.

The cooks did not exercise sanitary precautions. Meat was provided by a cow for each unit. The regimental butcher would do his work right in the area, and the food was often covered in blood, dirt and leaves. Normally, it was cut up and roasted using bayonets over an open fire. Water was obtained from local creeks. Since units and horses and mules frequently passed through these creeks, the potability of water was usually suspect.

It was no wonder than when troops were located in garrison – that is, not campaigning – the sick rate climbed. When troops were campaigning during the season (April through November), they were out on the road, marching and exercising, and were in a healthier climate. When in garrison, and forced to spend long hours in winter quarters, problem with health occurred almost immediately.

One of the biggest problems for both armies was the monotony of food. Things like fresh bread and vegetables were almost unheard of. A diet of hardtack and some form of meat was the usual lot for most soldiers of both sides. There was no thought to the idea of an Army Master Menu, and no thought to the nutritional value of food. Hardtack was aptly named, but it had little nutritional value. Fruits were also not normally part of the diet. The common drink of soldiers of the period of coffee which was brewed by them frequently, but the quality and availability of coffee was sometimes a problem. Smoking and chewing was constant among both officers and enlisted men. A chaw of tobacco in the cheeks was almost universal among the ranks, and cigars frequently smoked by officers even in battle.

Toothpaste as such didn't exist, but a form of tooth powder did. Soldiers did not normally take care of their teeth, and it was not uncommon to see private soldiers with much of their upper and lower teeth missing. The teeth had rotted out because soldiers did not care for them.

About 1862, things began to improve for both sides. In the Union army, the U.S. Sanitary Commission was formed. It consisted of experts in that area who traveled from unit to unit giving lectures on how to deal with field sanitation and lectures to men on personal hygiene. One of the problems in the initial enforcement of sanitary conditions within a camp fell to the NCOs. Officers didn't do those sorts of things, nor did commanding officers habitually ensure that their soldiers were fed. Officers looked to their own comforts, and as a result, they suffered, in the main, less health problems than did the average soldier.

One of the reasons for the high mortality among common soldiers was the fact that in order to be inducted into either army, all that was required was a cursory physical. That is, if you could walk, talk, and use a rifle, regardless of your age or physical looks, you were "in". Of course, cripples who sought to serve were habitually, and blind or deaf people were also eliminated from consideration, but many young soldiers, particularly from the poorer sectors of society entered the army in poor health, and they were just not up to the rigors of field life. You had to be tough to survive in the Union or Confederate army. You had to be able to endure pain and discomfort.

As a result, it was no wonder that many men died of dysentery which killed far more than the shot and shell from weapons. Once the Sanitary Commission did its work, the loss to disease was cut down greatly. The Confederates had a similar organization as well.

Today, much attention is paid by military organizations to the mental well-being of the soldiers, and this was also an interest of Civil War soldiers. Both the armies established what the Union called the U.S. Christian Commission. It was they who did much of the work done by the USO for people in uniform. They provided reading material and bibles for soldiers and did what they could to stop the rampant use of alcohol and other stimulants in the camps when soldiers had little or nothing to do. They also attempted to stop card playing – it is interesting to note that most civil war soldiers did not want to be shot and killed with a deck of cards on their person, so if you look into areas occupied by soldiers of both sides right before a battle, you would find the area littered with discarded decks of cards. The Sanitary Commission and the Christian commission tried to make life healthier and happier for the average soldier. But nothing can disguise the fact that Civil War Medicine left much to be desired.

#### *When in Doubt - Amputate*

There were two reasons for the large number of amputations during the war. One was the powerful nature of the bullets fired from rifled muskets. At 200 yards, a minie ball could penetrate four inches of pine wood. Think of what that would do to the human body if that bullet struck bone. It simply shattered the bone above and below the area it hit. It caused something similar to a compound fracture,

and it wasn't all that unusual to see men on the operating table with bits of white bone showing through the skin. In that case, the surgeons felt that they had no option but to amputate. The other reason was that medicine had not gone very far with the treatment of bullet wounds, nor in the healing of breaks in bones.

The surgeons did something else. They did not exercise much in the way of sanitary conditions at the hospitals. What Hawkeye Pierce would call "Meatball" surgery at the 4077<sup>th</sup> MASH, the Union surgeons would also use the same term – only in their case, it would mean the removal of as many limbs and they could in the time allotted. Surgeons would work for hours at a stretch with only a few minutes break in-between. It was not uncommon for a surgeon to amputate 1,000 or more arms and legs during a period of duty in surgery. The surgeon also used the same equipment time after time with no thought to cleaning it. Just a little wipe of the instruments would have saved thousands of soldiers on both sides from post-operative infection.

The Confederates had less problems in this area for an interesting reason. Most Union surgeons used sponges which they could easily obtain to clean wounds, and would then rinse out the sponges in a bucket of dirty or blood stained water. The Confederates, not having access to sponges, used bits of cloth which they threw into a pile. The pile would be taken out to a large pot of boiling water, and thrown in. Once washed, the cloth would be hung out to dry, and then used again. In this way, the southern surgeons cut down the amount of potential infection.

If a total of 10,000 soldiers were wounded in a battle, about 25% would die within a year from post-operative problems. For instances, when items are placed in a surgical opening, one of the nurses at the operating table is given the responsibility to insure that a tally is kept, and that all the items are removed from the body prior to the incision being closed up. No so in the Civil War because the surgeons worked alone and with little help from nurses or corpsmen.

#### *Summation*

At the beginning of the war, both sides had almost no medical capabilities to care for wounded. By the end of the war, both sides had made great strides in field medicine and in the treatment of various illness associated with various sieges or battles in which they became a factor. The Union in particular had a well developed medical system to compliment its troops in combat. Unfortunately, much of it came only after thousands of soldiers of both armies had sickened and died from lack of good food, proper sanitation, and bad medical care. Since the Civil War, the U.S. Army has greatly increased its ability to care for its wounded to the point that in SVN nearly two decades ago, you had a better than 90% chance to survive if you were still living when the evacuation hospital was reached. Soldiers who would be terribly wounded in battle were now surviving where they would have died in World War II. The Civil War began the trend toward better military medicine.

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## **GREAT GENERALS AND THE QUALITY OF OPPOSITION**

Mention the names of Caesar, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Lee, Patton and General Vo Nguyen Giap. All were successful as military leaders, and all have had their campaigns studied and re-studied. But no one seems to have seen the obvious. Many of the greatest commanders in history did not face commanders of equal caliber and when they did, their record of victories is much. Some may say, so what! In a sense they are right. What difference does it make that many of these commanders executed some of the best classical campaigns of history in which they showed tactical and strategical brilliance against inferior opponents?

But, consider this, what if General "Stonewall" Jackson had faced Union generals like John F. Reynolds, John Sedgewick, Philip Sheridan, or George H. Thomas when he began to build a reputation with the Confederate Army. Would the famous Valley Campaign have been one of the most outstanding examples of maneuver in history? The commanders that Jackson faced were Major Generals Shields, Milroy, and Banks. None performed well at any time during the military career in any type of command. Banks lasted the longest, and his Red River Campaign in 1864 was a model of waste, stupidity, and folly.

Among the best generals of Rome, Caesar certainly deserves a place at the top, yet look at the generals Caesar faced. Although Pompey was a good sailor and had proven so in several instances, he was not good at ground tactics as Caesar proved at Pharsalus. Vercingetorix was a great leader, but not a subtle tactician. He shut his army in Alesia and allowed Caesar to build a wall around his fortress. When a relieving force came to the rescue, Caesar simply built another wall to fend them off. The Romans were the best engineers of the ancient world and the Gauls played to their [the Romans] strength. Such construction was second nature and Caesar's men went at it with a will.

Caesar's later campaigns in Spain against the various lieutenants of Pompey were exercises in some brilliant maneuver and marching, but against opponents who allowed Caesar the initiative in all things. At no time was Caesar in any danger of losing a battle

in his entire career. If his troops were in peril it was because of the fighting ability [man-to-man] of his opponents. Remember, Caesar's men and their opponents fought up close and personal and not at the distance of a rifle shot.

Look at Hannibal's greatest victories. At the River Trebia, he faced the counsel Sempronius. Hardly a great commander! At Lake Trasimene, he faced the counsel Flaminius. Again, not a great general, but only a commander with a temper to match his name, and Hannibal created the world's greatest ambush depending on Flaminius to get angry and take the bait he offered.

At Cannae, Hannibal faced an army commanded by two counsels. In history, name any army commanded by two different individuals that accomplished anything of note – especially when they commanded on alternate days. Paulus saw Hannibal's formation and was smart enough not to accept battle, but Varro was more aggressive, and didn't see something that should have made him suspicious. When Hannibal faced the counsel Fabius who was a careful commander, he was supremely frustrated. You may laugh at Fabius for his lack of aggressiveness, but his tactics of attriting Hannibal were far more successful than the direct tactics employed by previous commanders. The counsel Fabius knew that to meet Hannibal in battle was to invite disaster, so he adroitly avoided such a confrontation. Try as Hannibal might, he could not bring the Romans to battle. Each day he did not cost him men he could ill afford to lose.

Because Hannibal was so deadly, the Romans did not attack him directly, but used the "indirect approach" by attacking Carthage. That powerful city-state that had given Hannibal scant help in his nearly two decades of combat with the Romans now called him home for a final battle with a Roman commander that was Hannibal's equal.

Hannibal before Zama requested a meeting with the Roman commander Scipio. In this general, Hannibal saw a leader fully his equal, and he was not confident of victory. In fact, quite the opposite – he was in despair. This Roman commander would not make the same mistakes as had other generals on which Hannibal built his reputation.

Yet, Hannibal executed one of the finest examples of leadership when his outnumbered army almost brought the Romans to defeat. For more than two decades Hannibal held an army of differing peoples and cultures together through great adversity.

That ability alone would mark Hannibal as a great captain of history. But, what if Hannibal had met Scipio early in the Second Punic War. Would his string of victories against Rome have continued?

What about Napoleon. How many generals did Napoleon face in battle that were close to being his equal. Wellington, certainly, and Archduke Charles probably. Most of the other commanders including the helpless General Mack, and the semi-mobile Kutuzov were often older officers who had learned their trade under commanders who were used to the doctrine of Frederick the Great. Napoleon had moved far beyond that great captain and his troops and his mind were much quicker. The Austrian, Prussian, and Russians commanders were not fast enough intellectually, nor had they created forces that matched speed of thought. Napoleon had.

Two armies made efforts to change – one made great efforts, and the other slower but no less steady. The Prussians had done an after action review. Why had Napoleon defeated them? Hours of debate and reams of paper were consumed, and a consensus was finally reached. The Prussians created a General Staff to match the staff system that Napoleon used. But their staff system supported more than one commander, and even if the commanders changed, the quality of the Great General Staff did not.

The Prussian army developed a faster marching pace, and the Prussian cavalry was changed to more match Napoleon's horsemen. When Napoleon faced a rebuilt Prussian and Austrian Army after Austerlitz, he found that victories were still possible, but the enemy had begun to learn. Good commanders had come to the fore, and training had become better to the point where they commanded soldiers fully as good as those of Napoleon's Grande Armee. It was Napoleon's success that was, in a sense, the seed of his undoing.

To prove the point, let's deal with some of the great commanders in history to see if they really are that good when they meet opponents of nearly equal caliber. General Lee from 1862 through 1863 faced a series of Federal commanders – George B. McClellan, John Pope, then McClellan again, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Joseph Hooker. During that time, Lee fought and won most of the battles. The Seven Days, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Only Antietam was not a real victory, but to have

held the field and retired from it unmolested after having fought off an army twice the size of his own classifies as an appreciable victory for Lee. This does not, however, mitigate the fact that McClellan abysmally mismanaged the battle and allowed Lee to win it.

General Lee in 1864 faced commanders of a different sort. U.S. Grant was not a brilliant tactician as was Lee, but he was competent and steady enough to ensure that Lee could not defeat him. Both commanders had chances to win it all during the Wilderness, and both misfired on that chance. The rest of the campaign leading to Lee's surrender was anticlimactic. The Confederate commander did not have the strength to deal a blow against the Army of the Potomac, and Lee had to surrender the initiative to Grant. The Union superiority in numbers and logistics guaranteed that only one outcome was possible providing Grant did not allow Lee to resume the offensive.

So desperate was Lee to seize the initiative from Grant that he detached a not insignificant part of his army under General Jubal Early to move through the Shenandoah Valley and defeat the Union forces there to threaten Washington and hopefully relieve the pressure on Lee's forces at Petersburg. Read Lee's letters during this period. His rhetoric is of a commander whose arteries are hardening and there is nothing he can do about it. In all fairness to Lee he was a realist, and he did not want to "sugar coat" the situation for President Jefferson Davis.

Grant had a strangle hold on Lee and would not let him go. He [Grant] was stronger, and eventually Lee would bleed to death as Grant intended from the beginning. The Union general had obviously studied how Lee operated, and was intent on not allowing him any means to take the offensive. Look at Grant's plan to move his army over the Rappahannock and fight Lee in May, 1864. At no time did the Union commander ever intend to fight Lee within the Wilderness itself. He plainly wanted to reach beyond the belt of forests that made up the Wilderness, and into open country where his numbers against Lee would be more dramatic and he could control them better. That his subordinates [i.e., Major General G. K. Warren] – especially his cavalry under Major General Sheridan – did not carry this out was not really Grant's fault.

To be fair, Grant was not Lee's equal in battle in the tactical sense. Grant was a dogged commander who hued insofar as he could to his operational timetable. Everything

he did was aimed at one objective – not Richmond or Petersburg, but Lee's Army. He had instructed Major General Meade that he was to take his army everywhere Lee went. Not brilliant, but in light of the tremendous numerical and logistical superiority of the North was a solidly composed strategic scenario.

The same could be said of Field Marshal Rommel. When the Afrika Corps came to the desert, they were sent to bolster a beaten Italian force. The British Commanders in the desert – Field Marshal Wavel and General O'Connor were first class soldiers. But, by the time that Rommel had gotten his forces into the action, they had left the scene. In their place were commanders of a lower caliber – i.e., General Alan Cunningham and General Neil Ritchie at the major levels, and divisional and corps commanders like Beresford-Pierse, Herbert Lumsden and Alec Gatehouse.

Through a series of brilliant maneuvers, Rommel forced the British back. Part of the problem was Churchill who kept raiding the Middle East to help other parts of the fighting front – i.e., Far East and Greece. The British did not have the strength to deal with Rommel and their best commanders had already been sent to other fronts.

If battles were decided on courage alone, the British certainly would have more than held their own against the Germans. But victory in the desert wasn't based only on courage, but on the ability to maneuver masses of armor and infantry in a highly mobile and fluid situation. One had to be very, very flexible, and take considerable risks to prosper in desert combat. Even though the British Army had some of the most original tactical thinkers who influenced doctrine before the war, they were not in the desert. Infantry fought with infantry, and armor with armor.

At one point during a desperate battle in 1941, a British brigade was almost wiped out by German tanks with a British armored unit lagged close by, and although the infantry commander pleaded for armor support, the commanders of the British armor would not engage as they did not believe in working closely with infantry.

Rommel and General Montgomery were much like Lee and Grant. Rommel was the brilliant tactician, and Montgomery the dogged but well supplied opponent. However, Montgomery deserves considerable credit for realizing the key to victory in the desert

was a close working relationship between all arms such as that generally accomplished during El Alamein.

When he took over the Eighth Army from General Auchinleck, Montgomery immediately threw out all of the current thinking and installed his own. Although some of it was rather inflexible, he started the various arms talking with and working with each other and insisted on it to the point of changing commanders who did not get the message. In the end, the 8<sup>th</sup> Army was as strong a force as the Afrika Korps. What Montgomery lacked in brilliance, he more than made up in precise planning and determination as Grant did to Lee. That led to victory at El Alamein.

It is not fair to denigrate Rommel further. The desert was the only place where his particular battlefield capabilities were given a good test. His actions later in North Africa and Europe were not long enough to have had any appreciable effect on the campaign – after beating the pants off the US. at Kasserine Pass even though he wasn't really present; he had already gone back to Europe at the express orders of Hitler and did not return to North Africa. The army that Rommel left in Tunisia was surrendered by General von Arnim to Eisenhower. The “Desert Fox” was given control of the preparations for the Atlantic Wall which he performed with commendable zeal using what material he had. Undoubtedly he was correct when he opted for a defense on the beaches were the inland strategy of his direct superior, Marshal von Rundstedt.

In Europe, Rommel faced commanders of a different stripe than the British in the early months of the desert war. Montgomery was back in control of the land fighting, and Eisenhower and Montgomery had excellent supporting commanders ranging from Americans Bradley, Hodges, Simpson, and Patton to English commanders like Dempsey and General Crear the commander of the 1st Canadian Army. Former major commanders in the desert, i.e., General O'Connor and General Ritchie, both commanded corps under Montgomery and did outstanding jobs. All of these subordinate commanders along with divisional and brigade commanders were quite competent. Rommel was not able to make any headway against them prior to his nearly fatal encounter with a strafing Allied fighter.

Commanders do make the difference in war. Admittedly, the Romans conquered much of the known world and were often the best army commanded by the worse leaders.

The ineptitude of the Romans was often compensated for by the fighting ability of their soldiers. In the end, though, the Generals make the difference over the long run.

We admire Lee because of his aggressiveness and tactical brilliance, but the cold fact remains that his side lost the war. Is it not the whole point of conflict to win it as a whole even though one might lose a battle. The U.S. Army recognizes this and attempts to develop leaders that are both professional and competent. For the major part, the Army succeeds. Remember, during World War II, the generals that began the war were not in the main the generals that ended it. The reason for this is not loss in battle because the U.S. Army lost relatively few generals in comparison to say the German or Soviet armies, but the process of learning who the combat performers are and who are not, and promoting those with a good record as a combat commander to higher level.

General Lee built his superb Army of Northern Virginia squarely on that principle. No commander as far as Lee was concerned would be promoted in his army without demonstrated competence at his current level of command and Lee's belief that he was ready for a higher level.

Those in position to select commanders for a military organization must not be fooled by the record of a commander who seems to be successful. They must look deeper and from all angles. Because that general may either be supremely lucky or have less qualified commanders on the other side who made him look good. In politics this is done all the time and to the overall detriment of the nation. Any mistake in this area could be catastrophic to the overall result of the war – to win. General MacArthur knew the importance of having good commanders as he once pointed out that a bad commander can lose the war.

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## **HIGH COMMAND IN THE CIVIL WAR -- A CLASH OF EGOS**

During the Civil War, the business of prosecuting the war was often hamstrung by a clash of egos between the political leaders and major commanders in the field, and sometimes among the commanders in the field themselves. In the case of the South, such clashes contributed greatly to Confederate strategic setbacks and the eventual loss of the war.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis, a leader who suffered from this clash of egos, had two faces – a private one and a public one. In personal contact, Davis could be quite charming, friendly, and had a sense of humor. But in public and in his official dealings, Davis could and did give offense, but it was not always his fault. Davis' view of his office was, perhaps, a bit less flexible than that of Abraham Lincoln. He also had a stiff manner when communicating in writing to subordinates. He often gave offense without meaning to do so. He wrote several letters to General Johnston that gave unnecessary offense – in all fairness, Johnston was an extraordinarily touchy commander. He also did not always read letters from Johnston and understand their meaning.

The relationship between a political leader who determines strategy and the military commanders in the field must be close – and there must be a functioning level of communication and an agreement as to what course of action is to be followed.

At the beginning of the war, Jefferson Davis had two major commanders in the Virginia theater – P. G. T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston. Both of these commanders had massive egos, and when coupled with the not inconsiderable ego of Jefferson Davis, it was a prescription for problems, and they weren't long in coming. Neither of these two commanders proved to be first rate generals and Lee had not yet come to the fore. At the time, they were considered by both the North and South to be the best among the officers of the old army that had gone south. President Davis would have been less a president not to have considered these two senior officers for high command in the army he was forming.

Although a generally competent and courtly officer, Johnston had a hunger for rank – that is, the top rank – that bordered on the extreme. In the beginning of their

relationship, Davis had a high level of confidence in Johnston, and endeavored to treat him with consideration and kindness in spite of carping from Johnston and matters so trivial that they cannot be described.

For a number of weeks, this worked, but eventually problems began to occur. At the urging of the President, the Confederate Congress created the rank of full General, and Davis nominated five men to fill those jobs. The first was Adjutant General Samuel Cooper as he would not perform field duties, but would remain in a staff position. The next was Albert S. Johnson who was a close friend of Davis and was also considered by many to be the best officer in the pre-war U.S. Army. The third was General Robert E. Lee, and the fourth was Joseph E. Johnston.

Now, there lies the problem. Johnston had been staff Brigadier General in the pre-war army, but he was only a Colonel of the line (that is, in a combat position and not staff) as were the others. Johnston, however, believed he had been slighted because officers junior to him were ahead of him, and he believed he and not Cooper should rank first. He wrote an insulting letter to the Confederate President that bordered on the insubordinate. The relationship between the two men deteriorated to the point where there were barely on speaking terms.

President Davis also had problems with another touchy General, P. G. T. Beauregard. Although a talented man, the difficult Creole possessed as large an ego as did Johnston. His problems with Davis stemmed from the Battle of Manassas. As the ranking Confederate general and de facto commander of the Confederate army that opposed the Union forces of General Irwin McDowell, he felt that the glory of the victory should go to him.

Since Davis was present for part of the battle, he [Davis] took credit for its outcome and this irked Beauregard. So much so, that when he submitted his report on the battle, he saw to it that Davis got all the blame for the failure of the Confederate forces to follow-up the victory.

The president had no knowledge of the report until it appeared in summary form in a Richmond newspaper. He obtained a complete report from the War Department, and although the full report did not assign total blame to

Davis, the damage had already been done. This angered Davis, and created a breach between the two that never healed. With two such commanders in one theater, one had to go, and Davis managed to get the Creole re-assigned to the West where he became the deputy commander to Albert Sidney Johnson, and managed to “gum-up” the plan at Shiloh for the Confederates. He spent the rest of the war with the exception of the last months where he managed to cap General Butler at Bermuda Hundred (in all honesty, not a difficult thing to do as Butler was one of the MOST incompetence of the remaining Union Generals).

Throughout the rest of the war, Davis managed to have reasonably good relationships with his principal commanders – most notably Lee and Bragg. However, the Confederate President could not keep himself out of micro-managing the action.

The exception to this was Lee who got along well with Davis. He wrote the president nearly every day while operations were ongoing and kept him informed. Bragg did the same though not as often, and often his communications were filled with denunciations of his subordinates and all sorts of belly-aching about how bad the situation was.

You should not believe that Davis was either the sole reason for these relationship problems, nor totally blameless. It is about half-and-half, but Davis was, by far, the more forbearing.

The Union also had a clash of egos, but the Union commander-in-chief did not have as great an ego – at least not in the same sense that Davis did. Lincoln was determined to keep the power of the President in tact, and not to abrogate to his commanders in the field powers which he believed the President as commander-in-chief should exercise.

Just as touchy generals as Beauregard and Johnston bothered Davis, Lincoln also had his crosses to bear. The greatest being George B. McClellan. That this general was a brilliant organizer and trainer is not in dispute. He created the magnificent Army of the Potomac. It was on campaigning that he was a conspicuous failure but he continually blamed his ineptness and timidity on problems caused by the government in Washington – read Abraham Lincoln.

That McClellan's ego was enormous can easily be seen in the letters he wrote to his wife, Ellen. The Union general believed that Lincoln was an incompetent as were most of his cabinet. Only McClellan himself could lead the Union forces to victory – providing the President left him alone and gave him everything he wanted. Actually, the historical truth of the matter is that Lincoln generally did that.

In one way or another, McClellan did all his could to upstage Lincoln. One night Lincoln dropped by McClellan's headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. He was told that the commander was out, but was directed to the living room in the front of the house and asked to wait. Shortly thereafter, McClellan returned and was told the President was waiting. The Union commander remarked that he was too tired to see the President, and that he should come back in the morning, and went up the back stairs to bed.

As Lincoln rode back to the White House, one of his secretaries was angry at the arrogant treatment accorded the commander-in-chief, but Lincoln remarked to the effect that he would gladly suffer egos to obtain a victory and would even hold their horses if necessary.

The President had to keep his temper numerous times. During heavy fighting on the Peninsula in 1862, Lincoln had withheld a 40,000 man corps from McClellan because Lincoln was afraid of the Confederate Army in the Shenandoah Valley commanded by a then obscure Confederate Major General named Thomas J. Jackson. During one particularly pivotal battle during the Seven Days, McClellan sent a telegram to Lincoln in which he said, in part, "you have done your best to destroy his army." This terribly insubordinate and largely inaccurate phrase was edited out of the final telegram that went to Lincoln, so the President never saw it.

McClellan, thinking the full text went to Lincoln redoubled his contempt for the President, and this only ended when McClellan so botched the Battle of Antietam that Lincoln, knowing that the Union forces had Lee's army at a disadvantage, allowed Lee to get away. At that point, Lincoln relieved McClellan and the ego-centric Union general never again held a command the rest of the war.

Through the War, Lincoln searched for a commander with which he could have the same relationship that Lee had with Jefferson Davis. When U.S. Grant and his friend

William T. Sherman, Lincoln, at last, found two major generals that he could and did forge a good relationship. Each general had one thought in mind – end the war. They did not let ego in the way of their accomplishing that mission.

The lessons learned from these historical situations is easy – ego has no place in war. Only the accomplishment of the mission and a successful culmination of the conflict should be allowed.

Egos can and should surface AFTER the conflict is over. A good example of this would be the successful OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM (i.e., see the book entitled The General's War; also see David Irving's The War Between the Generals). Egos were placed on hold during the operation, but have now come out with memoirs where they should be.

History is clear on this point – the bad relationships Davis had with his principal subordinates Johnston and Beauregard materially damaged the chances of the South to gain a victory and preserve its freedom. Lincoln's dealings with McClellan and his lack of ego and support of McClellan when simple common sense dictated that his egocentric and insubordinate commander be removed certainly contributed to the prolongation of the conflict.

There were also problems between and among commanders. Even the saintly Robert E. Lee had continual problems with some of the egos of his subordinates. Even though Lee had good relations with "Stonewall" Jackson, the same could not be said of Jackson and his subordinates. Through his tenure as a Corps Commander before his death at Chancellorsville, Jackson had arrested or threatened court martial for most of his divisional commanders.

To say that "Stonewall" was a bit eccentric would be to consider the stupid movie "Clueless" as a Oscar winner. Although often brilliant in battle, Jackson did have strange periods of lethargy and ineptitude such as his performance during the Seven Days and at Cedar Mountain. These times were also punctuated by temper tantrums by Jackson and usually his subordinates were treated to the bad side of his personality.

One incident involving Jackson and the commander of the "Light" division, General A. P. Hill resulted in Hill's challenging Jackson to a duel. If one reads the three

volume Lee's Lieutenants by Douglas Southhall Freeman, you will see the problem that Lee had controlling his very touchy subordinates.

This problem was not confined to the Confederate ranks. When Grant was fighting toward Vicksburg, one of his subordinates was Major General John McClelland who was one of Lincoln's less sterling "political" appointments. This general continually caused Grant problems in not only not obeying orders and doing what the commander wanted, but in writing Lincoln directly and saying bad things about Grant. Also McClelland also had intense political ambitions, and he was always using his military position to attempt to enhance his political position – i.e., taking credit for what others did, and overestimating military actions to his benefit. Eventually, Grant managed to get McClelland removed and sent back to Illinois, but Lincoln, who was more than aware of this general's lack of ability, had to keep him in action solely because of political considerations.

Lincoln had another monumental problem with Major General John C. Fremont. If McClelland had an ego, Fremont matched him measure for measure, but Fremont lacked any of McClelland's better organizational and training abilities. He was a complete and total incompetent, and when things went from bad to worse in his area, Fremont blamed everyone but himself.

There is also considerable historical information that Fremont was not always honest in his dealings using government money. Fremont was also a braggart, and boastful about his meager record, and this did not make the administration look good in the public eye. To put it mildly, Lincoln was exasperated with Fremont.

The last straw was the visit of Fremont's wife to the White House. She was the daughter of former senator Thomas Hart Benton, and a rabid supporter of her husband's ill-concealed presidential ambitions. Almost from the moment she entered the oval office, Mrs. Fremont proceeded to lecture Lincoln on tactics and strategy as if the President was a lower class boob.

Lincoln was a most tolerant man, especially with women, but this passed all bounds, and within a few days, Fremont was removed. Lincoln was willing to take the

political heat to remove a popular if strikingly inept general to make room for someone who would fight.

The lessons learned here is that the President, as commander-in-chief, must balance the military equation with the political equation. Lincoln was more successful at this than was Jefferson Davis because he had less of an ego, and recognized that in successful subordinate commanders. All the great commanders of history have recognized ability in their subordinates even if they have not all been humble men.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**SUBJECT: THE ANACONDA PLAN – A STRATEGIC DIRECTIVE THAT  
WORKED**

At the beginning of the conflict, neither side expected the war to last very long. Most newspapers felt that it would be decided in one battle, and that would be that. Little did they know that it would take four bloody years to decide the outcome. It need not have been if the North or the South had realized the importance of innovative strategic thinking.

The one chance that the South had to win the whole war was right after the smashing victory by General Beauregard at First Manassas. The path to the Federal capital lay open to a good division of Confederate troops. In fact, the President and the government were preparing to move to New York should the South march. Because he claimed that his army was not in shape to do so, Beauregard forfeited the last chance the South had to finish the war by a strategical move. Thereafter, the initiative passed to the North. However, the North did not immediately seize upon it because they, too, did not have a plan. That is, until the aging and often senile Commander-in-Chief, General Winfield Scott came up with what proved to be the winning plan. His young replacement, General George B. McClellan could not think in such terms. His method – in fact, Congress's and the public's, was the march to Richmond and take it. This McCellan did, but to no avail as Lee, taking command of the forces defending the Confederate capital, threw McCellan back at the Seven Days Campaign. Back to square one.

The North had to accept the fact that it would take a great deal of blood and treasure to “make” the south come back. All Davis had to do was to conduct a purely defensive campaign until the North got tired of attacking, and gave up, concluded a treaty, and left the South alone. The Confederate President was a naïve man. He failed to realize the depth of determination of the Union to make the South return to the United States,

and they were willing to pay the price. Lincoln had attached himself to this view, and come what may, he had to remain with it or face political ruin. At least twice during the war, Lincoln met with delegates from the Confederacy, but his [Lincoln's] terms was not to the South's liking, and it remained for the North to CONQUER the south. Enter Scott's plan which was formulated to do just that.

Scott's plan was simple in form, but it would take a long time to execute it. The first part of the plan required a fairly effective blockade of the South. At the beginning of the conflict, the Union Navy barely mustered 50 ships of which only about half were seaworthy. It would take them until 1863 to achieve a really good control of the potential southern ports and effectively strangle trade. Individual blockade runners continued to get through, but the lifeline that the south had to depend upon to keep itself economically and logistically viable was stopped.

The second part of the plan mandated that the North would control the Mississippi River from the North to its entrepot in the south at New Orleans. Some historians believe that two major disasters in 1862 effectively sealed the ultimate fate of the Confederacy. The first, was the loss of New Orleans to the Union. A combined naval and ground assault on New Orleans commanded by General Butler and Admiral Farragut was successful. The Queen city of the south had fallen. It was, without a doubt, the biggest port of the Confederacy, and much of the cotton from the middle and deep south left from there for Europe and New England. Now, that was denied to the Confederacy, and Davis never made a serious attempt to get the city back. He would have been well advised to do it as the loss of this city provided the Union a base of operations to control much of the lower Mississippi. Following New Orleans, lack Confederacy strategy and a weak command hand played by General Albert S. Johnson lost the South the twin forts of Henry and Donelson. The former was sited on very bad land, and would have been difficult to defend anyway, but the latter was a well sited work, and adequately garrisoned. It should have been able to hold out, but it was quickly surrendered by less than stellar Confederate commanders after a farcical defense. In two relatively small, but strategically calamitous events, the upper and lower Mississippi were now controlled by the North.

Had Davis been a better leader and strategic thinker, his next obvious step was to insure that Vicksburg, the natural fortress that effectively negated Federal control of the River, be held at all costs. Again, his ability to pick commanders adequate to the situation failed him, and Lt. General Pemberton lost Vicksburg. That Davis and Joseph E. Johnston bear considerable blame in their own right does not remove responsibility from Pemberton. But, the Confederates defended the city adequately for a number of months, setting back the timetable for the North. When the fortress did fall, it was the summer of 1863, and the final act of the drama could be played out.

The reason that Gettysburg was such a calamity to the South has nothing to do with the inept generalship shown by a number of Confederates Lee included, but far more to do with the losses suffered. Lee took 75,000 men into the conflict. With an army that size, Lee could take the offensive when he wanted, or could adopt a strong defensive policy that would force the North to pay in blood for every mile they penetrated into the South. Lee chose to be aggressive, and who knows what would have happened had he won rather than Meade at Gettysburg. With the thinning of the Confederates ranks by this battle, Lee forever lost the ability to attack and make a real impression on the Federals.

But, for Lincoln to execute the final part of the Anaconda Plan, he had to have the type of overall commander that could adequately handle the task and pressure of directing a number of armies that would simultaneously invade the South from different directions. Someone had to have the strategical mind to develop a plan that would make that happen. In Grant, Lincoln found the general with the brains and drive he needed. Along with Grant, Lincoln also obtained the services of William T. Sherman. He and Grant thought alike and were close personal friends. They worked as a "team" to develop a strategy that would win the war. Sherman would command in the West and Grant in the East. Each had control of an army over 100,000 strong with substantial reinforcements available.

The South had no substantial reinforcements available, and the two major Confederate Armies – the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Tennessee each were far smaller than their Union opponents. This mandated a cautious approach by both Generals Johnston and Lee, and a totally defensive strategy.

In addition to the two major armies, there were several smaller ones that were also moving in concert with the main ones. General Ben Butler's 23,000 man Army of the James, and small nearly 10,000 man army under Major General Franz Siegel were operating in Virginia to support Grant. In the Red River Area, a 25,000 man Army commanded by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks had been operating until it was defeated by a Confederate Army at the Battle of Sabine Crossroads, and forced to retreat. It had been intended by Grant to operate against the Confederate port of Mobile, but could not do so. Other armies, none much larger than 10,000, operated in conjunction with Grant and Sherman.

The main push for ending the war was placed in the hands of the two major armies, and Grant and Sherman hoped for a quick and decisive battle on their fronts. But, they did not get what they wanted. In the east, Grant's Army met Lee's in the Wilderness and a terrible three day battle ensued with high casualties on both sides. Both had chances to inflict a decisive stroke, but both misfired. As the ashes of the Wilderness were cooling, Grant moved around Lee's flank and south. Lee simply matched him at both Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, and North Anna.

Although Lee could little afford the casualties he suffered, and Grant could, it was the Union side that suffered the most in lack of press support. When the casualties from the Wilderness came in, the press and to some extent part of the public began to call for Grant's removal, but Lincoln stood firm in his support of his commander. This cost him some valuable political support, but Lincoln, unlike his people, could see the final culmination of the Anaconda Plan within reach. Sherman and Grant were beginning to squeeze the South into a smaller and smaller area, and, hence, the life was ebbing out of the rebellion. All that was needed was for the military to continue to apply pressure to the South and the war could be won. But, how long would the public allow the President to continue to apply that pressure.

Sherman was having the same trouble. While not as aggressive as General Lee, Joseph E. Johnston was a very careful commander. He never made a major mistake. He would fortify a line, and then hold it until Sherman turned his flank. For most of the Atlanta campaign, Sherman restrained himself from a direct attack. Only at Kennesaw

Mountain in the later part of June, 1864 did Sherman order a direct assault, and his army suffered heavy casualties. It was not a mistake that Sherman would make again.

This time, the Fabian strategy followed by the Confederate Commander was to cost him. Behind his back, one of his subordinates, Lt. General John B. Hood was writing directly to President Davis, and informing the President of every mistake and fall back that Johnston made, and promising he would be more aggressive.

Finally, because of political pressure from Governor Brown of Georgia among other politicians, President Davis relieved Johnston and replaced him with Hood. The new commander immediately attacked Sherman at Peachtree Creek, Ezra Church, and Atlanta. In the process, he hardly damaged Sherman, but lost nearly 20,000 of his troops. This dropped the strength of his army to under 50,000 men and cost the Confederates any chance they had to fight the war to a stalemate. General Johnston had kept his army as an “army in being”. It was big enough that Sherman could not really leave him alone, and had to follow Johnston wherever he went. Now, the Confederate army had been reduced to the level that Sherman could afford to ignore it, and concentrate on winning the war by a direct march across the final “bread basket” of the South and deprive the remaining Confederate armies of any further logistical support.

Hood for his part, believed that if he moved on the major Union depot at Nashville he would force Sherman to follow him. Had Hood not used up his army in those three battles around Atlanta, Sherman might have, but all the Union commander did was to detach roughly half his army, place it under General Thomas, and take the rest, roughly 55,000 men on his famous “March to the sea”. Hood moved on Nashville and his army was decisively defeated there by General Thomas in one of the most one-sided and decisive battles in the Civil War. Hood had gone north with nearly 50,000 men, and when his army reached the relative safety of Mississippi, there were less than 10,000 men left.

Grant had settled down with Lee at Petersburg, and to a war of attrition that the North was bound to win. When Atlanta fell, this brought the electorate to a view that the war was about to end, and they returned Lincoln to the White House. Still, the actual vote count was not that lopsided for Lincoln, and it was the soldier vote that helped keep Lincoln as President.

The South had now run out of air as the North attacks squeezed the life out of the country. Morale had reached the bottom, and hundreds of Confederate soldiers were deserting and going back home. Finally, Lee had to evacuate Petersburg, and Grant harried him until Lee surrendered at Appomattox. The other Confederate Army in the field – now commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, surrendered a few weeks later. The Anaconda Plan had been entirely successful

The obvious question occurs – could the North have ended the war earlier using the Anaconda Plan. Doubtful because of a variety of reasons, but the bottom line was that Lincoln needed an overall commander who could direct the multiple armies to execute the final part of the plan. Grant was only discovered by Lincoln in 1864, and he [Lincoln] did not settle on Grant until Rosecrans was defeated at Chickamauga. He [Rosecrans] was the only other Union commander Lincoln believed could handle the job. Once he and Grant agreed on a plan, the South was doom because Grant's determination to succeed matched Lincoln's. Both thought alike in a strategic sense. The President made it clear that Grant called the "shots" tactically, Major General Halleck would run the administrative side of the House, and Lincoln would handle the political side. It was a good and ultimately, a winning combination. The Anaconda's success can be a good teaching tool for us today.

There reasons are as follows:

- a. The plan must be executable.
- b. The plan must be based on solid strategical principles and must target the center's of gravity of the enemy.
- c. The commanders of armies in the field must understand the strategy and their part in it.
- d. The population must be willing to support the plan regardless of losses taken to implement it.
- e. Normally, strategic plans are joint, and all elements of the military must support that plan to the limit of their abilities.
- f. The commanders who must execute the principles of the plan must have the ability to command the forces required to win

- g. The military and those charged with political direction must agree on all components of the plan.

As equally as important as the endgame in any conflict, the beginning strategy must be decided upon and then acted. Perhaps the best example of this was World War II where the British and Americans through the use of a Combined Chiefs of Staff, agreed more or less on the strategy to be followed and then implemented it. That the end game left something to be desired was not the fault of the beginning strategy. To defeat Nazi Germany first was unquestionably the right decision. What and who determined what happened at the end in Europe is still argued about by scholars. It is, however, an important argument to study because this situation can and will come again. The spiral of the U.S. beginning the war behind, and then winning it but losing the peace has to be stopped. Only a combination

of political and military minds who think alike can do it. If both are at odds, then a failure is a distinct possibility.

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## THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFEDERATE STRATEGY

At the beginning of the war, Jefferson Davis opted for a simple strategy. The South wanted to leave the Union in peace, and would not take any offensive action against the remaining states of the Union. All the South wanted to do was to develop its own government and be left alone. To have taken any other stand would have been politically unsound – how? Simple, the South had set itself up as a nation that yearned to make its own destiny – it was seceding for its own protection from other states seeking to oppress it. To take the offensive and invade while espousing such “high ideals” would have been a contradiction in terms, and would have cost the Confederates the European recognition they needed and wanted.

In military terms, Davis’ strategy was unfortunately shortsighted. He [Davis] opted for what amounted to an area defense. The soil of the Confederacy would be defended EVERYWHERE. This flew in the face of the fact that the South had very limited military potential and a much smaller manpower pool to draw from than its Northern opponent. It made better sense to pool that manpower to contest the Union at important areas or concentrate to make the maximum use of smaller numbers. This played into the strong suit of the Union which had more numbers and could attack at a number of points and force the Confederates to dissipate their strength – this they did from the start.

It would not be until the middle of 1862 that Davis would think in terms of an offense, and then, not for strategical, but for largely political/psychological reasons – the invasion of Maryland. Till that time, the Confederates thought only of defense. The South never developed an overall strategical plan to end the war, and was reduced to what I would call a strategy of “hope” [the North did and called it the Anaconda Plan].

The whole point of southern resistance was to make it so unpalatable to the Union to continue the war in an effort to re-bond the Union that they would stop. The South never embraced the idea that even though they were smaller, they could, if they applied military and political force with intelligence and strength, defeat the North and get it to stop the war on southern terms.

The Gettysburg campaign was a case in point. Lee wanted to carry the war to the north as a political and psychological gesture, and decisively defeat the Union forces on their own soil thus forcing the North to consider that peace was a better option. There were those in Lee’s camp who thought otherwise – they wanted the Confederate army to assume a more passive strategy and using its then significant strength to force the Union army to attack on southern terms, suffer the

level of casualties as had been lost at Fredericksburg and then grow tired of the war while the South husbanded its strength and dwindling manpower. A good idea, but Lee's naturally aggressive tendency and his view that, like Napoleon, he was seeking THE DECISIVE engagement that would win the war – i.e., Gettysburg.

The South was also following a flawed economic and political strategy. First of all, they decided at the beginning of the war to withhold cotton from the market so that it would bring Europe in on their side. This was flawed for several reasons – 1. The cotton crops of the previous two years had been good, and the warehouses of Europe were then bulging with cotton; 2. The South believed that they would be the only place where Europe could obtain cotton—the English, for example, began to increase its cotton acreage in both India and Egypt so that by the end of the war, most of their cotton came from their colonies. France did much the same. This is not to say that there was not some considerable suffering the England's midlands textile areas because there was and some serious riots occurred. However, those who were out of work were also anti-slavery and were in the main willing to endure hardships to see slavery ended in the United States. Another reason is that the South needed money to build a military force and equip it. At the beginning of the war, and before the Union blockage was effective, the South could have shipped millions of dollars worth of cotton to Europe, and used it to obtain both equipment for the military and further and more expansive loans to support the government. The famous Earlander Loan to the south was ruinous to the Southern economy because the only people who made any money off it were the bankers in France who arranged it. The South was left holding the economic bag.

Southern political strategy was a bit better. They did not make the war a referendum for continuing slavery. There was a huge anti-slavery movement in England, and even Jefferson Davis knew better than to set the political center of the south on an institution that was out of favor in the world [Oddly enough, Lincoln was also advised not to set the Union armies in motion to destroy slavery, but ONLY to save the Union. The soldiers in blue would not fight for any other reason]. But, failing that, they pinned their hopes on the “fighting for home and hearth” defense. That would strike a resonant cord with the English and French. The Southern aristocrats believed that the English aristocrats would support them – true enough, the sentiment of the nobility supported the South, but the nobility did not have the strength they once did – the merchants and trades people now ran the show – that is, those who controlled the factories held real power, and they did not like or support slavery from the practical view of economy and for many of them, a moral view as well. Try as they did, the South could not get England to take the important step of recognition

of them as a nation. England did not like the idea of a potential war with any part of the American continent as they had fought two already and preferred to give the south ONLY belligerent recognition until they could determine if the South would remain independent. If England and France supported the South directly, they risk the wrath of the federal government after the war. This half-measure was a way to satisfy both sides after a fashion.

By 1863, it had become evident to thoughtful southerners that the war was not going in their favor. They embraced more than ever the tactic that if they continued their resistance, the North would eventually tire of it. However, Lee's and Bragg's tactics of the aggressive defense were slowly but surely diluting Southern strength, and the deterioration of Southern railroads had begun to lower Confederate living standards, and to visit upon the nation a feeling that they were slowly but surely going down to defeat.

Actually, the South was closest to victory in the early days of the war and didn't know it. After the victory at First Manassas, the South had an easy march into an undefended Federal Capital. This would have clearly shown to Europe that the South was a strong nation, and full recognition as a nation might have followed. But, General Beauregard told Davis when he was asked by the Confederate President why he didn't march on Washington that his army was not in any condition to march. Actually part of it was, and could have because only a few small regular units barred the way, and Lincoln and his government had ships in the Potomac to move them to New York or Philadelphia and continue if Washington fell. By the time the Confederates were sufficiently organized, the time had passed, and there were enough troops to bar the way, so the Confederates retreated back to Manassas and entrenched.

In a sense, the Atlanta campaign was pivotal to the continued existence of the South. This campaign and its twin in the east with Grant fighting Lee was the culmination of the Anaconda Plan. The final invasion of the South leading to victory. The year was also important – that is because it was an election year and General George B. McClellan was counting on the war weariness of the population to elect him president. He made no secret of what he would do upon election – end the war temporarily and begin negotiations with the South. The polls indicated that Lincoln could be defeated.

The two major campaigns were in their opening weeks very inconclusive. Lee fought Grant to a standstill in the Wilderness, and Johnson kept his army intact against Sherman. There were no smashing victories, no final charges, and the Union casualty lists kept climbing. The desire to end the war became more and more of an acceptable theme to larger number of the

Northern populace. When Davis replace the cautious Johnson with John Bell Hood [This man was a superb division commander, and was adequate as a corps commander, but was an unmitigated disaster as an army commander], he sealed his country's fate. Hood, as aggressive as Lee but without a lick of common sense, attacked Sherman at Peachtree Creek, Ezra Church, and Atlanta. In all three battles, Confederate losses exceeded Union, and the Army of the Tennessee lost nearly 25,000 men – nearly 30% of its strength. This loss made the Confederate Army less of a threat, and Sherman could continue on his famous march to the sea and devastate the last “bread basket” of the South as well move through the Carolinas and destroy what industry the South had left. This idea of “total war” ended the conflict. Had Atlanta held out until the elections, that might have swung the vote to McClellan. Until Atlanta's fall, people were on the fence as to keeping Lincoln in office; after the fall, they got off the fence and began to wear VOTE FOR LINCOLN signs.

In the final analysis, the southern strategy was fatally flawed from the beginning. It was not aggressive enough to finish the war quickly, and relied on a less than adequate view of the resolve of the North to continue to invade. At the end, it did not follow that flawed strategy enough to have given it a real chance to succeed. They were “damned if they did and damned if they didn't”.

Burton Wright III, Ph.D  
Command Historian

## **CAVALRY IN THE CIVIL WAR**

### **Cavalry from Manassas to Mid-War**

**The prevailing use of Cavalry during the war grew out of the experiences of the Union and Confederate Officer prior to the civil war. They had been trained at West Point where Denis Hart Mahan had constantly stressed Napoleonic tactics. Because of that training, both sides tended to use cavalry in the early part of the war the way Napoleon did:**

- a. As advanced scouts**
- b. As flank screens**
- c. For security**
- d. Logistical train guards**

**During the Mexican War and up until the civil war, the Army had units of mounted infantry called DRAGOONS, but most of those type of regiments had died out before the war. Only one brigade of mounted infantry existed during the war, and that was in the Union Army of the Cumberland -- Wilder's Brigade. Neither side seems to have understood that such an organization offered the mobility of cavalry with the firepower and staying power of infantry.**

**In the early days of the conflict, both sides attempted to use cavalry as previously described. Their cavalry units were similar in organization and equipment (for example):**

- a. pistol**
- b. saber**
- c. carbine**

**cavalry company was normally under 30 men in size for both armies**

**a cavalry regiment would have no more 300 to 350 men**

**a cavalry brigade would have fewer than 1,200**

**a cavalry division would have fewer than 4000**

**The Union and Confederates after a short time diverted from how they generally used cavalry. The reasons were more personal than tactical. As outstanding Confederate cavalry leaders like J. E. B. Stuart and Earl Van Dorn**

came to the fore, Rebel cavalry began to break free from confinement at the hands of the infantry, and branch out far afield on various types of raids. Stuart was particularly good at this, and made several famous rides around the Union Army. Also Stuart was a superb developer of intelligence, and Lee's tactical decisions when he took command of the Army of Northern Virginia were made in many cases based on the accurate information provided by General Stuart. General N. B. Forrest was the best cavalry leader in the South, and he combined the reconnaissance power of Stuart with the savvy ability to command both infantry and cavalry [Sheridan also did both, but not as well as did Forrest]. The raiding strategy adopted by the South was a method to an end -- that is, to make any invasion of the North so expensive in manpower and equipment that the North would no longer be interested in attempting to bring the South back into the Union. This raiding strategy was done as a cost -- a cost in creative strategical thinking and experimenting with new tactics with regard to infantry. Stuart was at his best when detached, but no battle in the early to mid part of the civil war has any Napoleonic pursuit [only one, Nashville, has a real pursuit in it. Neither the North or South ever managed to stage the final act of a Napoleonic battle drama the way Napoleon had done].

In the early years of the war, the best Union cavalry leader was Brigadier General John Buford. He was an old cavalryman and graduate of West Point with considerable experience against hostile Indians on the Great Plains, but he rose slowly in rank. But, his work on the battlefield was excellent. For instance, during the Second Manassas campaign, his cavalry division, by itself, held up Longstreet's entire corps for nearly a day as it was moving onto the flank of Pope's Army. His frantic messages to Pope for infantry support went unanswered, and it was not his fault that Pope's army was crushed at Second Manassas. Buford was to help select and then hold the ground the Union Army was to occupy during the Battle of Gettysburg, and he might have achieved more, but he died from natural causes six months after the battle on the eve of his promotion to Major General and command of the Union Cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. The only other cavalry leader of prominence was Major General Alfred Pleasonton. This man was second rate as a commander of cavalry, and his performance in battle was spotty at best, but, at the time, he was considered a "wizard" when commanding cavalry. He was nothing of the sort and was easily out generated by Stuart. No telling what Forrest would have done with him.

Cavalry was never decisive arm -- it was clearly subordinate to the infantry, and this was especially so in the Union Army. There were few imaginative cavalry leaders in the Union Army until the mid-point of the war. Also, the North suffered from a problem in that the average Northern cavalryman had no real experience riding or caring for a horse. The South, being largely rural and agricultural, had much more experiences with horses than did the more Urban North. Their horses, at least in the early part of the war, were "blooded" animals of good line, and were excellent. As the war took its toll on animals in the South, the quality of horseflesh declined markedly as did the quality of leadership as more and more cavalry leaders were killed or wounded.

The north eventually developed leaders on a par with Start and Forrest. James H. Wilson, and Philip Sheridan were both good commanders, and they had an excellent supporting cast -- Generals Custer, Devin, Gamble, "Grimes" Davis, MacIntosh, Merritt.

#### Cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign

It would not be correct to say that General Sherman did not have a love of, nor real understanding of how to properly use cavalry. Like Grant, he thought of cavalry not as an independent arm capable of strong attacks in its own right, or strategic "deep" operations. Cavalry was used to recon the area and provide flank security. During the Wilderness Operations in May and June of 1864, Grant, at least, attempted to use cavalry in an innovative way -- to seize critical areas and hold them until the arrival of infantry. Later, Grant would cut the entire cavalry corps from the army and allow General Sheridan to take his 12,000 horsemen and move toward Richmond as an independent force to draw the pesky Stuart away from the two main infantry forces and relieve Grant of the necessity of providing heavy guards for his logistical installations. Sheridan had proposed such an operation earlier, but the Army Commander, Major General Meade, would not approve it, so this participated a violent argument. Meade went into Grant and broached the subject, and to his surprise, Grant said, "so he thinks he can whip Stuart. Well, let him go ahead and do it." It worked. Sherman, however, did not think that way.

Also, Sherman did not have the best cavalry leaders available. His major leaders -- Kenner Garrard, Judson Kilpatrick, and George Washington Elliott were second rate commanders who could not do well in the type of independent roles

that Grant was then giving Sheridan. Luckily for Sherman, Joe Johnston and Hood had no better leaders. General Joseph Wheeler's reputation was the stuff of press clippings without any real substance. Wheeler, whose refrain was the famous, "the war child rides tonight" was more interested in raids than in the mundane screening missions, reconnaissance and security missions required of the Army of the Tennessee. There was no favorable press in it. Wheeler was also not terribly experienced as a cavalryman prior to the war, and was the youngest Major General in the Confederate Army at 26 years old. Only Custer in the Union Army was younger when he attained two star rank. However, he did often use his cavalry in a dismounted form, and frequently held one flank of the Confederate army as he was to do at Kennesaw when his divisions elongated the line above Big Kennesaw Mountain.

As for the size of the two cavalry arms of both Union and Confederate Armies, the south had a slight edge. Any reading of books on the Atlanta campaign show that Cavalry did not play any major roles in the campaign -- not like cavalry was doing in the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, and North Ana -- or as it would do under command of James Harrison Wilson during his cavalry raids into Georgia and Alabama.

As the Atlanta Campaign unfolded, the Cavalry was set into a pattern of development. First, the Confederates would construct a fortified defensive line with cavalry screen both flanks. Sherman would approach with his army, and he would come up to the line and hold it with the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio. The Army of the Tennessee would, screened by cavalry, find the Confederate flank and turn it. The Confederates would retreat to the next line of defensive terrain, dig-in, and begin the process all over again.

#### Cavalry at the End of the War

By 1864, the Federal cavalry had now achieved clear and continuing superiority over the Confederates. Their cavalry was now mounted on experienced horses and ridden by hard and capable men fully as combat effective as the Confederates had been during the first few years of the war. The Union could field entire cavalry corps of 12,500 men.

The Confederates no longer had cavalry leaders the equal of Stuart who had been killed at the Battle of Yellow Tavern. Those who remained, while competent, lacked Stuart's flair and abilities. Gone, too, were many of the best of

Stuart's supporting cast -- i.e., "the gallant Pelham", and the young Willie Pegram, both artillerymen who supported Stuart. Many of the brigade and regimental commanders were also gone -- killed, wounded, or captured. There was no one left to replace them. The Union began the war with its less than best, and the south began with its best, the roles were now reversed with the best Federals now reaching command positions at all levels of the cavalry. This experience won at so high a cost earlier in the war now translated into cavalry units that could move, shoot, and communicate as good or better than the Confederates at their peak.

The best example of this was the large corps taken by Major General James H. Wilson south into Alabama and Georgia. This juggernaut was armed with 7 shot Spencer Repeaters which gave them the firepower equivalent of an army of 45,000 men. There was no large Confederate forces -- either infantry or cavalry - who could stand in their way. Although Bedford Forrest did try at Florence, Alabama, he was defeated more by the experience and firepower of the Union cavalry than its general fighting ability. Forrest and his men were brave enough, but they could not overcome the firepower of massed Spencers.

In the east, Sheridan had acquired a cavalry army the same size as Wilson's, and he and his men rode down the Shenandoah against minimal Confederate opposition. Sheridan smashed Early in the Valley and then went on to use his cavalry to devastate the area -- an exact duplicate of the "scorched earth" policy being exercised by Sherman in Georgia. It could be said with no real fear of contradiction that the Federal Cavalry at the end of the Civil War was if not the best in the world, one of the top two in weapons, equipment, lean, and leadership. At the beginning of the war, the derisive cry of the infantry was "have you seen a dead cavalryman?" That changed over many times for the cavalry of both armies.

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18 November 1996

SUBJECT: Causes of the Civil War

**Was the Civil War inevitable?** No. With individuals of good will who want compromise, nothing is inevitable even today. However, in the decade between the last compromise that prevented war [1850] and the onset of it, the situation deteriorated because few statesmen remained of the stature and abilities of the members of congress [1820-1850] that fashioned compromises. America polarized almost to the point of no return.

**What were the direct causes of the war?** There are those who say that slavery was the ONE and only cause. There is much to support their point of view. This view is narrow because it ascribes everything that occurred to slavery even when slavery was not directly involved. One must, in my opinion, take the wider view. While slavery was the major cause, there were other causes helping the situation move toward war. Economics was certainly one. Nearly 90% of the portable wealth (that is, money in circulation) resided in states of the North. Most of the heavy industry also resided there. The South produced only one major cash crop -- cotton, and several minor ones of which tobacco was the biggest. Railways were far more numerous and standardized in the North than the South. Although the South had been in the decade before the war to industrialize, the process of pulling equal with the North had just begun.

**Politics and power was another cause.** The balance of power in Congress was shifting. Where do most of the first Presidents of the U.S. come from -- the South. Where do most of the major statesmen of the period 1820-1850 come from -- the South. As more states above the Mason-Dixon line were added, the power of the South eroded, and this bothered many in the South.

**States rights was another.** Remember back to the writing of the Constitution. Remember what the major views of the Southern delegates were, and what compromises had to be made to address their concerns. States rights was one of the strongest southern concerns, and many of the delegates from the South were very, very leery about giving a central government -- especially one not located in the south -- that much power. Notice that the current constitution says nothing about succession. This idea of states rights was brought up once before during the 1830's when John C. Calhoun of South Carolina wrote a piece called "The South Carolina Exposition and Protest" where he said that a state could NULLIFY federal acts if it impinged on the sovereignty of the state. The President at the time was Andrew Jackson -- a man of the South -- and he said that if South Carolina actually attempted to nullify a federal act, he [Jackson] would enter the state with an army and hang every supporter of such a measure he could find [he meant, of course, John C. Calhoun], and Jackson was not a man who threatened idly. That died down, but in the minds of many of the leading statesmen of the South at that time, the seeds of succession were planted by this view.

**Clearly the rise of the Republican Party was the trigger for the war.** The South -- rightly or wrongly -- viewed the Republicans as anti-slave, and anti-south. While there were members of that party -- i.e., William H. Seward -- who were on record as opposing slavery, to say that the party was totally anti-slave was incorrect. Lincoln, although in a debate with Senator Stephen A. Douglas said that "a house divided against itself cannot stand, half slave, half free", did not believe that slavery could be abolished where it then existed. When elected President, Lincoln sent the message to those in the south that feared his elevation to office would end slavery that he would not, as president, seek to interfere with slavery where it then existed [incidentally, it is interesting to note that at the time, slavery was only "legal" in two parts of the world -- Cuba and the South. The rest of the world had eliminated this loathsome practice as a legal entity even though slavery as a form of servitude still existed in so parts of the world and in some areas of the world, it still exists in a de facto status]. The south chose not to believe him [Lincoln].

**Both sides, if you followed the press of the day, contributed to a grave misunderstanding of the situation -- each side had a skewed view of the other, and**

**this helped to polarize the U.S.** The south viewed all Northerners as anti-slavery, and the North viewed all southern as slave owners. Both were wrong. Also, most people of both parts of the country believed that the other side contained only extremists and that no middle ground was possible. Incidents like the beating of Senator Charles Sumner by Representative Preston Brooks on the floor of the Senate was played up by the press on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line, but with two very different views. Brooks beating of Sumner dealt with southern “honor” and not slavery. It was a non-political beating, but that’s not the way the press played it. The North’s view was the beating came as a result of the views of Sumner on slavery and the speech he had just given entitled “the Crime Against Kansas.” Brooks was portrayed in the Southern press as a “patriot” defending the “honor” of the South. In the North, he [Brooks] was portrayed as a criminal. The truth lies somewhere in between. But in those days, the press often made “truth” the first casualty.

**The southern “firebrands” were another contributing factor.** They fueled the feeling in the South that southern culture and freedom were in jeopardy as a result of what the North was planning. People like William Loundes Yancey, John Slidell, and others went around giving speeches that appealed directly to the “gut” and not to the intellect. Their speeches were published and often embellished by the newspapers, and this helped to spread a climate of suspicion and nationalism that made the coming war almost inevitable.

**The actual trigger was, of course, the succession of South Carolina and five other Southern states, and the surrounding of Fort Sumter.** The problem was that the South had not thought out the best way to do things. If the south was portraying itself as an entity that was being bullied by the larger and richer north -- that is, “right” was on their side, and all they wanted to do was to be left alone. Therefore, their firing on Fort Sumter and forcing the federal garrison to surrender took what moral “high” ground the south had staked out in the world away from it, and Lincoln certainly took political and diplomatic advantage of it. There is no doubt that the lack of Southern aggression played no little part in the reluctance of England and France to recognize the South as a sovereign country; only as a simple “belligerent.” You see, part of the Southern strategy for survival

if the North sought to restore the Union by force was to involve England and France on the side of the South. This was no small problem to Lincoln in the early months of the conflict.

If you look at the abilities of both sides to prosecute a war, the South should have realized that if the North chose to bring its full power to bear, and did so for any length of time, they could not win. That they held out for four years was remarkable and speaks well of southern valor and abilities. It is also interesting to note the following. After the war, in the South, it was always an act of faith that the members of the family who fought for the Confederacy fought for “states rights” [or more accurately, against Northern aggression and NOT TO DEFEND SLAVERY].

The American Civil War was a terrible conflict in which more than 600,000 Americans on both sides died. The bloodletting, while small when compared with World War I, made the world wonder just what type of people Americans were when they would fight a battle in which 50,000 soldiers were killed, wounded, or mission. Those type of losses had not been seen in conflict since Napoleon’s time. But, what was going on in America was of considerable interest to the rest of the world, particularly Europe, and some of the weapons and tactics that were staples of the war were used later in World War I [barbed wire, machine guns, rail transportation, land mines, hand grenades, observation balloons]. It is interesting to note, though, that few European countries initially studied the Civil War because they did not think that war practiced by colonials was worthy. At the end of the war, both the Union and Confederate armies were the equal of any in Europe as to weapons, tactics, and a logistical infrastructure.

As an officer in today’s U.S. Army, you can learn much from a study of this conflict that will help you in any future actions which you might have to execute. Be ready!

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Command Historian

ATZN-CM-MH

MEMORANDUM FOR Chemical Officer Advanced Course

SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

The American Civil War was the first of the modern wars for a number of reasons. In terms of personnel mobilized, it was the first of the large scale clashes of great bodies of soldiers on multiple fronts. True, Napoleon often commanded an army of 250,000 men, but that organization maneuvered in a relatively confined space, and not over the hundreds of miles of terrain in the United States during the Civil War.

The Civil War proved that in a modern age, the size of an army depends greatly on the ability of an industrial infrastructure to support it. In Napoleon's time, the infrastructure was large, but not that industrialized -- much of the weapons and equipment produced for the French were produced by cottage industries or small businesses, and not the factories of the type developed during the Civil War. Weapons became more complicated during the Civil War -- in addition to being more lethal -- but they also lent themselves to some form of standardization which allowed them to be manufactured in large buildings by a number of semi-trained individuals. The old craftsman of frontier America who made weapons from scratch was not longer able to supply the wants and needs of a modern army. Assembly lines were the coming industry in the U.S. and later, the world.

The Civil War was a treasure house of emerging military technology. For example, at some time during the conflict, some of the earlier versions of modern war staples like barbed wire, the machine gun, rapid fire infantry weapons, sea mines, protected warships, hand grenades and military balloons were used.

However, the machine gun was first designed and produced during the war, but only President Lincoln appreciated the technology when the weapons was demonstrated by its inventor, Dr.

John Gatling, at the White House. Lincoln ordered the weapon produced and shipped to the army. In an era of linear combat with formation of close order soldiers attacking positions by marching forward with an even tread would have provided what would today be called "a target rich environment". However, the Gatling gun -- which is, by the way, the basis for the A-10 Warthog's weapons system -- was never produced and never used. The weapon had some early design flaws which made it cranky to use in action and it was subject to frequent stoppages. Also, the commanding general of the ordnance corps, MG Ripley disobeyed Lincoln's directive because he believed in settling on a single system -- rifle, pistol, cannon -- and sticking with it to insure rapid production.

To have produced the gun would have meant a development of a completely new assembly line, and another line to produce the metallic cartridges the gun needed. The technology was there, but not the will to develop it or appreciate its capabilities in the overall picture.

Hand grenades were used at Vicksburg for a part of the siege. They were crude affairs -- basically large firecrackers -- but they could do damage. However, beyond the trenches, there was no real need for them because to have provided the necessary lethality and power was beyond the current capabilities of either army -- the casing and the powder were not good or powerful enough.

The repeating rifle was the only technological breakthrough that was used by the Union -- the Confederacy was incapable of developing this type of technology because they lacked the industrial base to have produced it -- example, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Confederate forces captured several Spencer repeating rifles, and they were sent to the head of Confederate Ordnance, General Josiah Gorgas. He sadly wrote to Jefferson Davis that reproducing Confederate copies of these weapons was beyond his capability. Two basic models were invented, developed, and produced -- the Spencer Repeater (in a rifle or cavalry carbine

model) and the Henry Repeater -- one model only, but two types, the 12 shot and the 16 shot version.

Lincoln himself fired the Spencer and again directed General Ripley to produce it -- the inventor of the rifle Christian Spencer owned the arms company that produced the weapons commercially, and as such, could sell the weapon on the open market -- except to Confederates, of course. Yes, that's right, a union soldier could buy a Spencer on the open market for about 50.00 dollars and also the ammunition to go with it. Spencer's company could mass produce the rifle in limited quantities, but not in the numbers that would be needed to arm the Union forces -- Ripley was unwilling to shut down his assembly lines producing the Springfield rifled-musket to re-tool to make the Spencer.

The Union had ordered 500,000,000 individual MINIE ball rounds for its .58 Springfields, and the line making them would have been stopped so that it could be retooled to make the single metal cartridge the rifle used. Only 50,000 such weapons were produced during the war.

The effect of the Spencer on combat in the war would have been decisive -- example, in 1865, Major General James Harrison Wilson equipped his entire 12,500 man cavalry force with Spencers, and took the entire force deep into Confederate territory where no confederate force was capable of opposing him-- his Spencers gave him the firepower equivalent of a Union army of over 50,000 men.

The Henry Repeater could likewise be purchased on the civilian market, but was never mass produced like the /Spencer. It was, in many ways, superior to the Spencer in range and speed, but the Union government did not want to adopt another repeater even though it was producing the Spencer in limited quantities.

Unlike the armies of Europe which, by necessity, had to be large -- don't forget most of the countries of Europe were connected to one another by land, and as such, required large forces to defend their border -- the U.S., on the other hand, needed only a small army because neither Canada or Mexico was a

direct major military threat -- then or now. At the beginning of the Civil War, neither the North nor the South had a large number of trained soldiers to draw upon.

The South, perhaps, had the better of it in the early days. Most officers in the old army came from the South, and went with the native states at the beginning of the war. Neither the north nor the south had large reserve organizations they could use as bases for the development of larger units. Both sides were, in many respects, two ignorant groups of people -- pretending to be soldiers -- groping for some type of system that would allow them to prevail in battle.

General George Washington never commanded an army larger than 20,000 men and when he did, that army was half composed of French troops. No large force of U.S. soldiers had been raised since, so the logistic and sanitary systems used to support that much of an aggregation had not been in the American experience for nearly a generation.

Some 626,000 men lost their lives in the war. Of these, nearly 60% died not because of battle, but because of disease. The greatest killer among the civil war maladies was dysentery. This raged through much of the war for several reasons which seemed, for the most part, to elude leaders of both sides -- food was not properly prepared because the cooks were not properly trained. Streams were crossed and re-crossed by groups of animals -- i.e., the Army of the Cumberland in 1863 supported nearly 50,000 horses and mules for its units -- and these animals left waste in areas that fed into streams from which the soldiers drank. Soldiers themselves had to constantly be admonished about sanitation, and the food was often times dreary and repetitive -- i.e., in Desert Shield, one Aviation unit lived on Hardee's hamburgers for nearly 3 weeks -- breakfast, lunch, and dinner -- and suffered dysentery because of the blandness of the diet.

Only when fresh vegetables, fruit and other condiments reached the area did the dysentery stop. Some soldiers had it

more or less constantly during the six months they were there. This problem is still with the modern army more than 130 years after the Civil War.

One of the most potentially useful and simplest technological inventions of the Civil War was never allowed to show what it could do. I am talking about balloons -- the modern day helicopters and other intelligence gathering systems now fielded.

The balloon was demonstrated for Lincoln by a Professor Thaddeus S. C. Lowe in 1862, and he ordered the War Department to field balloons for the army. Which it did, but very reluctantly.

Balloons were used during the Peninsula campaign in 1862, but with almost no success because of one notable factor -- Neither the North nor the South developed an adequate intelligence or staff system that could translate information provided by balloons into useful material understandable to the commander.

The confederates made one stab at the development of a balloon corps, and they actually made one similar to those used by Lowe. The balloon, however, was made from putting hundreds of silk undergarments and dresses from the women of Richmond. The balloon was being towed into battle when the ship towing it ran aground, and the balloon was captured by the Federals. This ended the Confederate balloon corps for good.

The average professional education of an officer was limited to West Point and what information the officer could obtain from either foreign officers, or trips to other countries. No command and general staff college or war college then existed; however, the Germans had a system that was to be adopted by most of the other armies of the major powers by the turn of the century -- they also had a great general staff of professionals whose sole business was staff work. The Germans gave these officers some experience with line units, and then rotated them back to the staff.

They also set up a KRIEGSAKADEMIE which selected ONLY the best officers. As a result, the level of professionalism was high

in the German army -- not, however, in the Union or Confederate Armies.

One would find very few regular army officers are regimental commander -- they usually led brigades, divisions, or corps. For example, the first commander of the famous 20th Maine regiment was Col. Adelbert Ames -- a regular army officer whose rank before the war has been captain. He trained the 20th in the style of a regular army unit and the men hated Ames. However, he did instill in the officers and men of the regiment a professionalism and fighting spirit which stood them in good stead on Little Round Top.

Regimental commanders were normally appointed by state governors of the North and South -- a sop to political power. Both Lincoln and Davis appointed commanders above that rank -- subject to the approval of the respective Congresses. The junior officers where -- in the early part of the war -- elected by the soldiers, and in the latter, commissioned by the state governor. The quality of officers varied wildly, but by 1863, the utter incompetents had been gradually weeded out and sent him or to backwater areas.

Many officers of both armies had absolutely no training as military men prior to the war -- i.e., Joshua Chamberlain-- who ends the war as a Major General -- was a college professor. General Nathan Bedford Forrest was a slave trader and planter before the war -- Major General John A. Logan was a lawyer but rose by the end of the war to command a Union Army and the list goes on and on. It was not that these men were not competent professionals at the end of the war -- they were -- but there was a great deal of learning in between -- learning in combat.

The lack of professionals meant a lack of knowledge of the higher strategical thinking with both armies. Neither side ever developed a plan -- based on well though out strategy -- to defeat the other and win the war.

The Confederates had only one strategy -- that of defense -- and to defend their territory, they used the area defense which forced the Confederates to be strong everywhere, and this they could not be. The North's view of the war was to simply take the Confederate capital -- now moved from Montgomery to Richmond and the war would end. Until Grant took control of the Union armies in the summer of 1864, that seemed to be the fixed point for all Union actions.

Only the nearly 70 year old Winfield Scott had the right idea -- he had a plan which historians have labeled "the Anaconda Plan" because it was designed to squeeze the south.

Unlike others, Scott had reached the conclusion that the South would never come back voluntarily into the fold -- it would have to be invaded and forced back. To do so meant a multiple series of armies attacking into the south from different directions -- all coordinated -- and pin the south against its own seacoast. Of course, General Scott had not neglected the naval aspect of the war -- a stringent blockade of southern ports to prevent the Confederates from supplying themselves from Europe. The old general also realized the strategic importance of the Mississippi River, and made that one of his strategical imperatives. Much of the South's commerce used the Mississippi and its tributaries. Also, total federal control of the river cut off all of Texas and parts of Louisiana from the rest of the Confederacy. If the south could use the waterway, so could the Federals to support their operations in Southern territory.

Although Scott put this plan forward in 1861, it was not fully carried out until three years later when Grant took command.

He appreciated the nature of the war -- simple, straightforward and simple in action. Simple in the sense that it was not complex to understand, but it was difficult for Grant to get the type of competent commanders that made an attack based on multiple armies work. They all had to work in tandem or the south would be able to live and move portions of its army to help block each of the

union armies -- they would do this with some success at Chickamauga.

For all the great battles of the war, a question needs to be asked -- could the south had won the war. Today, there are a number of factors that determine a country's ability to wage war - - population, technical capability, raw materials, industrial infrastructure to name a few the South was outdone in every category except will.

Burton Wright III, Ph.D  
Command Historian

# **BRIEFING PAPER STAFF RIDE PROGRAM U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL**

## **THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE CIVIL WAR**

Neither North nor South had the glimmer of an idea of how long the war would last or how to create armies to fight it. They learned as they went along. Both sides made use of those regular army personnel available to them. Remember, at the beginning of the war, there were only 25,000 in the U.S. Army. The balance went south.

Staffs are the heart and brains of an army. In the beginning, the South had the better staff organization because it had the majority of the more experienced officers. Drafting the orders that send a 75,000 man army on the move is not an easy task, but both sides eventually mastered the task.

For the first year and a half, the soldier in both armies were pure volunteer. After that, most who remained from the first wave had now turned into hardened soldiers, but the new group were draftees. The draft boards were run not dissimilar to the way they would be run today. You registered, you were given a number, and if your number came up, you had to report for duty. However, there was one notable difference in the Civil War draft. You could hire a substitute -- usual sum \$200 -- who would report for duty.

Normally, the new soldier would report to a regiment that was in the process of forming [the North created new regiments, and the south generally used draftees as replacements for already existing regiments] within the state where the individual resided. He would be given basic training within the regimental structure before the regiment was sent into combat. This period could last from six

weeks to over six months. The training involved mostly marching in formation -- the whole point of fighting in the Civil War was mass attacks involving large formations of soldiers. The ability of units to perform complex facing movements in the midst of battle was the major separation point for success on the battlefield.

Southern soldiers were rarely issued uniforms -- sometimes parts of uniforms -- and little other than LBE and a weapon. Northern soldiers were issued complete uniforms along with socks and underwear. Uniforms were made of wool -- remember, cotton was not available after 1861 -- and was worn both summer and winter. It is not wear well, and uniforms required frequent repair and replacement. The southern soldiers also used wool, but did have some cotton uniforms. However, the South did not possess the cloth making industry that the North did, so the uniforms were made by old fashioned spinning wheels.


In the early part of the war, weapons varied widely from the latest .58 caliber Springfield rifled-musket to Mexican War smoothbore muskets and even shotguns. By 1863, both armies had standardized two weapons -- the .58 caliber Springfield Rifled Musket or the .57 caliber Whitworth Rifled Musket [imported from England]. The south created more than a dozen variants of the Springfield.

Both sides issued bayonets for their rifles, but this weapon was so little used. Only about one per cent of death or wounds was caused by bayonets. The rifle was the greatest killer on the battlefield followed by cannon.

Artillery used by both sides was generally standardized. The Napoleon 12 pounder cannon was, by far, the most popular field piece. Weighting roughly 1450 lbs, this weapon was crewed by 8 men and could fire roughly 2 rounds per minute. Ammunition


available to this weapons included round shot [a round iron ball], canister [26 small iron balls in a can], and case shot [a round shot with a hollow center filled with gunpowder and set off by a fuze]. Grapeshot [simply iron balls attached to a tree of iron and placed in the cannon as is] was rarely used after 1863.

**The working unit of both armies was the regiment:**



A state [north or south] raised the unit, and when it was fully formed, the state turned it over to the government and the government would pay and equip the unit. Although more than 1,000 men at inception, most regiments by the time they fought their first battle had dropped to under 600 men. The average size of a regiment at Chickamauga (Sep 1863) was less than 400 men.


**The next largest unit was the Brigade:**



### **Artillery Battery (attached)**


If the regiments were small, a brigade could have as few as 900, or if new or with regiments relatively new, a brigade could have more than 3,000.

**The division was in reality an enlarged brigade:**



**Divisions could be as small as 2500 and as large as 7000**


**Divisions were formed into corps:**



**Both the Union and Confederate corps were small armies, but the Southern corps were larger and more capable of sustained combat.**

**Most major confederate armies had two or three corps, but union armies had as many as six or seven.**

**The largest unit for both North and South was the Army:**



**Although the population of the North was much greater than that of the south, the number of armies fielded by both sides was small.**

**Northern armies were named for Rivers; Southern armies for geographical areas. For example:**

#### **EASTERN THEATER**

##### **NORTH**

**Army of the Potomac**

**Army of the James**

##### **SOUTH**

**Army of Northern Virginia**

## **WESTERN THEATER**

**Army of the Ohio**

**Army of the Tennessee**

**Army of the Tennessee**

**Army of the Cumberland**

**Army of the Mississippi**

**The major strategic plan adopted by the North was called the Anaconda Plan (named for the South American constrictor snake that crushed its prey to death which was the major outcome of the plan from Northern perspective) It had three parts:**

### **PART ONE:**

**Establishing a tight blockade of the Southern Coast**

### **PART TWO:**

**Controlling the Mississippi River**

### **PART THREE:**

**Entering the South from multiple directions with different armies**

**Part one was finished by early 1863, part two was finished by June, 1863, and part three was begun in May, 1864, but not completed in mid-1865.**


**The average Union and Confederate soldiers were not very literate. Most could not read well, and most did not own a watch. Most soldiers of both armies were lean -- Army chow for both wasn't that good -- and many were in poor physical condition except during campaigning when health improved. Sanitary conditions were wretched until the Sanitary Commission was formed [the South had a similar organization] that taught soldiers how to provide proper camp hygiene.**

The greatest killer of the 600,000 plus who died in the war was sickness -- mostly dysentery. People took poor care of the person, and did not always watch what they drank -- the common diagnosis was either "camp or swamp" fever.


The command system of the Civil War as relatively simple, but the North, had, by far, the better system.

Notice that Davis had to CINC of the Army. He had a Secretary of War, but that individual (there were five separate men who occupied that job during the war) were used mostly to issue orders to the armies. The Secretary had no function -- Davis was his own commander whereas Lincoln had both a Secretary of War and a professional soldier in his chain. Jefferson Davis' military advisor had no power at all, and could only "advise" the President. The first occupant of the office was General Robert E. Lee after his abortive campaign in West Virginia, and later by the failed Braxton Bragg. In fairness to Bragg, he did not do a bad job in the months he was Davis' advisor. If anything, Bragg was a good administrator. The Confederate President ran everything -- Lincoln did not normally interfere directly in military operations and consulted with his military commanders. Davis constantly interfered in operations and often caused more problems than he solved. Eventually, Lincoln found the right general [see: T. Harry Williams. Lincoln Finds A General] he needed to guide his armies to victory -- Ulysses S. Grant. He had the strategic brain that matched that of Lincoln, and the President handled the political side of things and Grant handled the military side. Grant always insured that the President was fully informed of any operations planned.

## NORTH



## SOUTH



## ***BATTLE ONE***

**BATTLE:** BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN (INDIAN WARS)

**DATE:** 26 JULY 1876

**ANTAGONISTS:** 7 U.S. CAVALRY (12 COMPANIES OR ABOUT 800 MEN)  
25,000 NATIVE AMERICANS -- 5,000 FIGHTING MEN (SIOUX AND CHEYENNE)

**LOCATION:** STATE OF MONTANA

**TERRAIN:** RIVER VALLEY (LITTLE BIG HORN) -- HIGH HILLS AND ROLLING  
TERRAIN SPRINKLED TO STANDS OF TIMBER

**WEATHER:** SKIES WERE CLEAR, TEMPERATURE IN THE 80'S -- A HOT DAY

### **SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE:**

ARMY BEGAN A CAMPAIGN TO ATTEMPT TO BRING THREE COLUMNS OF TROOPS AND CATCH THE INDIANS BETWEEN THEM. ONE OF THE COLUMNS COMMANDED BY BG CROOK WAS ATTACKED BY SIOUX AND CHEYENNE WARRIORS ON THE ROSEBUD RIVER, AND WHILE NOT DEFEATED, WAS FORCED TO RETURN TO ITS BASE. TWO OTHER COLUMNS (ONE UNDER BG JOHN GIBBON AND ONE UNDER BG ALFRED TERRY) CONTINUED ON. THE 7TH CAVALRY WAS THE SCOUTING FORCE FOR TERRY'S COLUMN AND TERRY GAVE CUSTER PERMISSION TO PITCH INTO THE HOSTILES IF HE FOUND THEM AND HE HAD THE ADVANTAGE. BUT, CUSTER'S GENERAL ORDERS WERE THE SCOUT, FIX THE ENEMY, AND THEN HOLD THEM IN PLACE UNTIL TERRY'S COLUMN WAS UP. CUSTER VIOLATED THE SPIRIT OF HIS ORDERS. HIS RHEE SCOUTS FOUND A HUGE TRAIL OF A LARGE COLUMN OF INDIANS. CUSTER FOLLOWED WITH HIS REGIMENT AND CAME TO A PROMONTORY OVERLOOKING THE LITTLE BIG HORN VALLEY. THE RHEES TOLD CUSTER THAT THE NUMBER OF INDIANS IN THE VALLEY WAS THE LARGEST THEY HAD EVER SEEN, BUT CUSTER DISCOUNTED THEIR VIEWS, AND TOOK HIS REGIMENT INTO THE VALLEY -- BUT, HE DIVIDED HIS FORCES -- ONE BATTALION OF 3 COMPANIES UNDER CAPTAIN BENTEN WAS SENT TO THE NORTH TO SCOUT THE BADLANDS, AND CUSTER AND THE REMAINING 8 COMPANIES ENTERED THE VALLEY. AGAIN, SIGNS OF RECENT INDIAN COLUMNS. CUSTER REACHED THE BANKS OF THE RIVER AT THE UPPER END OF THE VALLEY AND COULD SEE THE UPPER PARTS OF THE TEEPEES OF THE VILLAGE. CUSTER THEN SPLIT HIS COMMAND -- THREE COMPANIES UNDER MAJOR RENO WERE TO ADVANCE DOWN THE VALLEY AND ATTACK THE INDIAN VILLAGE WHILE CUSTER WITH FIVE COMPANIES WOULD MOVE ALONG THE BLUFFS. MAJOR RENO DID AS HE WAS TOLD, AND RAN INTO THOUSANDS OF WARRIORS. HE HALTED HIS ATTACK, AND TOOK COVER IN A STAND OF TREES. THE INDIANS QUICKLY SURROUNDED HIM. THE RHEE CHIEF, BLOODY KNIFE, WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD AND HIS BLOOD AND BRAINS SPLATTERED OVER MAJOR RENO. THE MAJOR SEEMED TO LOSE HIS COOL, AND HE ORDERED A RETREAT TO A BLUFF ACROSS THE RIVER. THE MAJORITY OF THE LOSSES HIS TROOPS SUFFERED WERE DURING THIS RETREAT -- IT WAS NOT

ORDERLY. RENO THEN ESTABLISHED A PERIMETER THERE, AND THE INDIANS PRESSED IN, BUT SUDDENLY, THEY ALL BUT DISAPPEARED AND RENO HEARD FIRING DOWN THE RIVER -- CUSTER WAS IN ACTION. BENTEN'S THREE COMPANIES JOINED RENO AS WELL AS THE SINGLE COMPANY GUARDING THE PACK TRAIN. RENO WAS SAFE, BUT THE CUSTER WAS FIGHTING HARD. CUSTER'S FIVE COMPANIES RODE FAST -- SEVERAL MEN FROM HIS COLUMN JOINED RENO WHEN THEIR MOUNTS GAVE OUT -- AND FOUND A WAY DOWN TO THE INDIAN VILLAGE -- MEDICINE TRAIL COULEE -- AND CUSTER WENT DOWN IT, BUT THE INDIANS CAME BACK AND FORCED HIS COMPANIES AWAY FROM THERE TOWARD A HIGH RIDGE. TWO COMPANIES WERE WIPED OUT NEAR THE COULEE, AND A THIRD WIPED OUT HALF-WAY UP THE HILL. THE SURVIVORS CONGREGATED ON THE TOP OF THE HILL AND WERE EVENTUALLY WIPED OUT BY ARROW AND RIFLE FIRE. RENO DID NOT WANT TO SEND TROOPS TO FIND CUSTER AND REINFORCE HIM, SO LT. WEIR TOOK TWO COMPANIES OUT TO WEIR POINT WHERE HE COULD SEE THE BATTLEFIELD WHICH WAS SO COVERED WITH DUST AND SMOKE, NOTHING COULD BE MADE OUT. WEIR SAW THAT HUNDREDS OF INDIANS WERE MOVING TOWARD HIM, SO HE MOVED BACK TO RENO HILL. THE INDIANS ATTACKED RENO FOR TWO DAYS UNTIL THE APPROACH OF THE NOW COMBINED GIBBON-TERRY COLUMN. THEY FOUND RENO FIRST, AND THEN MOVED ON TO THE BATTLEFIELD WHERE CUSTER'S ENTIRE UNIT WOULD BE FOUND TO BE WIPED OUT TO A MAN. CUSTER WAS FOUND AT THE SUMMIT WITH TWO BULLET WOUNDS -- ONE IN HIS SIDE AND ONE IN THE HEAD. BOTH WOULD HAVE BEEN FATAL.

## **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**DO NOT DIVIDE YOUR FORCES IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY**

**MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF INTELLIGENCE**

**DO NOT ATTACK PREMATURELY**

**CONVERGING ATTACKS ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT TO EXECUTE BECAUSE OF TIMING**

## **BOOKS:**

**Davis Humphreys Miller, CUSTER'S FALL**

**Mari Sandoz, BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN**

**Frederick van Der Water, GLORY HUNTER**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. What principles of war did General Custer violate?**

**Ans: Mass  
Economy of Force  
Security**

**2. Where did his intelligence fail?**

**Ans: His Rhee scouts correctly identified that the valley was full of hostiles; it was Custer himself who discounted his own scouts and attacked against their specific advice.**

**3. Why did the hostiles defeat the 7th Cavalry?**

**Ans: From their early surprise, they quickly formed and attacked. This froze Reno's column and they successfully blocked it. When Custer appeared along the bluffs near Medicine Trail Coulee, the hostiles quickly changed front and aggressively attacked Custer to force him away from the village.**

**4. Was the general plan of the campaign adequate?**

**Ans: No, even in those days, it was next to impossible to pull off a successful converging attack. The kicker here was that the Crook column had been forced back at the Rosebud River the week before, and neither Terry nor Gibbon was aware of this.**

**5. Did Custer exceed his orders?**

**Ans: Yes. He could pitch into hostiles if he found them, but clearly Terry meant small bands of them, not a village with an estimated 25,000 in it. Since the Indians were highly mobile, Custer was right in a way to take them on, but he should have kept his force together and not split it. He was thinking of the Indian village as similar to the small one he had attacked on the Washita River years before. He was wrong. He should have waited until Terry reached supporting distance before taking on the hostiles.**

## **BATTLE TWO**

**BATTLE:** BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN (CIVIL WAR)

**DATE:** 25 JULY 1864

**LOCATION:** STATE OF GEORGIA (OUTSIDE OF MARIETTA, GEORGIA)

**ANTAGONISTS:** UNION ARMY UNDER GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN AND CONFEDERATE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE UNDER GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON

**TERRAIN:** KENNESAW MOUNTAIN IS TWO PEAKS (LITTLE AND BIG KENNESAW) TERRAIN IS WOODED AND HILLS ALONG THE SEVEN MILES OF FORTIFICATION THAT GENERAL JOHNSTON BUILT

**WEATHER:** Hot and clear. No recent rainfall.

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

GENERAL SHERMAN AND HIS 100,000 MAN ARMY HAD BEEN PUSHING THE MUCH SMALLER ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE BACK TOWARDS THE MAJOR UNION OBJECTIVE OF ATLANTA. JOHNSON HAD BEEN USING THE HILLY TERRAIN OF NORTHERN GEORGIA TO FRUSTRATE SHERMAN AND FORCE HIM TO ATTACK OR TO FLANK. TO THAT POINT, SHERMAN HAD BEEN FLANKING. HOWEVER, HE SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT AT KENNESAW HE COULD BREAK THROUGH THE CONFEDERATE LINES AND REACH THE RAILROAD BEHIND JOHNSTON AND WIN THE CAMPAIGN. THE CONFEDERATE TROOPS WERE IN A FISHHOOK DEFENSIVE POSITION BUILT AROUND LITTLE AND BIG KENNESAW. THEIR FORTIFICATIONS EXTENDED FOR NEARLY SEVEN MILES. SHERMAN DECIDED TO BLUFF AN ATTACK AT LITTLE AND BIG KENNESAW AND STRIKE NEAR THE CENTER OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES AND BREAK THROUGH. HE BELIEVED THAT HIS TWO FEINTS -- ONE ON EITHER FLANK -- WOULD FOOL GENERAL JOHNSTON INTO REINFORCING THE FLANKS BY WEAKENING THE CENTER. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN, AND SHERMAN'S GENERALS THOUGHT THAT THE ATTACK WOULD FAIL BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS THE CONFEDERATES HAD BUILT. GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS' ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND WAS GIVEN THE MAIN EFFORT, AND THE DIVISION OF BG JEFFERSON C. DAVIS WAS SENT INTO THE ATTACK. HIS BRIGADES WERE SLAUGHTERED BY CONCENTRATED CONFEDERATE FIRE. IN LESS THAN 30 MINUTES, GENERAL SHERMAN HAD LOST 5,000 MEN. THE CONFEDERATES REMAINED AT KENNESAW FOR ANOTHER TWO DAYS, AND THEN RETREATED GIVING THE BATTLEFIELD BACK TO THE UNION. SHERMAN WAS SO EMBARRASSED ABOUT THIS ATTACK THAT HE MAKES NO MENTION OF IT IN HIS MEMOIRS.

### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

INFANTRY CANNOT OVERRUN WELL DEFENDED POSITION BY MASS ATTACKS

**LISTEN TO THE ADVICE OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS**

**WHEN IN DOUBT, FLANK RATHER THAN ATTACK HEAD ON**

**DO NOT EXPECT THE ENEMY TO PERFORM EXACTLY AS YOU THINK THEY WILL**

**BOOKS:**

**Albert Castel, THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN**

**Joseph E. Johnston, THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL JOHNSTON**

**BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOLUME IV**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. Was Sherman correct in his tactical views?**

**Ans:** No, Sherman's plans ignored the advice of his own generals. They did not want to attack because they believed that the fortifications were too strong to achieve a breakthrough. Sherman disregarded his best generals and ordered the attack. The whole plan hinged on the weakening of the center to guard the flanks, but Johnston was too good a general to fall for that, and he kept his forces in place.

**2. What principles of war did Sherman violate?**

**Ans:**

**Mass --** he did not mass at the appropriate spot -- although he had the balance of the Army of the Cumberland in reserve, the fate of the attacking units was so obvious that he did not then use the reserves. It was doubtful they would have made a difference.

**Economy of Force --** he used too many to make his demonstration

**Objective --** he had no real objective other than the rail line the Confederates were protecting, but it wasn't that important.

**Maneuver --** he could have easily turned Johnston out of Kennesaw was striking at his weak right flank rather than a head on attack.

**3. Was Johnston's action prudent or did he miss a chance?**

**Ans:** Yes, but he did not miss a chance. Johnston was a very careful general, and did not have reserves in hand to counter-attack nor should he. He knew that within a day or two, Sherman would move around his flank, so he kept his army in hand.

**4. Could the attack have been handled better?**

**Ans:** No, no bombardment by massed guns could have paved the way for infantry. The Confederates had constructed such good fortifications that it is doubtful any direct artillery fire would have been effective.

## ***BATTLE THREE***

**BATTLE:** BATTLE OF THE TEUTONBERGER WALD (ANCIENT HISTORY)

**DATE:** A.D. 9

**ANTAGONISTS:** THREE ROMAN LEGIONS UNDER THEIR COMMANDER QUINTUS VARUS AND GERMAN FORCES UNDER ARMINIUS

**LOCATION:** NORTHERN GERMANY

**TERRAIN:** HEAVY FOREST WITH LITTLE OPEN GROUND

**WEATHER:** Fall temperatures -- clear and crisp. No recent rains or snow

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

VARUS WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR ROMAN COMMANDERS IN THE PART OF GERMANY THEY CONTROLLED. THE ROMANS WERE ALWAYS WARRING AGAINST THE GERMANS WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THEY OFTEN USED GERMANS AS AUXILIARIES. ONE LEADER THEY TRAINED WAS ARMINIUS. HE JOINED WITH SEVERAL LARGE AND HOSTILE TRIBES TO ATTEMPT TO TRAP A ROMAN ARMY. IN GERMANY, THE ROMANS HAD SEPARATE SUMMER AND WINTER QUARTERS. VARUS WAS MOVING FROM SUMMER TO WINTER QUARTERS WHEN A SMALL AND INSIGNIFICANT BATTLE BETWEEN TWO GERMAN TRIBES BROKE OUT. VARUS DECIDED TO MOVE HIS THREE LEGIONS INTO THE AREA, STOP THE FIGHTING AND CONTINUE ON TO THEIR WINTER QUARTERS. BECAUSE HE EXPECTED NO PROBLEMS, VARUS MOVED NOT AS AN ARMY THAT EXPECTED TO FIGHT, BUT ONE THAT TOOK ALONG ALL OF ITS BAGGAGE AND WIVES AND CHILDREN. THE THREE LEGIONS TOOK UP NEARLY 15 MILES OF ROAD SPACE. THE ARMY CAME INTO THE TEUTONBERGER WALD (OR FOREST) AND INTO THE TRAP ARMINIUS HAD SET FOR THEM. HE TOOK HIS AUXILIARY FORCES AND ATTACKED THE ROMANS ALONG THEIR LINE OF MARCH AND WAS JOINED BY THOUSANDS OF OTHER GERMANS. THE ROMANS WERE SPLIT INTO SMALLER GROUPS BECAUSE THEY WERE STRUNG OUT, AND DEFEATED IN DETAIL. THE GERMANS THEN ENGAGED IN HUMAN SACRIFICE TO THEIR RELIGIOUS DEITIES AND VARUS AND HIS LEGIONS DISAPPEARED. A CAMPAIGN BY GERMANICUS LATER FOUND VARUS AND HIS LEGIONS, BUT ONLY AS BONES STRUNG OUT OVER MILES OF TERRAIN. TRY AS HE COULD, CAESAR AUGUSTUS COULD NEVER RECONSTITUTE THE THREE LEGIONS HE HAD LOST IN THE DARK FORESTS OF GERMANY. THOSE LEGIONS HAD BEEN PURE ROMAN. NOW, ROME DEPENDED ON LEVEES OF BARBARIANS TO FILL THEIR RANKS, AND THE DESCENT OF ROME INTO ANARCHY WAS BEGUN.

### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**MARCH AS YOU INTEND TO FIGHT**

**NEVER MOVE INTO A SITUATION WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IS GOING ON**

**DO NOT STRING OUT COLUMNS WHERE THEY CAN BE ISOLATED AND DEFEATED IN DETAIL**

**BOOKS:**

**Sir Edward Creasy. DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WORLD**

**J. F. C. Fuller. A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. What principle of war did Varus violate?**

**Ans: Security. He marched as he expected no problems, and he took his baggage with him rather than march as though he expected combat. This led to his destruction.**

**2. Why was Arminius so successful?**

**Ans: First, he created a false sense of security in the Romans so that they would not suspect an ambush. Secondly, with the Romans strung out over so great a territory, Arminius attacked to break the Roman columns into parts and destroy them individually with greater strength. Thirdly, he achieved nearly complete surprise over the Romans.**

## ***BATTLE FOUR***

**BATTLE:** HORNS OF HATTIN (THE CRUSADES)

**DATE:** 4 JULY, 1187

**LOCATION:** IN WHAT IS MODERN ISRAEL NEAR THE DEAD SEA NEAR THE COAST

**ANTAGONISTS:** ARMY OF THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM (30,000) AND THE ARMY OF EMIR SALAD-DIN, EMIR OF SYRIA (50,000)

**WEATHER:** VERY HOT, SUMMER -- TEMPERATURES IN THE 90'S -- NO RAIN

**TERRAIN:** ROLLING DESERT AND MOUNTAIN TERRAIN WITH FEW STANDS OF TREES. ROCKY AND FORBIDDING TERRAIN

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM WAS THE LAST CRUSADER KINGDOM OF THE SEVERAL SET UP AFTER THE SERIES OF CRUSADES. THE MOSLEMS BEGAN A CAMPAIGN TO TAKE BACK WHAT THEY HAD CONTROLLED. TO ATTEMPT TO SAVE HIS KINGDOM, THE CRUSADER KING GUY, MARSHALED THE LEVY-EN-MASSE OF HIS KINGDOM AND WENT OUT TO DO BATTLE. SALADIN EXECUTED ONE OF THE MOST BRILLIANT PLANS TO AVOID A DIRECT BATTLE YET DESTROY THE CRUSADER ARMY. HIS TROOPS LAID WASTE TO THE AREA AND DESTROYED ANY WATER WELLS. AS THE CRUSADER ARMY MARCHED FURTHER INTO SALADIN'S TRAP, THEY FOUND LESS AND LESS WATER. FINALLY, KING GUY HAD TO MAKE A DECISION -- MARCH THROUGH THE NIGHT WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD CAUSE, OR HALT, AND BEGIN THE MARCH IN THE MORNING. IT WAS A FATAL MISTAKE. SALADIN'S MEN NEVER DIRECTLY ATTACKED THE CRUSADERS, BUT KEPT THEM UP ALL NIGHT BY MEANS OF ARROW FIRE AND SMOKE POTS. THE CRUSADERS, NOW DESPERATE FOR WATER, WERE SO TIRED AND THIRSTY THAT THE ARMY BEGAN TO BREAK UP AS SOME BEGAN TO RETREAT. SALADIN'S ARMY THEN ATTACKED AND LITERALLY POLICED UP ARMORED KNIGHTS BY THE HUNDREDS WHO WERE SO THIRTY AND DEHYDRATED THAT THEY COULD NOT MOVE OR FIGHT. KING GUY HAD BROUGHT THE "CROSS" THAT CHRIST WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN CRUCIFIED ON, AND SURVIVORS CROWDED AROUND IT IN HOPES OF SAFETY. THEY WERE TAKEN PRISONER AND THE CROSS DISAPPEARED. THIS WIPED OUT THE LAST MAJOR CRUSADER KINGDOM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

LOGISTICS IS KEY

**WHEN MOVING INTO FORBIDDING TERRAIN, CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO  
INSURE ALL ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES ARE BROUGHT ALONG**

**TRAPS ARE AS DECISIVE AS FLANK OR REAR ATTACKS**

## **BOOKS:**

**Lynn Montross. WAR THROUGH THE AGES**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. What principles of war did King Guy violate?**

**Ans:**

**Security --** With proper security, King Guy would have halted in areas where he could have obtained needed water and not gone further into the zone of destroyed areas Saladin had prepared

**Maneuver --** There was a possibility he could have maneuvered around the devastated area and taken Saladin on ground of his own choosing.

**Economy of Force --** King Guy could have send on a smaller part of his army as a bridge to bring the rest through the bad areas.

**Objective --** King Guy seems to have had no objective in mind save meeting Saladin in battle.

**2. Why was Saladin so successful?**

**Ans:** He lured the Crusader Army into an area where their logistics failed them, and they could not obtain needed water without a dangerous night march. He let human nature and the elements do his work for him.

## ***BATTLE FIVE***

**BATTLE:** BATTLE OF VERDUN (WORLD WAR I)

**DATE:** FEBRUARY 21st, 1916 to JULY 11, 1916

**ANTAGONISTS:** GERMAN ARMY UNDER GENERAL HANS VON FALKENHAYN AND THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER MARSHAL PETAIN

**LOCATION:** NORTHEASTERN FRANCE

**TERRAIN:** ROLLING FARMLAND DOTTED WITH SOME WOODS (FORET)

**WEATHER:** NORMALLY CLEAR AND WARM (The Battle lasted for nearly five months)

### **SYNOPSIS:**

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (GERMAN) GENERAL HANS VAN FALKENHAYN DECIDED TO CHANGE TACTICS. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE HAD ENDED IN GERMAN DEFEAT, AND THE REMOVAL OF THE FORMER CHIEF, GENERAL VON MOLTKE. THE GERMANS, FRENCH, AND ENGLISH HAD BEGUN TO SETTLE DOWN TO TRENCH WARFARE AND A SERIES OF OFFENSIVES AGAINST EACH OTHER'S TRENCH SYSTEMS. THIS WAS COSTLY IN MEN AND MATERIAL HE DECIDED ON A NEW WAY TO DEFEAT THE ALLIES -- A BATTLE OF ATTRITION. HE BELIEVED THAT HE COULD "BLEED" THE FRENCH, AND THE AREA FOR THE BATTLE WAS SELECTED -- THE FRENCH FORTRESSES IN AND AROUND THE CITY OF VERDUN. THIS BATTLE LASTED NEARLY 5 MONTHS, AND DURING THE BATTLE, THE GERMANS LOST 550,000 MEN AND THE FRENCH 500,000. VERDUN AND THE FORTRESSES AROUND IT HELD AGAINST ALMOST CONSTANT GERMAN ATTACK. THE GROUND AROUND FORT DANOU MONT WAS SO PITTED WITH ARTILLERY HOLES THAT IT LOOKED LIKE THE LANDSCAPE OF THE MOON. NO TREE OR BLADE OF GRASS REMAINED, AND THE CASEMATES OF THE FRENCH FORTS WERE SCARRED AND, IN SOME CASES, COLLAPSED. ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS TOOK SOME KEY TERRAIN -- IE FORT DANOU MONT, THEY MADE NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH, AND FALKENHAYN HAD TO CALL OFF THE ATTACK. AS A RESULT OF THE CASUALTIES AND THE LACK OF REAL PROGRESS, FALKENHAYN WAS EVENTUALLY REPLACED BY THE DUO OF FIELD MARSHAL HINDENBURG AND GENERAL LUDENDORFF.

### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

BATTLES OF ATTRITION GENERALLY BLOW BACK ON THE INITIATOR OF THE PLAN.

ATTACKS ON FORTIFIED AREAS BY MASSES OF INFANTRY EVEN WHEN GIVEN MASSIVE ARTILLERY SUPPORT USUALLY DON'T SUCCEED.

## **BOOKS:**

**Alistar Horne. VERDUN**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. Was the plan of General von Falkenhayn sound?**

**Ans: No, a battle of attrition is not a good strategy. It has never worked in military history.**

**2. Did General von Falkenhayn violate any principles of war?**

**Ans: Yes, particularly the objective. He did not want to seize territory as a tactical advantage, only to force the French into commitment of more troops which would be attrited by him.**

**3. Why did the French win?**

**Ans: It was not tactical or strategic subtlety, but rather grim determination that the Germans would not take through.**

## ***BATTLE SIX***

**BATTLE:** BRICE'S CROSS ROADS (CIVIL WAR)

**DATE:** 10 June 1864

**LOCATION:** NORTH EASTERN MISSISSIPPI NEAR THE TOWN OF CORINTH

**ANTAGONISTS:** CONFEDERATE CAVALRY LED BY MAJOR GENERAL NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST AND A UNION ARMY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL STURGIS

**WEATHER:** DRY, WARM, SOME RAIN BEFORE THE BATTLE

**TERRAIN:** THE CROSSROADS ARE OPEN GROUND, BUT THE ROAD FROM MEMPHIS THAT STURGIS' ARMY WAS USING TO GET TO THE AREA WAS NARROW AND HEAVY FOREST/SWAMPS WERE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. VERY RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN EXCEPT AT THE CROSSROADS

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN WANTED TO INSURE THAT HIS SUPPLY LINES WOULD BE FREE FROM INTERFERENCE BY CONFEDERATE RAIDERS -- THAT IS, BEDFORD FORREST. HE CREATED AN ARMY OF 10,000 SOLDIERS (OF WHOM, 4,000 WERE CAVALRY) UNDER MAJOR GENERAL STURGIS, AND GAVE STURGIS A SIMPLE ORDER -- FOLLOW FORREST, PIN HIM DOWN, ATTACK, AND DESTROY FORREST. GENERALS STURGIS MARCHED HIS ARMY OUT OF MEMPHIS IN CONCERT WITH SHERMAN'S MOVE FROM CHATTANOOGA IN MAY, 1864. THE CONFEDERATES KNEW THROUGH THEIR INTELLIGENCE THAT STURGIS WAS COMING, AND WHAT HIS OPERATIONAL ORDERS WERE. THEREFORE, FORREST LOOKED FOR GOOD TERRAIN TO USE HIS SMALLER ARMY (4,000) TO BEST ADVANTAGE. HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN HAVING LIVED IN THE AREA FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. FORREST REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF BRICE'S CROSSROADS, SO HE ORDERED HIS LEAD ELEMENTS TO MAKE FOR THE CROSSROADS AND HOLD IT. HOWEVER, THE UNION CAVALRY DIVISION UNDER BRIGADIER GENERAL GRIERSON ALREADY REACHED THE AREA WHEN FORREST AND HIS LEAD ELEMENTS ARRIVED. THIS DID NOT DETER THE CONFEDERATE COMMANDER, AND HE ATTACKED VIGOROUSLY. SO MUCH SO THAT ONE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS UNDER GRIERSON ASKED TO BE RELIEVED. STURGIS COULD NOT BRING HIS FIREPOWER TO BEAR BECAUSE HIS ARMY WAS STRUNG OUT ALONG THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS WITH NO AREA OF DEPLOY. FORREST ATTACKED THE UNION FLANKS AND AS HE PREPARED FOR A FINAL ASSAULT ON THE UNION CENTER, HE SENT A BATTALION OF TENNESSEE CAVALRY ON A WIDE AXIS TO THE REAR OF STURGIS' ARMY, AND THEY ATTACKED IN CONJUNCTION WITH FORREST'S FINAL ASSAULT ON THE CAVALRY DIVISION WHICH HAD BEEN FORCED BACK

**ALMOST PAST THE CROSSROADS. THE SUDDEN ATTACK BY THE WIDE SWINGING BATTALION BROKE UP STURGIS' ARMY, AND THE CAVALRY OF GRIERSON FOUGHT A REAR GUARD ACTION, BUT THE INFANTRY FLED AS FAST AS THEY COULD RUN. SOME SOLDIERS DIDN'T STOP RUNNING UNTIL THEY REACHED MEMPHIS. FORREST'S ARMY CAPTURED THE ENTIRE 16 GUN ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE UNION PLUS THE BALANCE OF THEIR WAGON TRAIN WITH THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION AND FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES. IT WAS A MAJOR DISASTER, AND SHERMAN WAS NOT PLEASED TO HEAR OF IT. HE QUICKLY RELIEVED STURGIS IN DISGRACE, AND RECONSTITUTED THE ARMY AND SENT IT OUT AGAIN, BUT FORREST MANAGED TO ELUDE ALL PURSUIT AND CONTINUED TO HARASS SHERMAN'S SUPPLY LINES AS THE UNION CLOSED IN ON ATLANTA.**

## **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**TERRAIN IS KEY**

**KEEP THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE**

**STRIKE AT THE RIGHT PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT**

**IT'S NOT THE SIZE OF THE ATTACK, BUT THE TIMING**

## **BOOKS:**

**Andrew Wyeth. THAT DEVIL FORREST  
BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOLUME IV**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. What principles did Sturgis violate:**

**Ans:**

**Mass -- his much larger army was strung out along a narrow road with only about 30% fighting the bulk of General Forrest's forces**

**Maneuver -- he allowed himself to get his army into a position where it was confined to a narrow road, and could not maneuver off the road very easily to attack the Confederates.**

**Objective -- his objective WAS Forrest's army, and that he found. But, he was not able to achieve his objective because he was maneuvered into this tight spot**

**Security -- he allowed the Confederates to flank and move deep into his rear without warning**

**2. Why was General Forrest so successful?**

**Ans:**

**He knew the terrain and picked the battlefield. Once he had fixed the leading cavalry division of the Union forces, he moved around their flank to attack the rear in conjunction with a final attack to his front. He knew or felt that the Union cavalry was about to give way because of the hammer blows of his attack. He knew one push would force them back. He picked the right tactical time to launch his operation.**

**3. Was Sherman's strategy sound?**

**Ans: In the main yes. It benefited him greatly to have his rear quiet as he moved toward Atlanta. The Confederates could destroy or damage his logistical lifeline, and that was critical to his success. Therefore, any steps he took to guard this lifeline were good. He erred in picking Sturgis to command the force.**

## **BATTLE SEVEN**

**BATTLE:** BATTLE OF TREBIA (SECOND PUNIC WAR)

**DATE:** DECEMBER , 218 B.C.

**LOCATION:** NORTH WESTERN ITALY NEAR THE BORDER BETWEEN ITALY AND FRANCE

**ANTAGONISTS:** CARTHAGINIAN ARMY UNDER HANNIBAL AND A ROMAN CONSULAR ARMY UNDER THE COUNSEL SEMPRONIS.

**TERRAIN:** ROLLING HILLS WITH SOME VEGETATION AND A RIVER (TREBIA)

**WEATHER:** COLD, WITH SNOW FLURRIES

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

BECAUSE OF ROMAN CONTROL OF THE SEA, HANNIBAL COULD NOT MOVE HIS NEARLY 80,000 MAN ARMY BY SHIP, SO THE ONLY WAY TO DO SO WAS TO MOVE THROUGH SPAIN, SOUTHERN FRANCE, AND OVER THE ALPS INTO ITALY. THE MARCH THROUGH FRANCE PUT THE CARTHAGINIANS INTO BATTLE WITH VARIOUS TRIBES IN THE AREA, AND THE MARCH OVER THE ALPS COST HANNIBAL THOUSANDS OF HIS MEN AND MOST OF HIS ELEPHANTS. WHEN THE ROMANS REACHED THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ALPS, THE MIGHTY 80,000 MAN ARMY HAD BEEN REDUCED TO LESS THAN 50,000 MEN. HANNIBAL AND HIS MUCH REDUCED ARMY HAD CROSSED THE ALPS AND HAD DESCENDED INTO THE FERTILE PLAINS OF NORTHWESTERN ITALY. IT DIDN'T TAKE LONG FOR THE ROMANS TO LEARN OF THE ARRIVE OF A CARTHAGINIAN ARMY, AND ROMAN FORCES WERE MOVED INTO POSITION TO ATTACK IT. THE FIRST ARMY TO REACH THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS WAS ONE OF THREE LEGIONS COMMANDED BY CONSUL SEMPRONIUS. HE BEGAN TO FOLLOW THE TRAIL OF THE CARTHAGINIANS. HANNIBAL HAD DECIDED TO FACE THE ROMAN ARMY, BUT HE CHOSE HIS GROUND WELL. TO HIS FRONT THE RIVER TREBIA RAN PAST. HE HAD PLACED IS ARMY IN A VALLEY SURROUNDED ON THREE SIDES BY HILLS WHICH PREVENTED A ROMAN FLANKING ATTACK. THEY WOULD HAVE TO COME AT HIM FRONTALLY. IN A DEPRESSION IN THE GROUND, A SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE RIVER, HANNIBAL HAD STATIONED 2,500 CAVALRY. AS THE ROMANS CROSSED, THEY COULD NOT SEE THE CAVALRY IN THE DEPRESSION AND SO PRESSED ON TOWARD THE CARTHAGINIAN ARMY TO THEIR FRONT. HANNIBAL DIVIDED HIS ATTACK INTO TWO PARTS. THE FIRST PART WAS TO DESTROY AND ROUT THE ROMAN CAVALRY. THIS WAS EASY BECAUSE THE ROMAN HORSES WERE NOT USED TO THE SOUNDS AND SMELL OF THE FEW ELEPHANTS THAT HANNIBAL HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM. WITH THE ROMAN CAVALRY ON BOTH FLANKS NOW ROUTED AND BEING PURSUED BY THE CARTHAGINIAN CAVALRY, BOTH INFANTRY LINES JOINED, AND THE FIGHT WAS HEAVY. HOWEVER, EVEN

**THOUGH THE ROMANS HELD THEIR OWN, THE CARTHAGINIAN CAVALRY RETURNED, BUT JUST BEFORE THEY DID, THE 2,500 CAVALRY HIDDEN IN THE DEPRESSION ATTACKED THE ROMANS IN THE REAR. THIS TWIN ATTACK BROKE THE ROMAN COHESION, AND SEMPRONIUS AND HIS ARMY WERE ROUTED WITH HEAVY LOSSES. THIS DEFEAT IMMEDIATELY GOT THE ATTENTION OF THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT. THEY HAD, HERETOFORE, TAKEN SUCH ACTIONS VERY LIGHTLY. THERE WAS SOME CAUSE FOR CONCERN.**

## **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**CHOOSE TERRAIN TO FIT THE PLAN OF ATTACK**

**REMEMBER SECURITY WHEN MARCHING TO BATTLE**

**ATTACKS IN THE ENEMY'S REAR ARE IMPORTANT, BUT ESPECIALLY SO IF THEY ARE COMBINED WITH OTHER ATTACKS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY AT THE BEST PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME**

**MASS WHERE YOU INTEND THE DECISIVE BREAKTHROUGH**

## **BOOKS:**

**Thomas Africa. IMMENSE MAJESTY: A HISTORY OF ROME**

**Lynn Montross. WAR THROUGH THE AGES**

**J. F. C. Fuller. A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD**

## **QUESTIONS:**

### **1. What principles did Sempronius violate?**

**Ans:** Principally that of security. He did not detect the Carthaginian cavalry lying to his rear. He also did not have an objective save to attack the enemy to his front. He did not maneuver much to gain better position.

### **2. Who had the better ground on which to fight?**

**Ans:** On the face of it, the Romans did. Hannibal placed his army with its back to a hill mass, so that if he was defeated, he would have no easy means of retreat. The Romans had marched up toward Hannibal and they did not have their backs to any natural obstacle. Hannibal had chosen his battlefield well. He placed his army in an area where the Romans could not flank him, nor get behind him. They had to attack straight on. Hannibal also placed a small force of cavalry to surprise the Romans. He was, correctly, counting on their sudden appearance to unnerve the Romans, and break their front.

## ***BATTLE EIGHT***

**BATTLE:** SECOND MANASSAS (CIVIL WAR)

**DATE:** 29-30 AUGUST, 1862

**LOCATION:** OUTSIDE OF THE CITY OF MANASSAS, VIRGINIA, MIDWAY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND RICHMOND

**ANTAGONISTS:** ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA UNDER GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND THE UNION ARMY OF VIRGINIA COMMANDED BY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE

**WEATHER:** FAIR, NO RAIN, WARM, LITTLE WIND

**TERRAIN:** ROLLING FARMLAND DOTTED WITH BUNCHES OF TREES

### **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

GENERAL LEE, HAVING CREATED THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, TRAPPED THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AFTER THE SEVEN DAYS CAMPAIGN, AND DECIDED, WITH MCCLELLAN AND HIS ARMY AT HARRISONS' LANDING ON THE JAMES RIVER AND CONTAINED, TO MOVE THE BULK OF HIS ARMY NORTH AGAINST THE 50,000 MAN ARMY OF VIRGINIA LED BY THE AGGRESSIVE GENERAL JOHN POPE. POPE MOVED HIS ARMY TOWARD LEE, AND THERE OCCURRED A BIT OF POSITIONAL MARCHING BACK AND FORCE WITH BOTH SIDES ATTEMPTING TO TRAP THE OTHER. LEE, IN A BOLD MOVE, SEND THE CORPS OF GENERAL THOMAS JACKSON AROUND THE FLANK OF POPE'S ARMY USING THE BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAINS AS A SCREEN. JACKSON'S MARCH TOOK POPE BY SURPRISE AS HE HAD NO ONE STATIONED IN THOROUGHFARE GAP. POPE'S REAR SUPPLY DEPOT WAS AT MANASSAS JUNCTION, AND THE FIRST NEWS THAT POPE HAD CONFEDERATES WERE IN HIS REAR WAS WHEN THE TELEGRAPH LINE WENT DEAD. GENERAL POPE BELIEVED IT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN CONFEDERATE CAVALRY, SO HE SENT A SMALL BRIGADE TO CHASE THEM AWAY, AND THE BRIGADE WAS DESTROYED BY A DIVISION OF JACKSON'S CORPS. THE ENTIRE MANASSAS DEPOT HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE CONFEDERATES WITH NEARLY 10 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF EQUIPMENT. WHAT THE CONFEDERATES COULD NOT EAT OR CARRY, THEY BURNED. JACKSON THEN TOOK HIS TROOPS AWAY FROM MANASSAS JUNCTION AND ARRAYED THEM BEHIND A RAILROAD CUT AND SOME LOW HILLS NEAR THE OLD MANASSAS BATTLEFIELD. GENERAL POPE BELIEVED THAT HE COULD TRAP AND DESTROY THIS LONE CONFEDERATE CORPS BEFORE LEE COULD ARRIVE. LINCOLN HAD DIRECTED GENERAL MCCLELLAN TO SEND PORTIONS OF HIS ARMY TO HELP POPE AND FITZ JOHN PORTER'S CORPS WAS SENT TO WASHINGTON TO JOIN POPE. BY NOW, THE UNION ARMY HAD FOUND JACKSON BEHIND HIS RAILROAD CUT, AND POPE THREW HIS ARMY PIECEMEAL AT JACKSON. ALTHOUGH PUSHED FROM TIME TO TIME, AND OUT OF AMMUNITION AT ONE POINT WHERE CONFEDERATES WERE THROWING ROCKS AT THE UNION ATTACKERS, JACKSON HELD.

**LONGSTREET'S CORPS POURED THROUGH THOROUGHFARE GAP AND WAS MASTERFULLY DELAYED BY THE CAVALRY DIVISION OF BG JOHN BUFORD, BUT APPARENTLY POPE DID NOT GRASP THE DANGER TO HIS LEFT FLANK. LONGSTREET FELL ON IT TOWARDS EVENING OF THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE, AND CRUSHED THE UNION ARMY. POPE WAS ABLE TO GET MOST OF HIS FORCES AWAY, AND THIS DENIED LEE A GREAT VICTORY. GENERAL POPE WAS RELIEVED OF COMMAND, AND GENERAL MCCLELLAN PUT BACK IN CHARGE. LEE DECIDED IT WAS NOW TIME TO CARRY THE WAR TO THE NORTH WHICH HE DID.**

## **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**MASS BEFORE ATTACKING**

**GUARD YOUR FLANKS**

**FIND AND FIX THE ENEMY, BUT DO NOT LET THE ENEMY DICTATE TERMS OF THE ENGAGEMENT**

**MANEUVER FOR BETTER POSITION**

**SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ENEMY IS IN FRONT DOES NOT MEAN AN ATTACK IS NECESSARY**

**DELAY USING A SMALLER FORCE AGAINST A LARGER ONE IS AN ART THAT FEW POSSESS.**

## **BOOKS:**

**John Hennessey. RETURN TO BULL RUN**

**Douglas Southhall Freeman. LEE'S LIEUTENANTS, VOLUME II**

**Fletcher Pratt. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR**

## **QUESTIONS**

**1. Where did Pope make his major mistakes?**

**Ans> attacking the Confederates on ground of their own choosing, and not paying enough attention to the vulnerability of his left flank. All day, the cavalry division of BG Buford had been holding off Longstreet very successfully. However, that was a time when Longstreet's corps fell on the Federal's open flank and routed General Pope.**

**2. Did Lee attain all he had hoped for at the beginning of the campaign?**

**Ans: No, because he wanted to utterly destroy pope. He got something much less as the remaining force managed to get back without heavy losses. Although the Union was decisively defeated, the army was still basically in-tact, and thus Lee was required to do a tap dance to keep his army's numbers up.**

**BATTLE:** TARAWA (WORLD WAR II)

**DATE:** 20-23 NOVEMBER 1943

**LOCATION:** ISLAND LAGOON IN THE GILBERT ISLANDS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC

**WEATHER:** HOT, NO RAIN, NO WIND

**TERRAIN:** A FLAT ISLAND WITH SOME VEGETATION AND PALM TREES

**ANTAGONISTS:** MARINES OF THE 2ND MARINE DIVISION AND JAPANESE MARINES OF THE 7TH SASEBO SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCE

## **SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

IN 1942, AMERICAN MARINES COMMANDED BY COLONEL EVANS CARLSON ATTACKED THE ISLAND OF MAKIN. AFTER RAISING SOME HELL, THE MARINES DEPARTED, AND THE ATTACK GARNERED FAVORABLE HEADLINES WHEN FEW HEADLINES WERE HAPPY ONES. HOWEVER, THE JAPANESE DID AN AAR AFTER MAKIN, AND THEY REALIZED THAT THEIR GILBERT ISLAND DEFENSES WERE WEAK. ONE AREA THE JAPANESE GARRISONED WAS THE ISLAND CHAIN OF TARAWA (SPECIFICALLY THE ISLAND OF BETIO). ADMIRAL KEJII SHIBASAKI WAS SENT TO FORTIFY THE ISLAND AND THIS HE DID. HE BUILD HUNDREDS OF BUNKERS, SPIDER HOLES, CONCRETE EMPLACEMENTS, ANTI-BOAT DEFENSES. THE ISLAND, AFTER SHIBASAKI GOT THROUGH WITH HIS WORK, WAS A FORTRESS. AMERICAN STRATEGY WAS BASED ON "ISLAND HOPPING AND USING ISLANDS SEIZED AS LOGISTICAL AND AIR BASES FOR ASSAULTS ON THE NEXT CHAIN OF ISLANDS. THAT WAY, THE U.S. WOULD FIGHT ITS WAY ACROSS THE PACIFIC TO THE JAPANESE HOME ISLAND -- THE FOCAL POINT OF THE STRATEGY. DEFEAT JAPAN. TARAWA WAS POSSESSED OF A HUGE NATURAL FLEET HARBOR PROTECTED BY CORAL REEFS. THE JAPANESE HAD ALREADY BUILT AND AIRFIELD ON THE ISLAND OF BETIO AND THE U.S. INTENDED TO DO THE SAME. THE SEIZURE OF BETIO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 2ND MARINE DIVISION. IT WAS A NEW OUTFIT, BUT WITH A LEAVENING OF EXPERIENCED COMBAT MARINES. THE NAVY ASSURED THE MARINES THAT ITS PRE-INVASION BOMBARDMENT WOULD DESTROY JAPANESE DEFENSES AND MAKE THE LANDINGS A WALK-OVER. FOR TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE INVASION, BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS AND AIRCRAFT SHELLS AND BOMBED THE ISLAND. THOSE WITNESSING THE BOMBARDMENT WERE CONVINCED THAT NO JAPANESE COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE BOMBARDMENT. ACTUALLY, THE JAPANESE WERE SO WELL DUG-IN THAT THEY SUFFERED RELATIVELY LIGHT CASUALTIES. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE MARINES WOULD USE AMPHIBIOUS TRACTORS -- CALLED BUFFALOES -- IN THE ATTACK. THE JAPANESE EXPECTED THE MARINES TO COME IN ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE ISLAND WHICH HAD NO REEFS AND THEY POSITIONED THEIR DEFENSES IN THAT DIRECTION. WHEN THE FIRST WAVE -- COMMANDED BY COL. DAVID M. SHOUP -- BEGAN LANDING, THEIR AMTRACKS WENT OVER THE REEFS -- THIS

**SURPRISED THE JAPANESE, AND THEY RADIOED TOKYO ABOUT THESE UNUSUAL VEHICLES THEY HAD SEEN. WHEN THE AMTRACKS APPROACHED WITHIN TWO HUNDRED YARDS OF THE BEACHES, THE JAPANESE POURED IN A DEVASTATING FIRE OF 37MM, MORTAR AND MACHINE GUNS. TRACKS WERE HIT AND BLEW UP. SOME SANK RIGHT IN THE LAGOON, AND THOSE THAT SURVIVED HIT THE BEACH, BUT THE MARINES WERE KILLED BY THE HUNDREDS AS THEY EXITED THE AMTRACKS. FOLLOW-ON WAVES WERE SUPPOSED TO BE SHUTTLED BY THE AMTRACKS TO THE BEACH FROM THE REEF, BUT SO MANY HAD BEEN HIT THAT THE TROOPS HAD TO WADE IN FROM THE REEF -- ABOUT 800 YARDS UNDER CONSTANT FIRE. MANY WERE WOUNDED OR KILLED AND DROWNED. AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY, COL. SHOUP HAD TO RADIO THE TASK FORCE COMMANDERS THAT THE "ISSUE WAS IN DOUBT." ON THE FIRST NIGHT AT TARAUA, THE NUMBER OF MARINES ALIVE AND MOVING ON THE BEACH IT TOOK THE MARINES TWO MORE DAYS TO SUBDUED THE JAPANESE GARRISON. IN DEAD ALONE, MORE THAN 900 MARINES DIED TO SEIZE AND ISLAND ROUGHLY A MILE WIDE AND THREE MILES LONG.**

## **LESSONS LEARNED:**

**FORTIFICATIONS CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY FIREPOWER ALONE**

**DO NOT LIFT SUPPORTING FIRES UNTIL THE FIRST WAVES ARE ON THE BEACH**

**MAKE SURE INTELLIGENCE IS ACCURATE BEFORE PLANNING**

**DO NOT INTRODUCE NEW EQUIPMENT WITHOUT EXTENSIVE TESTING**

## **BOOKS:**

**Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC. UTMOST SAVAGERY: THE THREE DAYS OF TARAUA**

**Eric Hammel. 76 HOURS: THE INVASION OF TARAUA**

**Robert Sherrod. TARAUA: THE STORY OF A BATTLE**

**Marine Corps Historical Center. THE BATTLE OF TARAUA (Campaign Monograph)**

## **QUESTIONS:**

**1. What major mistakes did the Japanese make in defending Tarawa?**

**Ans.** For assuming that the coral reefs covering most of one side of Betio would keep troops from attacking. However, the Japanese gun positions were put in locations where they had almost 360 degree traverse. The island was flat, and no masking of fire was a problem. The Japanese did not counter-attack during the first evening -- they were apparently unorganized because of the bombardment. However, the number of Marines (live) that were on the island were smaller than the surviving members of the Japanese garrison. A counter-attack would have wiped out the marines and forced another attempt to a direct landing.

**2. What enabled the Marines to win inspite of their losses?**

**Ans.** The Marines had a high number of experienced NCOs. That is, those men who had spent long years in the corps. When their officers were killed or wounded, these NCOs could step in and lead well -- which they did.

## **BATTLE 10**

**BATTLE: BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CIVIL WAR)**

**LOCATION: TOWN OF FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA (MID-VIRGINIA ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER)**

**ANTAGONISTS: UNION ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AND THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA**

**WEATHER: COLD, WINTER-LIKE, SOME RAIN, TEMPERATURES IN 50'S**

**TERRAIN: FLAT TERRAIN EXCEPT FOR MARYE'S HEIGHTS. LARGE DITCH MIDWAY BETWEEN MARYE'S HEIGHTS AND THE TOWN OF FREDERICKSBURG.**

**SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE:**

UNION GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE WAS GIVEN COMMAND IN NOVEMBER, 1862 WHEN LINCOLN REMOVED GENERAL MCCLELLAN. BURNSIDE, KNOWING THAT LINCOLN WANTED SOME AGGRESSIVE MOVES, FORMULATED A PLAN TO GET BEHIND LEE BY MOVING ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER THROUGH FREDERICKSBURG. BURNSIDE COMMANDED AN ARMY OF 120,000 MEN BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THE 70,000 LEE COMMANDED. THE PLAN REQUIRED A QUICK PASSAGE OF THE RIVER, BUT BECAUSE THE PONTOON BOATS DID NOT ARRIVE -- THEY WERE FAR BACK IN THE COLUMN, AND THE CROSSING HAD TO BE POSTPONED SEVERAL DAYS. THE CONFEDERATES, REACTING QUICKLY TO AN ATTEMPT TO TURN THEIR FLANK ARRIVED IN FREDERICKSBURG BEFORE THE PONTOONS DID, AND AS UNION ARMY ENGINEERS ATTEMPTED TO BUILD BRIDGES, CONFEDERATE RIFLE FIRE HALTED BUILDING OF THE PONTOON BRIDGES. ARTILLERY SHELLED THE TOWN, BUT DID NOT STOP THE FIRING, SO A BRIGADE OF INFANTRY CROSS TO THE SOUTH BANK AND DROVE OFF THE CONFEDERATE RIFLEMEN FROM BARKSDALE'S MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE. A TOTAL OF SIX BRIDGES WERE QUICKLY BUILT, AND THE UNION ARMY POURED INTO FREDERICKSBURG. THE CONFEDERATES HAD TAKEN A POSITION ALONG A RIDGE LINE OUTSIDE OF TOWN -- ABOUT 3/4 MILE DISTANT. THE ANCHOR OF THE CONFEDERATE LINES WAS MARYE'S HEIGHTS -- NAMED FOR THE MARYE'S FAMILY MANSION ON THE TOP OF THE HILL. THE MANSION HAD A STONE WALL IN FRONT OF IT FACING THE TOWN AND THE CONFEDERATES BUILT SHALLOW TRENCHES BEHIND THE WALL GIVING THEM A HEAVILY DEFENDED POSITION. BURNISDE CHOSE TO ATTACK THE HILL DIRECTLY, AND MARSHALED TWO OF HIS GRAND DIVISIONS (EACH HAD THE STRENGTH OF TWO ARMY CORPS), AND SENT DENSE MASSES OF INFANTRY AGAINST THE STONE WALL. THE UNION FORCES CHARGED UP TO 12 SEPARATE TIMES, BUT THE FIRE FROM THE CONFEDERATES AT THE TOP OF THE HILL WAS SO DEVASTATING THAT NO LIVING FEDERAL GOT WITHIN 50 FEET OF THE WALL. MORE THAN 10,000 UNION TROOPS LAY DEAD OR WOUNDED IN THIS AREA BEFORE BURNSIDE CALLED OFF HIS ATTACKS. THE GRAND DIVISION OF MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN ACTUALLY MADE A EASY PENETRATION IN JACKSON'S CORPS, BUT WITHOUT REINFORCEMENTS, THE CONFEDERATES PUSHED BACK THE UNION UNITS AND STOPPED WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A PROMISING ASSAULT. THAT NIGHT, BURNSIDE HAD A CONFERENCE WITH HIS DIVISION AND CORPS COMMANDERS AND COULD THINK ONLY OF ATTACKING IN THE SAME PLACES

**AGAIN, BUT THIS TIME, BURNISDE WOULD PERSONALLY LEAD THE ATTACK. HE WAS QUICKLY TALKED OUT OF IT, AND THE NEXT DAY, THE UNION ARMY BEGAN A WITHDRAWAL. AT A COST OF LESS THAN 2,000 SOLDIERS, LEE HAD INFLICTED A MAJOR DEFEAT, BUT EVEN WITH LOSSES IN THE ATTACKS SUBTRACTED, THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC STILL STOOD 100,000 STRONG. THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARMY WAS RUINED AND GENERALS BEGAN TO PLOT WAYS TO GET RID OF GENERAL BURNSIDE.**

**LESSONS LEARNED:**

**DIRECT ASSAULTS ARE NOT ADVISABLE**

**WHEN THE ENEMY IS FORTIFIED WITH AMPLE FIREPOWER, NO ASSAULT CAN NORMALLY CARRY SUCH A POSITION**

**CONSIDER MORE FLEXIBLE IDEAS WHEN TERRAIN DOES NOT FIT THE ATTACK PROFILE**

**BOOKS:**

**Major General Edward Stackpole. DRAMA ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK: THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN**

**BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR, VOLUME II**

## **QUESTIONS:**

**1. What mistakes did Burnside make that lead to the disaster at Fredericksburg?**

**Ans:** The pontoons for the bridges were far back in the march column. It took 48 hours for them to show up, and this gave Lee the time he needed to move his army to Fredericksburg and to occupy the key terrain west of the city. Rather than maneuver, Burnside then brought his army across the river and attacked the hills directly -- very few attacks against strongly held fortifications ever worked (i.e., Cold Harbor, Fort Wagner, Chickasaw Bluffs, Vicksburg).

**2. Did Lee make any mistakes in the battle?**

**Ans:** Yes. He did not follow up on his victory. The Union army had been badly demoralized by the action, and was vulnerable. Burnside was so unsure of himself that pressure of any kind would have probably caused him to make serious mistakes. Lee allowed Burnside to retire unmolested. He should have conducted a vigorous pursuit. He did not.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**IN THE PRESENCE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**

**THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE COMMAND SYSTEMS IN THE  
WILDERNESS**

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In the most recent past, the commanders-in-chief of various areas have always dealt largely with strategic visions and a wide-angle view of the conflict. Field commanders have always dealt with the intricacies of tactical decision making and maneuver. History seems to show that in the main, this works when commanders occupy their orbits of decision making and do not directly interfere with what is going on outside of their area.

In May of 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was about to change all that. Named by Lincoln and by the Congress as a Lieutenant General [the rank had been revived specially to allow Grant the rank to command the entire Union army] and commander-in-chief of the Federal military, the new CINC had chosen to make his headquarters in the field and co-locate it with the command and staff of the Army of the Potomac commanded by Major General George G. Meade.

We do not know Meade's true feelings, and while both men got along well from their first meeting, Meade cannot have felt comfortable with this arrangement. Grant was, in effect, looking over his shoulder. The Federal CINC was not peering over the shoulder of his chief lieutenant as he campaigned against Joe Johnston in Georgia, nor over any of the other Federal Army commanders [i.e., Major General Banks, Major General Sigel] who were also part of the grand strategic plan. Meade could not have felt "honored" by Grant's presence. There had to be doubt in Meade's mind.

That there was doubt in Lincoln's mind was evident by his attitude toward Meade after he let Lee's battered army get away from the Union forces after the Battle of Gettysburg. The

President was not at all pleased with Meade's handling of the pursuit, and said so with, if those historians who know Lincoln best are accurate, some passion. Grant knew Sherman and they had worked together well through much of the past eighteen months. Of the western theater, Grant had no doubt, but Meade was new to him, and like his President, Grant was not totally "sold" on Meade as the commander.

The Army of the Potomac consisted of three large corps, and one independent corps. That corps, composed of around 14,000 soldiers was under Ambrose E. Burnside. That this general was senior to Meade probably caused the unique arrangement that treated the IX Corps as a separate entity reporting DIRECTLY to Grant and not to Meade. If he [Meade] wanted to order the IX Corps to do something, he had to go through Grant. How funny people are about egos and position vis-a vis others. This somewhat unique command system was a way to avoid a clash of egos between Meade and Burnside. Burnside would not have willingly served under a man who was junior to him even though both men held the same rank. The split command was a sop to Burnside's ego, but it didn't make good tactical sense.

In reality, the Confederacy's CINC was not in the field, but in Richmond -- Jefferson Davis. The two men saw eye-to-eye and had a basically sound relationship. Both trusted the other completely, and Lee saw to it that Davis was kept fully informed of his [Lee's] plans. Not that it mattered much. Both knew that Lee had few alternatives but the defense against the far stronger Union army. But Lee was so much in command that Davis would never have overruled him, and Lee could do pretty much what he wanted tactically. As to the three corps commanders -- Ewell, Powell Hill and Longstreet -- they were "Lee's men", and fully loyal to him. No problem here, Lee himself dealt with no split commands. There was some dissonance in the Army of Northern Virginia; but it was no where near as much as in the Union Army.

An army is much like the human body. It receives signals just as muscle and body parts do, and reacts to those signals. If you want to increase your running speed, the mind sends out the appropriate commands to the heart and then to the leg muscles to move faster. The same for both armies, yet, when the Union forces began moving into the Wilderness area, they moved far too slowly. The fault for the slow movement of the army lay in two areas: the drafting of the

orders my Meade's staff which did not particularly underline haste, and the handling of the cavalry. Meade had preferred to use his cavalry to screen and to guard the wagons.

The three divisions of cavalry did not handle their respective chores very well, and this again was Meade's fault. This was especially true of James H. Wilson's cavalry division which was supposed to insure that the federal were not surprised by the Confederates, but Wilson managed to get his division sandwiched between Ewell and Hill that he had to take the long way around to get back to the Union army, and he was not able to warn the Union army of the oncoming Rebel army until it was too late.

His corps commanders were also Meade's picks, and seemed to be rock solid. Major General Hancock, Major General Warren, and Major General Sedgewick were all apparently solid performers; Warren was particularly well thought of by both Grant and Meade, and Grant had considered him a potential candidate for Army command should Meade need replacement.

Warren had been at the right place and the right time at Gettysburg. As a corps commander he was probably over his head, but there he was. Although confident in his letters to friends and family prior to the armies moving in motion. But when his corps, which was the lead element of the army, was directed to form and attack, Warren did not act quickly. Part of the problem of moving quickly was the terrain. The dense thickets and underbrush were so confining that it was difficult to form the line of battle. Also, Warren was only half thinking for himself. He received a message from one of his divisional commanders occupying the area of the Chewning Farm. This was one of the key areas of the battle of the wilderness and Warren was about to give it to the Confederates. It took so long for Warren to move his units into position that the normally placid Grant began to get agitated that nothing had happened. He wanted to strike the Confederates and now, and Warren, the key player in this tactical drama had not yet moved.

Lee, on the other hand, had no problem with his two corps commanders. They had been told to delay the federals until Longstreet came up, but that proved impractical, so they set up a positional defense using the naturally restrictive terrain of the Wilderness to negate the large Union forces. For two days, they performed this masterfully. Although the Army of the Potomac had suffered severe casualties, so did Lee, and Lee did not have the strength to make up his losses.

As the two day battle unfolded, Grant could not have been overly pleased with Meade's performance. As the fight continued and expanded, Grant began to take a direct hand and issue orders directly to Meade's people. That this violated the chain of command was obvious, and that Meade sat there and took it was also obvious. Grant did not do it often, nor did he take over the direction of the battle from Meade in any way. Usually, his headquarters was not co-located in a geographical sense with Meade's, but they were only short distances apart, and Grant would often go over to Meade's area to check on the situation. During most of the terrible battles in the Wilderness, Grant sat smoking endless cigars and whittling with a knife. He did not ride around the battlefield, nor encourage his troops by his presence.

Lee, on the other hand, was all over the battlefield, and as a result, he was able to get a far better perspective of the action. The two officers were fully in character. With Grant it was not a matter of physical courage. He had demonstrated that before. That was just his style. To give general orders, like Lee did, and let Meade supervise the execution. Lee did the same, but remained in the area to help when required. The Confederate commander rarely overruled a commander on the scene.

Would Meade have continued the fight after the Wilderness and go on to Spottsylvania as Grant did Or would he have marched the army back over the camps it had just left? If what the army did depended on Meade's judgement alone with Helleck rather than Grant in charge, Meade might have done so, but with Grant present, there would be no turning back, and he made that clear to Meade before the campaign started. Also Meade's tactical objective was also made clear -- Lee and his army.

Clearly with Meade alone, Lee might have damaged the Union army enough to force a retreat. Meade simply was not his equal. Grant wasn't Lee tactical equal either, but he was stubborn and was not to be deterred. That streak had done him well at Shiloh and at Vicksburg, and here as well. The Union had adopted a more elementary strategy for which they held the upper card -- attrition. As the campaign dragged on, the Union strength did not abate much, but Lee's army bled to death.

The command arrangements, while they caused the Union army's plans in the Wilderness and elsewhere to misfire, Grant and Meade worked together for the rest of the war in general

harmony although there were times, particularly at Petersburg during the "crater" action, that Grant had, apparently, considered removing Meade. Few Commanders in history have been placed in such a difficult position as Meade

He had to fight a campaign against one of the best generals this nation has produced and in terrain which negated to a considerable degree his [Meade's] military with the CINC looking over his shoulder. With different people, this would not have worked, and the campaign stopped because of it. There can be no doubt, though, if Meade had really faltered, Grant was quite capable enough of removing him [although why he waited so long to remove Warren from his corps command when his performance in the Wilderness and afterwards was suspect, is beyond most historians].

The outcome from the Union side for this unusual command arrangement worked reasonably well. I would, however, on the basis of this and previous history, advise against a repetition of this in the future. Given egos like those of MacArthur and Patton, that's the recipe for a real disaster.

Lee's command system worked extremely well. Where the problem lay is that when his commanders were incapacitated, there were few of equal caliber to take their places, and Lee began to sadly discover that there were not that many "Stonewall" Jacksons in his army. This, in the end, hampered Lee's aggressive style of leadership as much as his lack of personnel to execute that type of strategy. Yet, in the long run, had he sufficiently high caliber leaders available, his style would have been more preferable and generally successful than the federals as it would be today.

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**BRIEFING PAPER**

**THE ART OF CHOOSING WHERE YOU FIGHT --  
LESSONS FROM THE WILDERNESS**

The Battle of the Wilderness in early May 1864 is a prime example of the loss of initiative in allowing the enemy to pick and choose the place where he wants to fight. At the beginning of the campaign, Grant had over 100,000 men available for action. Lee had barely 60,000 of which only 35,000 was available for action. Longstreet's Corps was further south, and did not join the fighting until the second day of the battle.

There were several ways that Grant could attack Lee. He could use McClellan's old plan of going to the Peninsula and attacking Richmond from the South. Grant could also attempt to directly attack Lee by a smaller turning movement centered on the Mine Run area, or he could turn Lee's flank by going through the Wilderness and coming out into open territory on the other side.

Grant had the initiative as to when he would begin in movement. The Confederates had to sit and wait. Since Lee had lost so many men in combat at Gettysburg, his army no longer had the option of taking any type of strategical offensive. Although Lee would have preferred to do this, he had to write and tell Jefferson Davis that he had to revert to the defensive. The Federals had just too many men for Lee to attempt an assault at Grant except at the local level.

To his credit, Grant understood that Lee could meet him anywhere along his turning movement. The Confederates were quick and agile on the march, and their supply train was nowhere as large, slow, or bulky as Grant's. In the previous campaign in the winter of 1864, General Meade had attempted one last campaign before the weather made fighting impossible, but Lee simply blocked him at Mine Run, and the Federals, mindful of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, chose not to attack a strongly fortified line. Meade withdrew into winter quarters.

Unlike other Theater Commanders, Grant chose to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. He had found General Meade to be a good soldier, and Grant felt he could work easily with him. Meade controlled three large corps of more than 25,000 men each, and Grant controlled a corps (Burnside's IX of 20,000 men) directly. The command system for the Federals was cumbersome as the campaign was to prove, and this system and faulty planning cost Grant dearly.

The Union was more than aware of their numerical superiority over the South. Grant was resolved to take maximum advantage of the Rebels lack of numbers. But, to do so, he had to get his Army out of the Wilderness and into the open ground to the South.

Why was the Wilderness so important. This area was largely unoccupied, and there were few open areas. The area of the Wilderness was heavily forested with considerable secondary growth. Remember, the war was basically linear in concept, and the soldiers of both sides found it difficult to form their normal battle lines in the thick tangle of woods. In addition to restricting movements of lines, the forest itself was so thick that it was nearly impossible for units to keep track of who or what was on their flanks, or what was in front of them. Since there were few maps, it was not all that difficult for units on both sides to become lost during the battle and arrive late to the people they were supposed to support.

The Union marching plan was predicated on the idea that the Union Army would be through the bulk of the Wilderness and swinging onto Lee's flank before he could move in to block. Grant did want to get out of the Wilderness before he had to give battle to Lee.

However, moving an army of over 100,000 men is no easy matter when they need to be supported by a wagon train of over 2,000 wagons and their supporting equipment. While the Union forces were moving into the Wilderness, they were vulnerable to flank attack, and moved like it. Grant did not know the exact locations of Confederate corps (Ewell's and Powell Hill's were close together and needed to move simply East along high speed avenues in order to hit the Union on the flank). He was worried particularly about Longstreet's whose Corps had left the area, and the North knew not where it was. Actually, Longstreet was in the Roanoke Area and started for the battlefield the minute that Lee discovered the Union troops were moving.

The heart of the problem was the Union cavalry. They were supposed to perform the reconnaissance function and "sniff out" where the Confederates were, and if necessary, delay them

until infantry help could arrive. But, the cavalry divisions did not perform their actions well. This was especially true of Major General James H. Wilson who was new to cavalry command, and his division was in an important area to give alarm.

The Union march schedule was also somewhat leisurely. In fact, the Union troops could have been clear of most of the Wilderness had they marched with the same quickness as their Confederate counterparts. The Union, by their slow movement, in effect, aided Lee in his general plans. The Army of Northern Virginia had to fight the Army of the Potomac in the Wilderness where the superior numbers of the North would not impact on the smaller southern force. This Lee was able to do, and the North helped Lee to bring the Army of the Potomac to battle while it was still deep in the Wilderness. Over the two days of battle, the Army of Northern Virginia fought the larger Union force to a standstill by taking advantage of the terrain and the wooded areas that channeled the Union army, and did not allow it to bring its full force to bear. Also, the Wilderness strained the somewhat makeshift nature of the Union command system, and it showed General Grant that Meade was not up to handling a battle like the Wilderness.

When the ghastly battle was over, Grant did not follow his normal pattern, but instead of moving back across the river to re-group, Grant simply moved around Lee's flanks and moved south to the area of Spottsylvania. There, similar tactics adopted by Lee in the Wilderness stopped Grant's army yet again. At no time from then until just shortly before Five Forks, could Grant bring his superior firepower and numbers to crush Lee. The pick and shovel used by his veterans was so effective that even though Lee's overall numbers dropped until his army was barely 30,000 men, he fought an army whose strength rarely dropped below 90,000 to a standstill and all Grant had to show for his efforts was a higher and higher casualty list.

This frustration was as a direct result of the earlier part of the campaign. Grant had allowed Lee to dictate the position of the battle and thus, negate Grant's direct advantages. Try as he might, Grant was never able to make up for the mistake of allowing Lee to choose the Wilderness as his first battle. The federal commander did not expect an easy campaign, but he was not in awe of Lee as much as some in his own army. He was perfectly content to take Lee on any time, any place.

The lesson here is plain. If you allow the opposition to pick the place they want to fight, you have already surrendered an important initiative and advantage to the enemy. Any advantage

that the enemy could exploit and inflict heavy losses on the U.S. Army so that it might not win the battle should be avoided. Pay attention to terrain and how it may be exploited by the opposition. Not important, you say, consider a more recent conflict. In more than 50% of the actions in South Vietnam, the enemy chose the place to fight, and forced U.S. troops to attack into locations that they had often times spent months fortifying and preparing with the consequence of considerable losses to the American troops making the assault [i.e., S. L. A. Marshall. **Battles in the Monsoon**]. American troops had to fight on unfamiliar terrain and to find enemy positions that were often so well concealed that soldiers could walk up to them and not know the enemy was but a few feet away. Even in the modern era of precision munitions, there is some salvation in terrain, the pick and the shovel.

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**STAFF RIDE**

**84<sup>TH</sup> CHEMICAL BATTALION**  
**Fort McClellan, Alabama**

**THE BATTLE OF SHILOH**  
**6-7 April 1862**

**OFFICE OF THE COMMAND HISTORIAN  
U.S. Army Chemical School  
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4 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: 84<sup>TH</sup> CHEMICAL BATTALION STAFF RIDE  
PARTICIPANTS

SUBJECT: THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN

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I. **OVERVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN**: The campaign that ended in the Battle of Shiloh (6-7) April, 1862 was one of the most important in the Civil War. It was not at the time given the credit due, but the campaign that included this battle dealt the Confederacy a death blow from which it never recovered. From the battle of Shiloh arose three of the major commanders of the Civil War – U.S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Braxton Bragg. It was also a battle in which two armies came of learned to fight – what later became the Army of the Cumberland and the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. Many of the major commanders of both of those armies fought in this battle. The lessons learned from this campaign are among the most instructive of any land battle of the war. The mistakes by both sides were so horrendous it was a wonder that there was a winner and a loser.

II. **JEFFERSON DAVIS OPTS FOR AN AREA DEFENSE**. At the beginning of the conflict, Davis decided that the operational doctrine for the Confederates would be defensive – that is, they would do nothing to the North and make no attempts to go beyond their own border. If the North moved into Southern territory, then the army the South was then in the process of mustering its strength would be used to expel them. Davis had two ways to implement his defensive scheme – concentrate his military in several key areas to beat back the North or defend everywhere and not lose a meter of Southern soil. He chose the latter. This was, of course, a grievous mistake for the simple reason that the South, being a largely agricultural nation, and having a limited male population of military age, could not develop and man the necessary military forces to

hold everywhere. Because of the geography of the South – the eastern portion is divided from the Western portion. The eastern portion would be assigned to General Joseph E. Johnston, and the western portion of General Albert S. Johnson. Although both men were reasonably competent, neither was the dynamic, powerful commander needed for the situation. Also President Davis was a poor administrator and although he wanted to micromanage the situation everywhere, there was no general staff to help him coordinate that type of management. All of the actions fell on the Confederate President's shoulders. Had he been limited to military direction, that might have worked, but Davis was also the political head of the nation. He also had to fight the problem of states rights -- the reason, so the south said, for going to war in the first place. Dr. Frank E. Vandiver, one of the best known historians of the Civil War, in his excellent monograph entitled Rebel Brass-The Confederate Command System places the blame for the lack of a coherent strategy and smooth running military machine -- both of which the south desperately needed -- squarely on the bogeyman of "states' rights".

In the east, the Northern commander was selected by Abraham Lincoln to be Major General George B. McClellan who was then in the process of building and readying the superb Army of the Potomac for action in Virginia. The West Lincoln entrusted to Major General Henry Wagner Halleck. Again, the two major Union generals were competent administrators and trainers, but not dynamic field commanders. But the difference was the Lincoln generally attempted to influence the general strategy of the war, and left implementation up to the area commanders. He [Lincoln] also had what amounted to a general staff to help him do it. Something Davis did not have. The North did not have the problem of states' rights to deal with. The constitution as the founding fathers had written it was still in force in the north which gave the central government -- that is, Lincoln and his military machine -- supreme power. Lincoln was to use it to good effect.

**III. THE LOSS OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON** {See Map 1] It is hard to describe the loss of these two forts in less than apocalyptic terms. The Confederacy lost the war in the opening months and not with the loss of Vicksburg and Lee's defeat at

Gettysburg.. When you couple the loss of New Orleans with the loss of western and central Tennessee, you already have the beginnings of a death blow. First of all, General Johnston – Albert S. that is – had problems in the administration of his large theater command. Administration was not his best point. He allowed local commanders like then Major General Leonidas Polk to run the show in their areas and most didn't do a good job.

Fort Henry, for example, was poorly sited and constructed. It did not have the natural strength of Vicksburg. It was placed in a low lying area that did not allow it to drain very well, and the guns were not sited so as to truly command the river. Ironclads or other wooden vessels could approach very close to the fort before the fort's guns could bear on the attackers. It took just one bombardment by the Union fleet commanded by Commodore Andrew Foote to persuade the garrison that further resistance was futile. The fort was quickly abandoned. So quickly that the Union Army under Grant had not yet arrived when Foote's gunboats attacked again and received no return fire. They landed a small force of naval personnel and took possession of Fort Henry. The Confederates had destroyed little and the fort fell intact into Union hands. The Union Army then moved on toward Fort Donelson which many in both the Union navy and the army thought would be an equally easy fight.

Fort Donelson was, however, a different story. It was a properly built fort that had good command of the river. When Foote's ironclads attempted to attack and defeat the fort's batteries, the ironclads received so many hits that they hastily retired back up river. In fact, Foote's flagship, the ironclad Cairo was hit numerous times, and Foote was wounded by a shell that struck the armored pilothouse. It was a wound that would eventually kill him several months later. It would now be up to the army to take the fort, and Grant's Army moved in to begin siege operations.

The Confederate problem here had nothing to do with the strength of the fort, but with the strength of leadership within it. There were three Confederate generals within the fort, and a garrison of up to 25,000 men manning strong field works on the land side and powerful water batteries. As Grant's Army surrounded the fort, the three generals inside – BG Gideon Pillow, BG, and BG Simon B. Buckner were at a loss of what to do. They

could either remain within the substantial works and fight it out, or attempt a breakout. After much discussion, the generals first decided on a breakout. During this operation, they came within a “whisker” of actually punching a hole through Grant’s lines surrounding the fort. Only hard fighting by the division of Major General Lew Wallace saved the situation. The reason for this fiasco was that the Confederate Generals did not coordinate their efforts, and as a result, did not commit their full force. When the breakthrough was not made, the Confederates retreated back into their lines. A flag of truce was then sent to Grant asking for terms. His reply has become famous in American military history – “No surrender except unconditional surrender. I intend to move immediately on your works”. Two of the three Confederate generals abandoned the fort leaving the most junior [the reason was that both had occupied positions in the federal government just prior to secession, and believed that the Union forces would deal with them as traitors. Incidentally, neither man ever occupied a command again], Simon Buckner was left in charge and decided to surrender even though there was an ample supply of ammunition and food. Colonel Nathan B. Forrest did not want to surrender and said so to Buckner. He was given permission to attempt a breakout and this he did, going through a swamp which the Union army had thought impassable.

With the surrender of the 25,000 man garrison and the loss of the weapons and cannon within the fort the Confederacy had suffered a catastrophic defeat. Although the losses in manpower and equipment were serious, the loss of terrain and position was far greater.

The loss of Donelson led directly to a move by a Union army on Nashville [that of Major General Don Carlos Buell], and its evacuation by Confederate forces. In one swift stroke, almost 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of the vital state of Tennessee was abandoned to the Union with little or no resistance..

Realizing that the situation had begun to spin out of control, General Albert S. Johnson decided to personally take charge of the defense, and he ordered a concentration of his military forces – heretofore spread out to defend as much territory as possible – in the area of Corinth, Mississippi. He planned to strike swiftly at the Union Army and overwhelm it in one swift stroke. Actually, not a bad plan.

**ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSON** A graduate of West Point, and at the start of the war, a full colonel commanding the Second U.S. Cavalry in the west, General Johnson was considered by officers of both armies to be the best officer in the pre-war army. The South agreed and Johnson was one of the five full generals that Davis appointed at the beginning of the war – he was, in fact, the first named and, therefore, the most senior of the five [Joseph E. Johnston, Samuel Cooper, P.G.T. Beauregard, Joseph E. Johnston, and Robert E. Lee].

There are a number of fair biographies of this man. He was a good soldier and a respected leader at lower levels. But, he had no command experience with larger organizations such as a theater area command or a 40,000 man army. His handling of the Western Theater – see: Steven Woodworth's JEFFERSON DAVIS AND HIS GENERALS – was poor at best. In the strategic realm, he was hamstrung. Jefferson, as President, made all the decisions as to what strategy was followed. This put Johnson in a straight-jacket and limited his freedom of maneuver. With the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, General Johnson decided to take personal control of the situation, and to move against the Union army that was considered to be the closest and the most dangerous -- that of Major General Ulysses S. Grant.

After his victory at Fort Donelson, the then obscure Brigadier General U.S. Grant had been raised to the rank of Major General, and had concentrated his army of 33,000 men on the west bank of the Mississippi River at a place called Pittsburg Landing [See Map 2]. General Grant believed that the closest Confederate forces of any size were miles away and showing no signs of activity. The Union Army set up camp in and round the landing and awaited the 35,000 quick stepping reinforcements being sent to it in the person of Major General Don Carlos Buell and his army from Nashville.

V. **ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT** Unlike his Confederate counterpart, U.S. Grant did not come into the Civil War with a sterling reputation. In fact, far from it. A mediocre student at West Point, Grant garnered a good combat record in the Mexican War [two brevets for gallantry], but afterwards, his career went from bad to worse. In the 1850's,

he resigned his commission – he had a problem with alcohol. He moved from job to job. It was only the charity of his relatives that finally landed him a position as a clerk in a dry goods store in Galena, Illinois. In the meantime, Grant had married Julia Dent and started a family. When the war came, Grant was able to secure the command of a volunteer regiment, the 21<sup>st</sup> Illinois, and drilled it so well that he was quickly promoted to Brigadier General. In that capacity, he took a small army of several thousand men and attacked Confederate positions at Belmont, Kentucky. He won the battle after a fashion, and as a result, came to the favorable attention of the then theater commander, Major General Henry W. Halleck. As a result, he was given command of the army that moved upon Forts Henry and Donelson. As a soldier, Grant was nondescript in appearance. He did not radiate the dash and power of a George B. McClellan. In fact, it was hard to visualize him as anything more than a not too well dressed teamster.

At war, however, he proved to be very adept as his campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson proved. His unique reply to the Confederates at Fort Donelson galvanized the Union and brought the heretofore unknown General Grant to the attention of the President. Although they were not to physically meet until April, 1864, Lincoln began to follow Grant's career with interest. Lincoln had in mind a commander that could take the Union Army and execute the multiple attacks into the Confederacy that the Anaconda plan needed to be successful.

Grant after having been a very successful commander, was about to make some major mistakes that almost cost him the historical immortality that came from his commanding the Union armies to victory in the Civil War. There was something about the man that stirred people -- the face and eyes showed determination. Grant often displayed a certain stubbornness that few generals of his generation had. Anotherwards, Grant did not "spook" easily. His earlier performance in battle showed him to be a cool and a commander in full control of the situation. It was hard to believe that he could be so good in battle, yet do so poorly at about everything else he did. Before and after the war, he proved he was only in his element in battle. He was to be tested to the limit in this battle.

**VI. MOVEMENT TO BATTLE** The Confederates had two options. They could simply draw a new defensive line and fall in behind that line and wait for the Union army to move south and attack, or they could take the offensive. If anything, General Johnson was a man who believed in the offense. He ordered a concentration of all his readily available troops to form an army – that is, if you could call it an army. Most soldiers within the Confederate units at Corinth were eager enough for battle but without experience. Few had been in battle before. The various commanders of the divisions within the army had not worked together.

As his second in command, Johnson placed the intelligent but prickly Creole General P. G. T. Beauregard. It didn't take the Creole commander long to begin to undermine General Johnson and work to change his plans – because Beauregard did not believe they would work, and thought he knew best. As the Army started toward Pittsburg Landing, the troops were told to be absolutely quite. However, when one regiment spotted a lone chicken by the side of the road, they fired a full volley at it, and missed [there were a number of similar instances as the army moved closer to the Union position]. This mortified Johnston because he believed that the Union forces could not have missed all the firing. Actually, they did.

Grant had moved his headquarters about 20 miles upriver to a more comfortable plantation house, and left the army in its camps around Pittsburg Landing under the direction of his close friend, then Brigadier General William T. Sherman. Having little cavalry for reconnaissance, the Union forces were reduced to sending out an infantry regiment every morning to probe forward a few miles to see if they found anything.

The camps were supposed to be ringed by fortifications. Or, at least, that's what Grant expected to happen while he was gone upriver. However, being that the federals believed that no Confederate was within 50 miles, nothing had been done. The divisions of the army had been allowed to find and encamp where they wanted. Being situated near several creeks –the divisions settled down where they could easily find water. This, however, was not conducive for any type of defensive scheme Grant had wanted, and no entrenchments were dug.

The camps were made as comfortable, and the soldiers began to lose the edge that combat gives one on the firing line. Troops loll about and did only occasional training. The troops may have loved it, but not one knew that 40,000 Confederates were within just a few miles of their encampment [See Map 3]. Sherman and the other divisional commanders had made not one bit of preparation in case the Confederates attacked. This was to nearly destroy the Union Army in the coming battle for it was just his lack of unity in their placement of their divisions that General Johnson was about to exploit.

#### **VII. GENERAL JOHNSON'S PLAN [See Map 3]**

General Johnson's plan was a simple one. He intended to make his main attack along the right flank and drive the Union forces away from Pittsburg Landing and toward the waters of Owl Creek putting them in a cull-de-sac situation. In fact, it was on that flank that General Johnson was going to spend most of his time.

His second-in-command, General Beauregard did not believe that this plan would work, and he [Beauregard] began to change Johnson's plan even as the army marched toward the area of Shiloh Church.

#### **VIII. GENERAL SHERMAN IN CHARGE**

While Grant was 30 miles upriver at his own headquarters [See Map 2] near Savannah, Sherman had been left in charge of the army. The commanders, General Sherman included, did not believe they were in any danger, so the fatiguing duty of digging fortifications was not thought necessary. The divisions were so scattered about they could not easily support one another.

Most of the divisions' camps were fully set up with rows of white tents and all their equipment and considerable food in and around them. Most had their personal possessions scattered in their tents. This was to be an important reason for the lack of pursuit by the Confederates when they overran their outlying divisions. The Confederate soldiers, many of whom lacked all types of equipment and hadn't had a good meal for some time, stopped to forage rather than continue the fight, and this helped up a strong pursuit when was needed by the Southern Army.

When Sherman sent out a Missouri regiment on the day of the battle, it did so reluctantly. The soldiers moved out for a short few miles when it ran head on into the oncoming battle lines of the Confederate Army. The regiment rapidly fell back, skirmishing with the onrushing Confederates. The regiment's commander, a Colonel named Appler, went immediately to Sherman and babbled to him in hysterical tones that half the Confederate Army was there -- somewhat of an exaggeration but some people were saying that Lee's army was now composed of more than 100,000 men. Sherman was not inclined to believe this man because he [Sherman] thought him a coward, and when the Colonel persisted Sherman threatened to have him put under arrest. With that, the Colonel disappeared. When the attack occurred, and Sherman saw with his own eyes that the Colonel had been right, he exclaimed: "By god, we are attacked!"

#### **IX. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH – DAY ONE, 6 April 1862 [See Maps 4-6]**

The outlying divisions were quickly overrun with units not having any time to get into any type of battle formation. Without weapons, whole units dissolved in panic and began running toward Pittsburg Landing where they huddled in terror under the bluffs. If there is one division that deserved the thanks of the army it was that under the command of Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss. Further back than some of the others, Prentiss had the time to get his units into line, and his steady volleys brought the Confederate advance to a halt. Using this division as an anchor [center], Union units began to form on to either flank and a line of sorts developed. Since hundreds of Confederate soldiers stopped to plunder the Union camps, the momentum of the attack stopped.

General Johnston, whose original plan put much of his strength on the right flank chose to remain there, and oversee the battle. During the action, Johnston was apparently slightly wounded by either a bullet or a piece of shrapnel (he had led several charges, but seemed to be totally unharmed) which opened a major artery in his leg. As he rode around the battlefield, Johnston paid no attention to the wound, and after several hours, he collapsed due to loss of blood. His personal physician had been detached earlier to look after some federal wounded. So, when Johnston collapsed, the staff officers remaining with him did not know what to do, and when they found the blood in his high cavalry

boots, they did not know how to stop the flow of blood and General Albert S. Johnston quickly bled to death before a surgeon could be summoned.

With that, the direction of the army fell upon Beauregard who had been, in a sense, directing it from the beginning. However, the Creole general had problems. In organizing the army, Johnston had insisted in attacking in corps columns or one corps behind the other – three long lines which had, in the ensuing fighting, become so intermixed that it was nearly impossible to sort them out.

Union resistance had stiffened the closer the Confederates got to Pittsburg landing. Grant, who was upriver, quickly got his dispatch boat [the Tigress] under way and on the way down to his camps, and when he arrived, he saw hundreds of frightened men cowering under the bluffs of Pittsburg landing. He set his staff to rounding them up, and he [Grant] went off to assess the disaster. He found Sherman had cobbled together a rough line that the Confederates had not yet turned. If Grant's Army could hold out until dark, the first of General Buell's reinforcements would be arriving and the balance of the battle would fall back to the Union.

In fact, the division of Brigadier General William "Bull" Nelson had arrived on the opposite bank of the river, and was quickly ferried to the other bank where it quickly joined the battleline – in fact, Nelson, all 250 pounds of him, had pushed his way through the throngs of soldiers along the banks of the river yelling, "if you will not fight, then make way for men who will." They did. Other fresh troops were not far away.

The division of Major General Lew Wallace was quartered 10 miles distance from the other camps, and his division also marched in to reinforce, but a bit late as it took the wrong road and spent hours counter marching [Grant interpreted it another way, and never forgave Lew Wallace for not quickly coming to his aid, and Wallace spent the remainder of the war in backwater commands. After the war wrote the famous epic BEN HUR].

The commander of much of the forces on the left flank was Major General Braxton Bragg. He kept hurling his troops against the mass volley of the troops in the Hornet's Nest [Prentiss' division] with the admonition of "give'em the bayonet" even though his

eyes were telling him that the Confederate attacks were being blown to pieces by massed fire prior to their coming close enough to use them.

General Grant, having had some artillery experience in his earlier service, recognized the importance of having cannons to help stop the Confederate attacks. Using some heavy artillery that had been located near Pittsburg Landing, he set up a gun line of more than 50 artillery pieces along a small hill that ran inland from Pittsburg Landing nearly a half mile. Those guns continued firing during the latter part of the day, and well into night.

In addition, there were several Union gunboats in the Tennessee River opposite the landing when the battle began, and they immediately moved down the river to add the weight of their broadsides to the battle. Whether their heavy shells did any good, the reassuring booming of their cannon helped to restore confidence in the Union line and provide it with the strength to continue to fight.

General Beauregard was well in the rear near the Shiloh Church, and was feeding in new units as they arrived, and he used a group of young officers who were his “eyes and ears”, and they went over the battlefield to report all they saw, and the new commander of the army moved and shifted forces on that basis. As the Union strength grew, the Confederates weakened. No reserve was kept, and all the Confederate units were in the line at the end of the day whereas fresh union troops were arriving all the time. That night, over the shattered battlefield, a heavy rain began to fall, and Sherman and Grant sat under a tree to talk about the day’s events. General Sherman accurately pictured the first days fighting as a near disaster, and Grant thought for a moment, and replied quickly, “that’s true, but we’ll whip ’em tomorrow!”

## **X. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH - DAY TWO, 7 April 1862 [See Map 7]**

As night fell on 6 April, the Confederates were in a bad way. All their units were tired, and everything they could see and hear indicated that the Union army was being reinforced. There was no doubt that the Confederates now had to take up a defensive position and await the union attack.. As the morning dawned, Grant’s new line, now reinforced by nearly 30,000 fresh troops attacked.

The Beauregard, having assessed his position the night before, had already begun to put the army's trains in motion and move back toward Corinth. The Union forces met little resistance as Beauregard moved his army adroitly out of the reach . Given the Union losses and absence of cavalry, Grant did not pursue which angered General Helleck, and the Confederates were allowed to reach Corinth without being pressured. Recriminations on the Union side were fast in coming.

## **XI. THE AFTERMATH OF SHILOH**

The casualties at Shiloh were terrible. Although not large by Gettysburg or Chickamauga standards, the losses on both sides shook the nation. It didn't take long for the Union newspapers to brand Grant as the chief culprit in the disaster even though it was Sherman who almost brought the Union forces to ruin. Still, there were immediate calls for Grant's removal. Having remembered Grant's good work at Forts Henry and Donelson, Lincoln supported Grant – "I can't spare this man, he fights."

General Helleck quickly arrived on the scene with even more reinforcements until he had 110,000 men. It was only then that Helleck moved on Corinth. He did not with excessive caution—he moved only a few miles each day, and then in the early afternoon entrenched his entire army for defense, and then repeated the process each day.. It took more than a week to reach Corinth which the Confederates had already evacuated.

During the campaign to Corinth, Grant had been removed from effective command, and at the time, he thought that his career was over, but Lincoln soon got him restored to command of an army with the operational objective of seizing Vicksburg – the last impediment to the total control by the Union of the Mississippi River.

## **XII. THE STRATEGIC PROFIT AND LOSS**

Clearly, the South had now suffered nearly irreparable damage to its position. Most of Tennessee was now in the firm hands of the Union forces. Northern Mississippi was occupied by the federals and an attack on Vicksburg would certainly be the next objective of the Union.

The loss of Johnston was a blow, but not a mortal one at first. The commander left in charge was Beauregard. Although no Lee or Jackson, the Creole general was competent enough, but he and Jefferson Davis were mortal enemies, and it didn't take Davis long to shift Beauregard to duty in the Carolinas to be in charge of sea defense and to help raise more troops [it should be pointed out that Beauregard spent most of the war in Charleston, and was not brought back into direct command until the Wilderness Campaign when he successfully contained with almost no forces the 23,000 man army of Major General Benjamin Butler and bottled him [General Butler] up at Bermuda Hundred. That Butler was an incompetent does not diminish the good work that Beauregard did in this role and in the remainder of the war. Had he been in command of the Army of the Tennessee rather than Bragg, things might have been much different in the West for Beauregard was competent where Bragg was not.

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Steven Woodworth. JEFFERSON DAVIS AND HIS GENERALS

E. J. Warner. GENERALS IN GRAY

E. J. Warner. GENERALS IN BLUE

Shelby Foote. THE CIVIL WAR - A HISTORY

Bruce Catton. GRANT MOVES SOUTH

(NOTE: All of the above books are available in Fisher Library)

**STAFF RIDE**

**84TH CHEMICAL BATTALION  
U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL SCHOOL**

**THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN  
December 1862-July 1863**

**THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR  
Office of the Command Historian  
August 1996**

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## VICKSBURG -- THE TURNING OF THE TIDE IN THE CIVIL WAR

### Background to the Campaign:

The fate of Vicksburg was sealed, oddly enough, when President Jefferson Davis made the decision that the Confederacy would be defended throughout its entire length [see: Woodworth. Jefferson Davis and His Generals]. Rather than use the limited resources of the South in a positional defense to shield key areas and force the North to fight a war of attrition to win, Davis wanted to defend everywhere thus dissipating what strength the South had. He also picked the wrong commander to direct the opening moves of the war. If you remember in chess, the most important moves of the game are the opening moves.

When General Albert Sidney Johnson was appointed the Confederate commander in the West much was expected of him. Officers in both the Union and Confederate armies considered him to be the finest senior level commander in the pre-war Federal army. However, in Wiley Sword's Shiloh, Bloody April and also in the Woodworth book, the western front commander comes off as a vacillating individual whose talents were not up to the major responsibilities of theater command -- either at the tactical or strategical level or for that matter, command in battle..

Why else would the Confederates have so badly handled the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson. Take a look at a map [MAP A], the critical location of these two forts made them very useful for the very positional defense along critical avenues Davis should have adopted. General Johnson allowed local commanders to dally long enough for the Union to move in and seize these two forts with relatively little cost.

After Grant secured Fort Donelson in February, 1862, he paroled the Confederate garrison and moved his army to the vicinity of Pittsburgh Landing [see: James MacDonough. In Hell Before Night -- The Battle of Shiloh]. There, the army set up camps while Grant was to be reinforced by a 25,000 man Army of the Ohio commanded by Major General Don Carlos Buell. They had not yet arrived.

General A. S. Johnson realized that something would have to be done to force the Union back, so he assembled a army similar in size to that of Grant [about 40,000], and moved north from his base at Corinth, Mississippi to within just a few miles of Grant's camps without being detected. The Union army had no cavalry to provide any scouting forces, so the security of the camp was entrusted to individual regiments who sent out daily patrols which moved only a few miles outside of the camp.

Grant was not present himself. His headquarters was located 20 miles upriver at a water side plantation, and he commuted to the area of the camps by steamboat. Brigadier General William T. Sherman was in overall charge while Grant was away, and Johnson succeeded in totally surprising the Union Army at the battle named for a little church that happened to be within the battle area - Shiloh (see: James MacDonough -- In Hell, Before Night -- the Battle of Shiloh; Wiley Sword. Shiloh, Bloody April -- incidentally, the Church is still in use as a house of worship).

Although the Confederates made large initial gains, the disjointed nature of the Confederate command system tolerated by General Johnston broke down with individual commanders attacking when they wanted to, and the Confederates spent far too much time attempting to reduce a salient called the "Hornet's Nest" defended by the division commanded by Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlburt.

Grant rushed downstream to rally the lines along with Sherman, and he stabilized the front about half a mile from the landing itself by setting up a line of nearly 30 artillery pieces and rallying the disorganized infantry that had fought a stubborn delaying action most of the day. After darkness, Grant received the first units of Buell's Army of the Ohio.

The Union commander was confident, and believed he would "whip em, tomorrow, though". He should have been confident because his army was still largely intact [the Confederate soldiers stopped to loot the Union camps of their provisions, and left the battle line which took away valuable strength from Confederate attacks], and had also received 25,000 fresh reinforcements while the Confederate Army had received none.

General Johnson did not survive the battle, but bled to death because of what appeared to be a small cut but, in fact, was a severed artery. General P. G. T. Bureaugard took command,

and when Grant went over to the offensive the next day, the Confederate army gradually gave ground and retreated back to Corinth. The battle shook Grant to the core [it also shook the Union when the high cost of victory made the newspapers in long lists of dead and wound], and mortified his theater commander Major General Helleck, who quickly came out to the battlefield to assume command of the 100,000 man army he had assembled.. For a time, Grant was removed from command, and it looked like his career was over.

Abraham Lincoln, however, had seen something in the way Grant fought back from his setbacks during the battle, and eventually, Helleck was moved to Washington, and Grant once again back in command of an army. Grant was criticized by members of Lincoln's own cabinet, but the President said that he could not spare Grant because ". . . he fights."

He moved quickly to finish the job by attacking and seizing Iuka and Corinth [see: Shelby Foote. The Civil War: A Narrative and Fletcher Pratt. Ordeal by Fire - A Short History of the Civil War]. The problem was that the Confederate Army got away. Although angry at the leaving of a road unguarded over which the Confederates marched away, Grant had much to be happy about. He had a large army, ample supplies, and he could now move to finish part two of the Anaconda Plan.

### **The Anaconda Plan**

What emerges from a study of the early years of the war is that neither the Union nor the Confederacy really developed a way to end the war [See: James MacDonough. Battle Cry of Freedom]. Today, the end strategy of a conflict is still a lost art as the end of Operation DESERT STORM has shown. Jefferson Davis was thinking solely in terms of defending the borders of his new nation. No offensive operations were planned.

The North, upon whom the operational imperative of the offensive was paramount, could think of nothing more original than the "On to Richmond" campaign strategy. Lincoln knew better. He did not come to the office of President with a thorough grasp of military strategy, but he did possess a keen and adaptive mind. This he put to good use listening to the thoughts of anyone -- especially, military -- who offered them. The Army Commander-in-Chief, General Winfield Scott had been an excellent militia general during the War of 1812. Although old and

infirm, and often senile, Scott's mind evolved the plan that would, in 1865, bring victory to the North. He conceived it in three parts:

- a. A tight blockade of the southern coastline -- a distance of more than 2,500 miles.
- b. Total control of the Mississippi River
- c. A multiple-army assault into the heart of the Confederacy to finally strangle the life out of the Rebels.

The tight blockade of the South took its full effect in early 1863. Effective control of the Mississippi would fall to the Union if Grant could take Vicksburg. It was the one remaining fort on the river still in Confederate hands. The loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the Battle of Shiloh had given the North control of the river well into Mississippi, and the fall of New Orleans very early in the first year of the war gave the North control nearly up to the level of Vicksburg. If Grant prevailed, then the Mississippi would be under control throughout its length.

The Union forces had superior naval assets to control the river. In addition, loss of the river would cut off large parts of Louisiana and the entire state of Texas. The Confederates had been drawing considerable supplies through that area. In an agreement with Mexico which was then controlled by the French Army of Napoleon III, foreign shipping unloaded cargoes destined for the Confederacy at the Mexican port of Matamoros, and it was then shipped into Texas and then further east [see: Samuel Flagg Bemis. A Diplomatic History of the American People]. The Union Navy could then do nothing about it and the Union government was not militarily strong enough to threaten the French.

The third leg of the plan would not be accomplished until the summer of 1865 when more than four separate Union armies began movements into what remained of the South. This would not have been possible had Grant failed at Vicksburg.

### **Grant's First Attempts [See MAPS B and D]**

Given the difficulties of approaching Vicksburg, Grant had no choice but to approach the city from the North using both banks of the Mississippi, and his naval assets. General Pemberton

moved his forces out of Vicksburg to the North and began to threaten Grant's movements. The Union army was far larger than that available to Pemberton, so Grant could split his army into two parts with himself in command of one part, and Sherman the other. In November, 1862 Grant moved from his base at Grant Junction with an army approaching 40,000 to Pemberton's 22,000. On his move South, Grant established his main army forward supply base at Holly Springs, Mississippi, and continued on. Like many Federal commanders, Grant understood the importance of having a strong and robust supply system. Although Mississippi was a heavily agricultural state, it was not densely populated, and therefore, the army could not live off the land on its way south. It needed supplies and had to keep them close at hand. Hence his forward supply base. Grant moved across the Tallahatchie River (yes, the same river made famous by Jeannie C. Riley) while Pemberton fell back on Grenada, Mississippi.

If anything, General Pemberton was a man who knew his numbers, and with a much smaller army, he could do little but fight a delaying action. He requested reinforcements from Davis, and the President came visiting to see what was going on for himself. Always a military man, Davis could easily see that to prevail against Grant on this front, Pemberton would need to be substantially reinforced. Davis ordered the Army of the Tennessee under Braxton Bragg to send a 10,000 man division. Bragg was then holding Murfreesboro, and would soon fight the Battle of Stone's River against Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland.

Grant also launched a cavalry ride of 1,000 men commanded by Colonel Benjamin Grierson into the heart of Confederate Mississippi. The cavalry column was to move due south from Grand Junction and destroy and harass Confederate logistical units. This the force did, and that helped to draw off Confederate cavalry that might be used to harass Grant's Army. Rather than attempt to return to Grand Junction, Grierson simply marched his force south to New Orleans and linked up with Union forces there. As a raid, it did little to alter the course of the conflict, but it made for some very "scare" Confederates.

Before these much needed reinforcements arrived, the situation was drastically altered by an application of one of the south's most used strategy -- some historians have called it the "raiding strategy". Basically, this strategy called for cavalry forays by strong columns into the

Federal rear to destroy the logistical support structure, and force the Union army to move back closer to its permanent supply lines -- that is, out of the South.

At dawn on 20 December, Major General Earl Van Dorn at the head of 3,500 cavalry began a raid by swooping down on the major Union Depot at Holly Spring. The commander of the depot, a luckless regimental commander named Colonel Murphy, had been warned by telegraph that Confederate cavalry were on the move, and that he had better be prepared for a possible raid. This, however, he did not do, and went to bed on the 19th fully believing that he was safe. Early on the morning of the 20th of December, he was rudely awakened by one of Van Dorn's cavalry troopers as the Confederates were in the process of destroying nearly \$2,000,000 worth of Union supplies -- they also took quite a great deal of supplies with them that they could carry.

When Grant heard the news, Fletcher Pratt in his Ordeal by Fire notes that Grant bit a cigar in two. To say he was angry was an understatement. Colonel Murphy was, of course, court-martialed and cashiered from the Army for not doing his duty, but the fact remained that Grant's army was deep in Southern territory without any visible means of support. He would have to return to his supply lines. To add insult to injury, Nathan Bedford Forrest was also busy as he attacked a major Union support base at Jackson, Tennessee. This further dried up Grant's supply lines. He [Forrest] also tore up miles of track which would take the Union weeks to replace. Grant returned by stages to Grand Junction, and sent telegraphs to Washington asking for replacement supplies so he could begin again.

Secretary of War Stanton, at this stage no friend of Grant, complained of laxness at Grant's headquarters, and was slow in replacing the supplies burned by the Confederate raiders. Not only did Grant have problems with the Confederates but with his own administration and command system.

Major General John A. McClernand was a powerful politician from Illinois with a powerful ego and belief in his own very limited abilities. This individual had journeyed to Washington to see Lincoln, and offered, on his own initiative, to raise an army of Illinois regiments and march down to Vicksburg and take it. The President could not at that time afford to alienate so

powerful a political force, so he told McClelland to go right ahead, but Lincoln told no one including the man most interested in this turn of events -- U.S. Grant.

The Union commander soon learned of this, and sent Lincoln a telegram asking for clarification. The President, having knowledge of McClelland's lack of military ability, had no intention of replacing one of his then few fighting generals.

Grant and Sherman pulled a "fast one" on McClelland. When his horde of recruits arrived at Memphis, Grant ordered Sherman to march them south before McClelland could arrive. On December 27th, Sherman assaulted Chickasaw Bluffs one of the chain of fortified localities on the fringes of Vicksburg. The assault cost Sherman nearly 2,000 men, and the Confederates hardly suffered any casualties at all.

Sherman did not then know Grant had begun to pull back to Grand Junction, and that he was not only alone in enemy territory, but that Pemberton had now brought his army back to near Vicksburg and could concentrate against him. At this point, McClelland came down to take command of "his" army, and proceeded to alienate most of his subordinates. However, he did manage to orchestrate an attack on Fort Hindman, and as a result, added 5,000 more Confederates to the "bag" of prisoners. Sherman and the Navy Commander, then Captain David D. Porter were so angry at McClelland that they wrote back channel to Grant telling him that things were coming to a head.

This stirred Grant into action, and he paid a quick visit. Normally Sam Grant was the meekest of men and very self-effacing, but he was, in general, a good judge of military people, and he quickly judged McClelland to be an "idiot" and that Sherman and Porter had been right. Grant then exercised his "ace in the hole" [that is, Lincoln's assurance he [Grant] commanded here and not McClelland] and took command over both Union forces. McClelland went into a towering rage and departed muttering "blood thirsty promises". At least, his departure marked his last appearance in any capacity during the war which was, in retrospect, a blessing in disguise for the Union.

General Grant then decided to move against Vicksburg from the West in direct command of his enlarged forces. Grant moved his forces to a new base at Milliken's Bend where he organized his now 60,000 man force into three equal corps commanded by Sherman, McClelland

[he leaves, of course, very quickly because he thought he was to be the supreme commander and not a subordinate] and James B. McPherson [See MAP D].

Grant's second attempt at Vicksburg would revolve around the Desoto Canal. This offered a way to "bypass" Vicksburg without every having to fight for it, and render the fortress moot. In fact, it was Lincoln that had first pointed out the obvious -- that there existed a possible way using the canal and the chain of lakes and bayous in the Mississippi. All that had to be done was to join them with a new and larger canal.

For weeks Union troops attempted to find and build their way past Vicksburg, but they were defeated not by the Confederates but by "mother nature". Rain, mud, and swamps were bad enough, but the living conditions in this areas cause considerable sickness and suffering among the troops with a natural drop in morale. This was simply not feasible, and when finally the way was blocked by terrain conditions that could not be overcome, Grant dropped his second attempt against Vicksburg. He would now make a third attempt as he returned to his first view. The best way to take the fortress was to attack from the east. The problem was how to get there, and Grant eventually developed one of the more daring plans in U.S. military history. It was, perhaps, that it was so daring, that it was, in the end, quite successful.

### **Grant's Gamble**

Grant and Sherman had been looking at Vicksburg for nearly nine months, and had not yet managed to crack the fortress. Every attack had been for one reason or another thwarted. Now Grant decided to use what Liddell-Hart has called the "indirect approach". His plan was simple as it was daring [SEE MAP C].

Part one of the plan called for Admiral Porter's Union fleet to run the gauntlet of Confederate batteries, and move down the river to the town of Bruinsburg. A significant part of the army under Grant would march down the west bank of the river avoiding the Confederate fortifications at Grant Gulf, and cross at Bruinsburg. A smaller part of the army would be left to occupy the attention of the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. Once on the east bank of the river, Grant would move directly on Jackson, Mississippi. There was a railway that ran directly from Jackson to Vicksburg, and Grant then intended to move on Vicksburg from that direction.

There was a small Confederate Army in Jackson commanded by General Joseph E. Johnson who was supposed to be coordinating the defense of the area. This army would not cause Grant any trouble, but his plan called for the movement of his forces deep into enemy country, and away from their lines of supply. Grant was determined to live off the countryside. If Grant was pinned down anywhere along his line of march, he might be forced into a quick surrender.

On the night of 16-17 April 1863, the Union fleet ran the gauntlet of Confederate batteries at Vicksburg and passed south of the Fortress without significant loss. Union ships then ferried Grant's 43,000 men to the East bank of the river on 30 April, and they began marching toward Raymond. Sherman playing his part in the deception, demonstrated North of Vicksburg to "freeze" the Confederates and keep Pemberton's Army safely in Vicksburg while Grant gained his rear. At Raymond, Mississippi Grant ran into a Confederate force of 7,000 that had been sent to check out the possibility of Union troops in the area. The lead division of Grant's force easily routed the Confederates. This alerted the Confederates at Vicksburg, but by then, Grant was almost at the state capital at Jackson, forcing the much smaller army of Joe Johnson to move east.

The Union army then proceeded down the rail line toward Vicksburg. At Champion's Hill [SEE MAP C] on 16 May, 1863, Grant's army met up with Pemberton's. The Confederates had set up a defensive position along the low hill mass to the right of the roadway, and it was, surprisingly, this position that was attacked and carried by Grant's forces after a hard fight. With his left flank collapsing, Pemberton ordered a retreat to the Black River, where his army, now thoroughly demoralized, set up a defense. Grant again attacked quickly on May 17th, and overwhelmed the smaller Confederates, and sent them into their fortifications at Vicksburg [See MAP D].

In his Memoirs, Grant regretted ordering two assaults. One was at Cold Harbor in the summer of 1864, and the other was the assault he ordered to take the fortress on both the 19th and 22nd of May. After about 45 minutes on 22 May Grant called off the assault because Union casualties were so heavy -- they eventually totaled 7,000 -- and no gains were being made. The fort's defenses were too strong. The Union then settled into a siege operation, and began to dig parallels. Shelling from mortar boats in the Mississippi continued unabated.

General Pemberton had made two great errors. First, he had allowed Grant to pin his army into Vicksburg, and he had not withdrawn the civilian population of the town. Nor for that matter had he stockpiled food for a long siege. It didn't take Grant long to discover this fact, and to know that it was only a matter of time before the Confederates would have either to surrender to him or attempt a breakout.

There was consternation in Richmond over this as there should have been. Davis attempted to direct operations through Johnson, and also reinforced him, but not enough to attempt to break the Union siege -- at least, on the land side. Johnson simply would not take the aggressive action necessary to do so. The Confederates launched cavalry raids in an attempt to destroy Union supplies and force Grant to retreat, but this time Grant was ready, and his supply lines were well defended, and could not be disrupted.

Within just weeks of the onset of the siege, rations were short in Vicksburg. Most people had taken to living in bombproof shelters, and the two sides had settled down to mining and sniping operations. This siege was also the first use of grenades and both sides pitched them at one another over just 20 or 30 feet that often separated them from each other. Day after day, this continued.

Pemberton eventually polled his commanders to see if they favored a breakout. All indicated that they thought their men were too weak from lack of food to make the attempt, and that surrender was the only option. Although Davis wanted the fort held, Pemberton had no choice because his army and the civilians it protected faced immanent starvation. He asked Grant for terms. This was a different situation than Donelson when Grant offered none by "unconditional surrender." He dealt more easily with Pemberton and the Confederate army laid down its arms after a siege of but 48 days, and the Union provided immediate food while the protocols of exchanges were laid out. A 30,000 man Confederate Army had been removed from the war for months. The Union now controlled the Mississippi through its entire length. The effect on southern morale and the strategical situation cannot be underestimated.

Although he could have done more, Pemberton was a semi-tragic figure as he would never be allowed another command for the rest of the war. Many in the south thought that because of his northern background, he had surrendered Vicksburg much too early. This he did not, but no

one would serve under him, and although a personal friend of Davis, the President could not find him any gainful employment.

Coupled with Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, these twin disasters set the tone for the South for the rest of the war. Some historians believe that at this point -- July, 1863, it was downhill for the Confederacy to defeat.

## **THE COMMANDERS**

### **NORTH**

The Union commander was an individual who was successful ONLY as a soldier. Ulysses S. Grant had been a failure all his life at anything he undertook outside of the Army. When he arrived at West Point, his given name was Hiram Ulysses Grant. Since he cared little for the initials HUG, he changed his name to Ulysses S. Grant.

As a cadet at the military academy, he complied what could charitably be described as a mediocre student. He nearly was separated from the academy because of excessive demerits, and he ranked very low in his class. His only really good subject was horsemanship. He was commissioned in the Infantry which in those days meant an officer could be considered as intellectually deficient -- the best went to the Engineer Corps as did McClellan and Lee.

Grant's service as a soldier in the Mexican War was excellent. He was breveted several times for gallantry and for taking initiative in battle. But, after the war, he spent nearly a decade in the doldrums of the peacetime army. He also developed a fondness for the bottle, and it was this drinking problem that finally forced him to resign his commission.

He then took up a series of dead-end jobs, and did none well. In fact, just before the war, he was reduced to living (as was his wife Julia Dent and his sons) on the generosity of his relatives and clerking in a store. He wasn't all that good doing this relatively simple job. When the war began, his family's friend, Congressman Elihu B. Washburne got Grant a commission as the Colonel of the 21st Illinois Infantry Regiment. At drilling and preparing troops Grant excelled, and made the regiment into a fine outfit. This was noticed, and it didn't take Grant long to secure

a commission as a Brigadier General, and command of a small Army which fights a disorganized Confederate force at a little known battle called Belmont.

This brought him to the attention of Lincoln, and Grant got greater forces for the most important effort of the war -- the attack on Forts Henry and Donelson. Grant was a good commander, but he benefited greatly from the poor coordination of defense orchestrated by General A. S. Johnston and his subordinates. For little effort, Grant took both forts, and made his name a household word in the North with his famous "unconditional surrender" proposal at Fort Donelson. The fact that his initials U.S. also stood for "unconditional surrender" did not hurt his popularity. Grant then went on to Shiloh.

As a person, Grant was surprisingly meek. In fact, he was so careless of dress that one might think him a private soldier or one of the army's teamsters. He cared little for pomp and spit and polish. He relished a fight, and during the battle of Shiloh, displayed a singular coolness under fire. After the battle, it looked like his career might be over, but Lincoln realized that he had found a general who would fight if given the opportunity. Since Lincoln was then dealing with the somewhat timid McClellan, Grant was a refreshing change.

In addition to battlefield bravery, Grant had an uncommonly great gift of reducing the complexities of tactics to simple actions, and he also had the ability to pick good subordinates. He saw capabilities in both Sherman and McPherson, and saw to it that they were promoted. He developed a military family, the most important member of whom was then Lt. Colonel Rawlings. It was Rawlings who kept Grant out of trouble, on good relations with the press, and off the bottle. During the weeks and months of hammering at Vicksburg, Grant began to despair, and there is at least one time where historians believe that Grant got some liquor and got deeply drunk. He took off riding down one of the bayous at breakneck speed and his horse threw him. Although not seriously injured, Grant's experience was sobering one, and he never again touched liquor.

If anything, Grant had a single minded determination to take Vicksburg, but the intellectual flexibility to weigh each potential avenue, and take the one that offered him the best chance of success. When Grant took Vicksburg and then relieved Chattanooga, Lincoln knew he had found the overall commander he needed to finish the third leg of the Anaconda and he and

Grant worked so well in tandem that one would have thought they were brothers. The president supported Grant without reservation, and did not interfere at all in Grant's handling of the war. Grant, of course, returned that loyalty.

The general was not without his faults. He tended to be too trusting to those he liked, and his tactical flexibility was not that good in the Wilderness. His actions often cost more lives than they should, but he did display occasional brilliance as his attack on Petersburg attests.

Make no mistake, Grant could be ruthless to those who failed him. When General Granger spent more time serving a gun than in directing his forces, Grant saw to it that Granger was sidelined for the rest of the war. When Major General Warren failed late in the war, Grant relieved him even though Grant had great feeling of friendship for Warren. Some historians believe that Grant waited far too long to deal with Warren when the man's "combat fatigue" had become evident to all.

## **SOUTH**

Lt. General John C. Pemberton entered Confederate service with one strike against him. He was a Northerner who had married a southern lady and moved to the South. Like those of southern background in the Union forces [i.e., Farragut and Thomas] he was not trusted, but because he was a close friend of President Davis, he was rapidly raised in rank without showing what he could really do -- something that would never have happened in Lee's army.

Pemberton was moved from division command to an area command over the heads of some "southern" generals senior to him, and this raised eyebrows. What eventually overcame Pemberton was not altogether his fault. First, President Davis insisted on being a true CINC and made an attempt to micromanage the fight from Richmond. Secondly, Pemberton was normally outnumbered, and he was up against one of the better Northern generals. Remember, throughout the war until Grant came east, Lee fought a succession of less than adequate Union generals.

The Confederate command structure in the west was poor as Woodworth in his Jefferson Davis and His Generals clearly demonstrates. The theater commander over Pemberton was General Joseph E. Johnson who was not only an enemy of Jefferson Davis, but so cautious as to make him useless to a military force that needs to take the offensive.

Vicksburg was the focal point of Pemberton's efforts, but in truth, he was not given the assets he needed to defend the fortress, nor was there any reasonable effort made to mount a rescue operations. Pemberton, himself, made several serious mistakes. He failed to see his vulnerability to attack from the east, and Grant's movement South. When he finally woke up to that fact, Grant was already well on his way to Raymond and Jackson, and Pemberton's efforts were disjoined and not those of a man in command of the situation.

He did not evacuate the city, nor prepare the fortress properly for a siege. He based this inactivity on the fact that he believed even if Grant shut him up in Vicksburg, forces would come to his aid. That might have eventually happened, but without the proper amount of food and other logistical supplies within the city, he could not, and did not withstand a siege of any length. Some sieges in the Middle Ages lasted for years and Pemberton's for only 48 days.

When he was paroled back into active service, President Davis tried to get for him an active assignment, but because of the surrender of Vicksburg, none in the South would trust him and no commanders would serve under him. After Chickamauga, Davis brought Pemberton with him and attempted to get him Hill's old corps, but in talks with the commanders, he learned that none would trust Pemberton, and would not serve under him. The luckless transplanted Northerner spent the rest of the war in administrative assignments -- a man more sinned against than sinning, but an example of what happens to a commander who fails at his moment in history. Grant did not fail.

## **STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN**

It was not that the Confederates misunderstood the critical position of Vicksburg. They understood it all too well. Understanding and doing something about it are two different things. Part of the fault lies with Davis' command arrangements. He ran things from Richmond, and the commanders in the field felt constrained by the micromanaging tendency of the Confederate President. His command structure used a theater commander -- in effect, Joe Johnson -- even though Pemberton was to be in charge of the area.

When Grant finally moved south and then east, Davis did not direct reinforcements, nor did he force Johnson into some offensive actions to relieve pressure on Vicksburg. The lack of

manpower caused the Confederates problems. Lee was locked in combat with the Army of the Potomac, and Bragg was unable to help as he was opposing Rosecrans in Tennessee. There were no substantial reinforcements available to attack Grant.

Pemberton also has to shoulder a part of the blame. He did not act decisively when he could have, nor was he watchful for the very move that Grant made against him. The Confederate commander was not thinking in two dimensions. He reacted way too late when the situation could have been saved by both resolute and aggressive action. He also did not evacuate Vicksburg to prepare it for a protracted siege.

General Joe Johnson did nothing except to muddy the situation. His lack of resolution exceeded that of General Pemberton. Resolute generals like Forrest and Patrick Cleburne would have made a difference in a similar situation, but they were never given the type of command that would have allowed them to use their considerable abilities to the fullest [neither General was a West Point graduate, and Forrest was semi-literate and Cleburne had written the "Cleburne Memorial" which advocated freeing slaves to fight for the Confederacy].

General Grant deserves a considerable amount of credit for his steadfastness in taking Vicksburg. Other generals would have given up, but there was a considerable streak of both stubbornness and toughness in the character of "Sam" Grant. These characteristics served him well for the duration of the operation. Although President Lincoln was sympathetic, Grant was under continual strain from pressure from Washington and Major General Henry W. Halleck, the Chief of Staff. Newspapers were hammering on the theme that "why had Vicksburg not fallen?"

For weeks Grant and his army had attempted nearly every type of maneuver and action to either get past Vicksburg by building a new channel or by a direct assault as at Chickasaw Bluffs. None had succeeded. By "hook or by crook" the Confederates had thwarted Grant's every move. In John Ford's movie "The Horse Soldiers", there is a meeting between John Wayne playing the part of the actual cavalry commander, Colonel Benjamin Grierson, and Grant and "Cump" Sherman.

The actor playing Grant describes the situation he faced at Vicksburg exactly. Had Vicksburg not fallen when it did, the war could have dragged on for some time longer, and if so, would have sapped Union morale to the point where it might have failed and dictated a separation

on the U.S. into two separate countries. Lincoln was most anxious for some type of victory because in 1864 he was facing re-election..

From a tactical perspective, there isn't that much in this campaign. It is really a strategical gem on the part of Grant. The Confederate command system was so flawed that it allowed Grant to engage in the "indirect approach" [as coined by B. H. Liddell-Hart in his book entitled Strategy] with ease, and to invest the city. The Battles of Raymond, Champion's Hill, and Black River were simple straight ahead actions without any attempt for tactical or battlefield ingenuity.

It must be remembered that Vicksburg was a JOINT operation and involved direct cooperation with the Union Navy. In fact, the investing of Vicksburg could never have been carried out without the support and help of the Federal naval forces under Flag Officer (Admiral) David D. Porter. Few historians have really gotten into the joint aspects of the war, but the Union employed it well. Since the Confederacy had no real navy, their use of it was severely limited. The Union Army and the Navy got along generally well enough to execute any of the many types of joint operations during the Civil War.

For example, take the fall of New Orleans in 1862. The Union Navy under Admiral Farragutt forced its way past the two major forts [Forts Jackson and St. Philip] that defended New Orleans. Once the Navy passed the forts, their relevance to the tactical situation ended. Army forces under Major General Benjamin Butler were then landed and moved overland past the forts which quickly surrendered.

In the same year, the North mounted several amphibious assaults along the North Carolina Coast to seize bases for blockading Union forces [i.e., New Bern, North Carolina]. These joint operations contributed greatly to the Union's ability to prosecute the war. The joint aspect of the war reached its culmination with the successful landings by the Union army and seizure of Fort Fisher which closed the last remaining port open to Confederate blockade runners -- Wilmington, North Carolina.

Along the rivers of the South, the Union Navy and Army also had close cooperation. Major General John Pope combined with a naval squadron to seize the important fortification of Island No. 10 [this operation, for which the Navy deserved the bigger share of the credit, got Lincoln's attention and got Pope a major command in the East]. Grant used a fleet of Eads

ironclads under Flag Officer (Admiral) Henry Foote to seize Forts Henry and Donelson [it should be pointed out that Fort Henry was abandoned without much of a fight by the Confederates after a bombardment by the Navy, but when Foote's squadron approached Donelson, it was shot to pieces by the heavy firepower of the fort and Foote was wounded -- a wound that later caused his death]. He could not have done so without the assistance of Foote's naval vessels.

It was the Union Navy that helped to transport supplies to Grant's army during the siege of Vicksburg, and its mortar boats helped to provide nearly continuous bombardment of the city during the 48 days of siege. Union gunboats also patrolled the river above and below the fortress to insure that no Confederate reinforcements reach the fort from any Rebel army west of the Mississippi.

As a cadet at West Point, General Grant studied many of the campaigns of history that would have been useful to plan his final moves against Vicksburg. The Duke of Wellington's campaigns in Spain have much of the same flavor and daring as Grant's moves against Vicksburg. Napoleon's Italian campaigns particularly with regard to his investment of the Austrian fortress of Mantua were also instructive. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul and, in particular, his siege of Alesia when he fought Vercingetorix.

The Union general was to execute a similar operation in 1864 when he changed his base from the lines around Richmond at Cold Harbor, and moved against the critical rail junction town of Petersburg. In so doing, his engineers built the longest bridge in corps history -- over 2,500 yards long. Only critical errors by those in his leading units kept Grant from realizing his operational objectives [see: Richard K. Sommers. Richmond Redeemed: The Siege of Petersburg] and forcing Lee to leave the Richmond fortifications and fight him in the open or give up the city and move into North Carolina.

The planners for OPERATION DESERT STORM used the Vicksburg for the matrix they needed to begin their planning. If you look at DESERT STORM, it does bear some resemblance to Vicksburg and Grant's movement away from his base to flank and take the fortress from its landward side just as the Allied forces did when they moved out into the desert to flank the Iraqi fortifications in Kuwait. The SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) at Leavenworth

insures that its students -- the pick of each year's C&GSC Class -- are given a very firm grounding in the history of military campaigns and battles. You can see why.

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